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SUMMARY 
Touche Ross & Co. has long been concerned about the responsibilities of auditors. We 
believe our record indicates a continuing awareness of current developments, and a willing-
ness to step up to needed improvements in auditing standards and procedures well before it has 
been possible for professional consensus to be reached. 
We are substantially in agreement with the Commission's recommendations. Though there 
are certain matters with which we disagree or believe need further  study, we want to compli-
ment the Commission on an extraordinarily thorough coverage of the auditing profession, 
never before accomplished. 
Admittedly, there is a considerable built-in reluctance — not in a little way related to liability 
exposure — which causes the auditing profession to slowly evolve, rather than make revolu-
tionary changes. Therefore,  it is good that the Commission gave so many ideas to us at once, to 
focus our attention on a combination of concerns which we otherwise tend to deal with 
individually. Experience shows that fractionalized standards are difficult  to write and to explain 
in context to professional staff.  To the extent that the Commission's actions wil l make progress 
less traumatic, we have a vital interest in these deliberations. 
There are a few overriding observations we think should be made at this time: 
1. Even though certain conclusions of the Commission seem desirable, we may disa-
gree about whether conditions exist, at least in the seriousness suggested by the 
Commission, so as to mandate the adoption of a recommendation. 
2. Many of the Commission's recommendations have a flavor of social desirability in 
them. Care must be taken that the auditing profession is not asked to provide 
assurance beyond its attainability. While auditors may have to learn additional 
disciplines to accomplish some of the recommendations, we are in favor of such an 
extension of expertise so long as it has a reasonable relationship to the fundamental 
social position appropriately occupied by the auditing profession. We may be going 
too far afield to sweep, into the assurances given to financial statement users, a 
coverage of other disciplines such as law, actuarial science, geology, appraising and 
so on. 
3. Although we do not intend to overstress this problem, we believe that the litigious 
environment is serious, and despite the reasonableness of some of the Commission's 
suggestions, implementation may not be practical without liability relief  — at least 
temporarily, as through the safe harbors recommended by the Commission. We 
would prefer,  instead of safe harbors, or in addition to them, that much clearer 
standards be written, but we are not prepared at this time to offer  detailed alterna-
tives. In any event, something more than "reasonable and proper" or "due profes-
sional care" is needed for the underlying standard. 
4. Many of the Commission's recommendations wil l carry a significant cost with them. 
We, too, do not know how to approach this except on a recommendation by 
recommendation basis, but we urge experimentation, perhaps in stages, before a 
final determination of the need for auditor involvement is made. 
5. There appears to us to be a fundamental thought in the Commission's recommenda-
tions that corporate audit committees have the ultimate responsibility for client 
integrity and accountability. Indirectly, the Commission may have ordained many of 
the duties of audit committees without really addressing whether their members may 
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reasonably be able to perform all that is asked of them. In general, we agree that 
directors should have these responsibilities, but provisions must be made for provid-
ing advice and counsel to such persons. As we see it, their expertise wil l even have to 
be broader in concept than that of the independent auditor. The synthesis of a good 
audit committee member would include accounting, auditing, law, business man-
agement, finance and considerable prudence. It is doubtful that a sufficient  number 
of individuals maintaining these skills and disciplines — especially through service in 
their own organizations — would be available to fill the audit committee needs 
throughout the United States. Further inquiry needs to be made into this subject. 
6. A large proportion of the recommendations apply to publicly held companies, and 
might very well be impracticable for smaller, privately held companies. As there is a 
debate on "big GAAP" vs. "little GAAP," one could envision a debate on "big 
GAAS" vs. "little GAAS." That, however, may not be the issue. Auditing standards — 
those inscribed almost thirty years ago — should be invariable regardless of the 
audited entity's size. Procedures — and by that we mean interpretations of the basic 
auditing standards which are most often promulgated in statements on auditing 
standards — might possibly be variable, particularly where a procedure is required of 
the auditor because of its social significance to absentee owners. 
7. Underlying many of the Commission's recommendations is the thought that the 
auditor is a reporter on financial information, not its originator. This should be 
emphasized. If that message can be communicated to the public and if the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board can achieve adoption of one of its tentatively stated 
objectives of financial statements — that financial statements are designed for 
investors and creditors having a reasonable understanding of financial accounting 
and reporting and a willingness to take the time necessary to study financial reports 
— we might be able to close another gap. Perhaps a user of audited financial 
statements should also be expected to have a reasonable knowledge of auditing 
standards in order to understand the degree of reliance he may (or may not) place on 
the auditor's association with financial information. 
8. The release of the Commission's Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  somewhat coin-
cided with the Metcalf Staff  hearings, undoubtedly adding a greater degree of finality 
to the Commission's conclusions than might otherwise have been the case. 
We are particularly concerned that corporate management and audit committee 
members may not have given full recognition to the impact of the Commission's 
recommendations, especially from a cost standpoint — both fees as well as time of 
company management and personnel — and we hope that the Commission encour-
ages additional participation, even after the issuance of its finalized report. 
Highlighted in the remainder of this summary are comments on individual sections of the 
report. 
Section 2 — Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations 
We totally agree with the Commission that the word "fairly" should be eliminated from the 
auditor's report as we think it can no longer be successfully defined. But it appears to us that the 
Commission's recommendations about selecting among alternatives need further  study: 
1. Though we agree that auditors should make an evaluation of the cumulative effect  of 
management's judgment on the selection of accounting principles, we think that the 
issue is one of defining substance, the focal point of the Commission's recommenda-
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tion. Until the FASB specifies financial statement objectives and a conceptual 
framework,  it is not possible to be unequivocally responsible for assessing substan-
tive compliance with promulgated accounting standards. 
2. After  circumstances are considered, there are not that many free choice alternatives. 
In any event, standards for evaluating the cumulative effect  must be promulgated for 
those restricted instances. 
Section 3 — Reporting on Significant Uncertainties in Financial Presentations 
While we agree that auditors' reports should not be qualified for uncertainties — even where 
a "going concern" question is involved — we are concerned that the adequacy of disclosure of 
uncertainties could be as difficult  to evaluate as it presently is in deciding when to apply a 
qualified opinion. 
In this regard, the FASB should be encouraged to lift out of its broad conceptual framework 
project the issue of ordering financial statement disclosures according to their degree of 
factuality vs. interpretation. Naturally, information on uncertainties would tend highly to the 
interpretive. 
Section 4 — Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud 
The Commission recommends that "the auditor should be concerned with all controls that 
have a significant bearing on the prevention and detection of fraud." We agree that auditors 
have an obligation to search for fraud. We think that an alertness to its possibility is essential 
and will, in combination with other Commission recommendations, raise the auditor's discov-
ery rate substantially. We point out that SAS No. 16 calls for the auditor to plan his examination 
so that he can give reasonable assurance the financial statements are not materially affected  by 
errors or irregularities. Even though less than material fraud could be discovered during the 
audit by this planning approach, we ask that the Commission reconsider whether the auditor 
should change his planning process; to require the auditor to study and evaluate all "controls 
that have a significant bearing on the prevention and detection of fraud" could seriously affect 
the economics of auditing because: 
— Requiring a review of all internal control systems when there is a more economical 
means to substantively audit the area could eliminate the auditor's prerogative of 
testing, both as to quantity and design; and 
— It is not feasible to create internal control systems providing virtually absolute 
assurance against management or collusive fraud. 
Section 5 — Corporate Accountability and the Law 
It is essential that there be a clear specification of those illegal or questionable acts for which 
the auditor has to search. Furthermore, materiality standards, if not relative then absolute, must 
be provided. Clear definitions are needed for managements to systematize the gathering of 
information, and auditors are unable to perform an intelligent search, even for material items, 
without quantification of what is involved. 
We are not against auditors exercising common sense, but independent auditors can not 
monitor compliance with corporate codes of conduct in a manner which surpasses the inherent 
effectiveness  and specificity of the codes themselves. 
In this regard, we feel particularly that, because laws and regulations are involved, lawyers 
need to be brought directly into all of these determinations in individual audits. 
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Section 6 — The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and Its Extension 
In general we are in favor of extending the auditor's role in keeping with an accounting and 
auditing orientation, but we have a concern with this, already mentioned: the Commission's 
recommendation that auditors should be required to review and test systems of internal control 
to form a conclusion on their functioning during the year seems excessive. To require systems 
tests in all areas will greatly increase total audit effort  and cost. 
We are in favor of gradual experimentation on the issue of management's reporting of 
internal control weaknesses, as we are uncertain about the understandability of these matters to 
financial statement users at the present time. Consideration should be given to making such 
reports available to the public only on request. 
Section 7 — The Auditor's Communication with Users 
We agree that the auditor's standard report should be changed, but foresee difficulties  with 
"standardized alternative phrases or paragraphs." Such a format may be much the same as we 
presently have — only longer. The auditor should make a series of positive and reasonably 
factual statements, and should not be asked to state the obvious merely to make a longer report. 
For example, saying that "auditing procedures were adequate in the circumstances to support 
our opinion" is unnecessary. 
In a sense, the auditor's report would appear to be a conglomerate of issues which are topical 
at any point in time. This is good provided there is an on-line, real-time, auditing standards 
board determining what those topics should be and devising a way to dispense with matters no 
longer topical. 
In addition to our agreement with the idea of the proposed report by management, we are in 
favor of experimentation with the presentation of reports of other experts. This should apply not 
only to lawyers, but could be extended to any profession whose judgment has a significant 
impact on the financial statements. 
We think it is time to stop sharing audit responsibilities between primary and secondary 
auditors on a single entity, i.e., including its controlled subsidiaries. This should be studied, and 
if it could be so resolved, would substantially eliminate the question of how to report on the 
shared responsibility. 
Section 8 — The Education, Training, and Development of Auditors 
We think the Commission's proposal of a four-year  liberal arts undergraduate program and a 
three-year graduate professional program would not be of significant additional help in prepar-
ing persons for the profession. "On the line" experience is necessary for the understanding of 
auditors' responsibilities and objectives. 
Section 9 — Maintaining the Independence of Auditors 
We maintain that, despite significant fee pressures and competition, there is a resulting effort 
to become more efficient  in auditing and not to reduce audit scope below what is required. 
With the Metcalf Staff  believing that there is insufficient  competition and the Commission 
suggesting there is too much competition, this may be an indication that competition is not the 
issue — the nature of services and their quality are what's at issue. 
Even when faced with intensive price competition, we and other firms have added proce-
dures in recent years which have been costly. In our case, we have added about five to seven 
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percent to total audit costs and for this reason we have a large investment presently in the 
refinement and adoption of a more efficient  and conceptual approach to auditing. 
We believe the subsection dealing with the overriding effect  of time pressures on the quality 
of the audit is the most incisive area of the Commission's Report.  We agree that "audit failures" 
are probably due to mistakes in judgment because of excessive reliance on client representa-
tions. But the Commission may have lost focus of a major part of the excessive reliance issue by 
stating that "although  there  are  other  factors,  the Commission believes that excessive time 
pressures are the most pervasive cause of audit failures." (Our emphasis.) Among these other 
factors is one we believe more important: guidance is needed on what the auditor should do 
with representations of extreme difficulty  in substantiation, or perhaps not susceptible of 
outside documentation. Another factor is defining the "effective  date of a transaction," which 
we think the FASB should put on its agenda for early treatment. 
Unreasonable client time demands should be resisted, to be sure, but it is hard to conclude 
that they cause the auditor to compromise his independence. The Commission may be 
underestimating the energies of dedicated professionals to both do it right and do it fast. Some 
tension is beneficial, at least in a productivity sense. 
Of concern to us is that the Commission reported in the body of the tentative Report  the 
comment that "58% of respondents still in public practice and 68% now out of the profession 
have signed for completing audit steps (not covered by another compensating step) when they 
have not performed the work." The greater detail included in the Commission's survey report 
shows that only 3% did this in any way which would reduce, in their judgment, the overall 
audit quality. Therefore  the major problem may not be in audit quality, but in documentation. 
Documentation is, of course, important, as its absence or incompleteness has contributed to 
unfavorable results for accountants in problem cases which may not have been, in the final 
analysis, "audit failures." 
A major factor suppressing tendencies to sign-off  audit procedures without performance  is 
indicated as being the level of review employed by a firm. We agree, and have had a high level 
of review throughout our firm's entire existence. The entire profession should adopt a thorough, 
preissuance independent review of the audit work as well as the financial statements and 
auditor's report. 
The Commission has recommended "that individual public accounting firms immediately 
undertake to conduct studies to determine the extent of the conditions revealed by the 
Commission's study and the effects  on their practices." SAS No. 4 already calls for firms to 
maintain an inspection program to monitor compliance with professional standards. All of the 
larger firms perform some type of periodic review of each office's  practice quality. In our firm, a 
"Task Force Review" (in-depth review of selected engagements) is alternated biennially with a 
"Technical Center Review" (a more restricted coverage of overall quality aspects) so that each 
office  has annual consideration of its professional standards compliance. We believe this 
approach should be emphasized, and we hope the Commission did not have in mind a study of 
the integrity of a firm's professional staff  as a means of ferreting  out past defects. It seems to us 
that the emphasis should be on high standards of conduct, with the admonition (based on the 
Commission's survey results) that disregard of those standards should be summarily dealt with. 
We also note that none of the material published in the Commission's Report  of  Tentative 
Conclusions,  either in the body of the Report  or in the more detailed appendices, articulates the 
strategies involved in the survey, the kinds of results expected from the questions as worded, 
and the variety of possible conclusions, in addition to those that the Commission and the 
researcher believed were the most probable conclusions. This kind of information would 
establish a better setting, in our view, for the survey's critical results. 
v 
Section 10 — The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards 
While we have been pleased with the output of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee 
in recent years, we are generally in favor of an auditing standards board, full-time and smaller 
in size — we suggest nine members. Some of the features of the auditing standards board would 
be: 
1. As much openness as possible; public hearings would be appropriate for deliberative 
sessions 
2. A larger staff  to assist the proposed board 
3. A board member's term of three years without provision for renewal 
4. No requirement for complete independence on the part of a board member (in the 
sense of being unable to return to his previous firm). 
5. Serve as the focal point for auditing research. 
To charter the new auditing standards board, we believe that a review committee composed 
of representatives from the profession and other appropriate sectors should be created promptly 
in the fashion of the FAF Structure Committee. 
Section 11 — Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice 
The Commission suggests that firms have intensified their practice control activities in 
response to highly publicized "audit failures." We think that perhaps more important is the 
concern over being unable to convince a lay jury or judge that an audit was properly 
conducted in conformity with generally accepted auditing standards. We strongly agree that, 
unfortunately,  there is a considerable element of "wasteful, defensive auditing." Most of this 
has been directed toward documentation and represents an excessive societal cost caused by 
the "burden of proof" requirements of the Federal Securities Laws. 
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DETAILED COMMENTS ON 
SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 11 
SECTION 1 
THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— "There  is a need to clarify  the auditor's  role....  The  underlying  purpose  of  an audit  [is] 
its  social  function." 
— "The  role  of  the independent  auditor  in improving  corporate  accountability  can be 
significantly  strengthened  by  closer,  more  active  cooperation  between  boards  of 
directors  and auditors." 
The Need to Clarify the Auditor's Role 
We are in substantial agreement with the statements by the Commission concerning the need 
to clarify the auditor's role. There is no question that many users of financial statements have an 
erroneous impression of the auditor's role, and therefore  an exaggerated expectation of what is 
conveyed by the auditor's association. Many users indeed believe that the auditor's standard 
opinion attests to the financial soundness of the company, as is often asserted when invest-
ments become worthless or do not result in the return anticipated. 
These misunderstandings are not surprising. Although many of the public's expectations of 
auditors probably cannot be met because of costs disproportionate to benefits or because they 
are not within the reasonably imaginable expertise of auditors (and, in some cases, of anyone 
else), there are still many areas explored by the Commission in which auditors can do more to 
fulfill  their appropriate societal role. Efforts  to inform the public of the present limited role of 
auditors have been unsuccessful primarily because auditors have not recognized that expan-
sion of the role is needed despite the problems of oppressive litigation. 
The Federal Securities Laws in general require that the auditor be able to prove having 
performed a satisfactory audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards when 
challenged, as opposed to a plaintiff  having to demonstrate that the auditor did not. This 
arrangement has been a very prominent counterproductive force in restraining the appropriate 
extension of the auditor's role. It is entirely true that "Court decisions...must be considered 
carefully because a decision is usually closely related to the facts of a particular case" (p. 2). 
(This is not understood by the public, and in our comments in Section 9 we discuss whether this 
fact might have been given insufficient  credence by the Commission in its discussions of "audit 
failures.") 
It is significant that numerous recent statements on auditing standards have emerged because 
of requirements established for publicly held companies by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Approaches acceded to by the SEC in recognition of the auditor's concern about 
role extension — differential  disclosure, unaudited footnotes and a "safe harbor" (for published 
forecasts) — are not sufficient  of themselves. We agree that an overall reconsideration of the 
auditor's role, particularly including responsibility to whom, for what and at what financial 
peril, is needed before coordinated and coherent advances of the auditing profession beyond 
its present levels can occur. 
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The Audit Function 
"The  underlying  purpose  of  an audit  [is] its  social  function"  — The Commission's discussion 
of "accounting as a means of social control" focuses on "accountability." We are unable to 
find a clear and complete definition of "accountability" in the Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions. 
To say that "...the entity is accountable for every transaction" (p. 3) is vague; no specific reason 
is given and there is no specification of the intended beneficiaries. 
The nearest we can come to a definition in the Report  is found in this citation (p. 4): 
"Directors, managers and administrators have this duty of  accountability,  a duty  to 
demonstrate  the quality  of  their  performance  within the constraints of the limited 
responsibility which has been entrusted to them. It is in this context that society has 
conceived the audit function whereby the performance  of, and the account of their 
performance,  submitted by the directors, managers, etc. may be subject to some 
scrutiny on behalf of those to whom the directors, managers, etc. are accountable." 
(Emphasis added.)1 
Perhaps the Commission intended the definition to be encompassed within the passage (on 
page 5) that "Users of financial statements need assurance that management has fulfilled  its 
stewardship responsibility by establishing and supervising a system that adequately protects 
corporate assets." There are numerous other references  to accountability in Section 1, but they 
all speak only in terms of its consequences rather than its full meaning. 
While the Commission's views could be inferred  from the text, we think it is important that 
accountability be more precisely defined in the Commission's final report, since it is proffered 
as the fundamental purpose of accounting.2 Retaining the present wide latitude invites expo-
nential implications for auditors' responsibilities. 
"Accountability," as used in the Commission's Report,  might be an objective of accounting 
already overemphasized. For example, current Congressional and regulatory activities in the 
areas of "illegal or questionable acts" suggest that legislators and regulators may be unin-
formed as to the limitations of both accounting and auditing to accomplish what they intend to 
prescribe. There should be greater deference to the primary purpose of financial accounting 
("production of financial information for decision making"), and we hope the Commission will 
be able to incorporate in its final report the Objectives of Financial Statements now expressed 
in tentative form by the Financial Accounting Standards Board as part of its project on the Broad 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting. There may be a tendency to 
lose sight of the primary purpose of accounting in emphasizing it as an element of social 
control, not fully coordinating with the FASB progress. 
1 David Flint, "The Role of the Auditor in Modern Society: An Exploratory Essay," Accounting  and Business  Research 
1 (Autumn 1971): 288. 
2 Our emphasis in discussing "accountabil i ty" relates to the fact that there are varying views of its meaning, without 
the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities specifying its own view. For example: 
a. The Report  of  the Study  Group  on the Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  provides an extensive discussion (in 
Chapter 4) on "Accountabil ity and Financial Statements." This represents a broad view of the beneficiaries of 
"accountabil ity." 
b. The FASB's Tentative  Conclusions  on Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  of  Business  Enterprises  discusses 
stewardship and management performance  as being more restrictive, because the FASB has tentatively con-
cluded that the beneficiaries are only investors and creditors. 
Certainly there are other proposals (e.g. an unspecified accountability of public companies to the general public, as 
suggested in the Metcalf Staff  Study), all pointing to a need for adoption of a uniform definition. 
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We recommend that the Commission acknowledge the fact that current historical based 
accounting does not, by its very nature, provide an adequate measure of accountability (either 
performance  or stewardship). Much of the public's disenchantment with auditors' performance 
might very well be related to deficiencies in the present accounting model and inadequacies in 
accounting standards under that model, which auditors by their Code of Professional Ethics 
must observe. As the Commission notes (p. 7): "In general, if an accepted accounting principle, 
such as historical cost, has limitations, audited financial statements remain constrained by 
those limitations." 
Since the Commission asserts that "[a]n audit provides reasonable assurance that manage-
ment has fulfilled  its [stewardship and performance]  responsibility" (p. 5), the inverse relation-
ship between "reasonable assurance" and the constraints of the established accounting 
framework  need to be better understood and reconciled. We believe it will not be possible to 
enhance the public's understanding of the auditor's role until there is considerable advance-
ment in specification of the accounting framework,  as more fully discussed in Section 2 of this 
response. 
The Commission also indicates (p. 7) that "[t]he existence of other controls places limits on 
the extent of assurance needed from independent auditors." Among these is the control over 
management by the board of directors, and presumably by the audit committee. Other societal 
controls (the press, analysts, regulatory agencies, litigation and the securities market) are 
mentioned. 
We believe a substantial burden for control must be placed elsewhere than on the inde-
pendent auditors. While an audit should be responsive to the degree of control exercised by 
outside institutions in general, and to the degree of control exercised within the entity by other 
means, the auditor should not be held responsible to totally compensate for defects that may 
exist in other control forces. In short, the auditor cannot be the panacean equalizer of all 
controls. This raises the issue of adequacy of standards for boards of directors, audit commit-
tees, and many other control forces. Although the Commission must necessarily limit its 
detailed considerations to auditors, it would be proper, in our view, that an articulation be 
given by the Commission of at least the primary responsibilities of these other parties having a 
position of control over management. 
The Auditor's Relationship to Parties Interested in the Audit Function 
The Commission can not overemphasize the importance of frank communication between 
management and the auditor as a means of obtaining audit evidence sufficient  to give the 
auditor a sense of satisfaction concerning audit conclusions. It is particularly fitting that the 
Commission chose, as an example of a threat to the present auditor/management relationship, 
the recent efforts  by the Internal Revenue Service to attempt a "fishing expedition" into 
accountants' working papers without specifying matters for which the search was to be 
performed.  In the recent Johns-Manville case (footnote 21, p. 10), litigated at no doubt a 
significant cost to the defendants, the IRS was dealt a setback, which could very well be 
temporary unless the Commission in its final report comes out strongly against such incursions. 
For example, in another recent case,3 the Internal Revenue Service was told that it was 
inquiring beyond its informational needs via some of the "Eleven Questions" relative to illegal 
and improper payments (the "slush fund questionnaire"). This matter is now being petitioned 
for a rehearing and may be further  appealed. 
3 United  States  et al v.  Richards  (C.A. 77-0189R). 
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We are concerned that the Commission, in discussing management's responsibility for 
financial statement representations, has inadvertently endorsed the popular belief that there are 
a multitude of free choice alternative accounting methods. Although management must 
"choose among accounting methods" (p. 10) and has opportunities for "biased actions 
involving...outright misrepresentation" (p. 11), we question the inference that this leads to, 
"more commonly, taking advantage of the many gray areas in accounting measurement." The 
Metcalf Staff  Study's4 allegation of unbridled free choice was demonstrably deflated in the 
response of the Financial Accounting Foundation to the Staff  Study: of the free choice alterna-
tives extant some five years ago, only a few still remain.5 And if one considers Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 5 on "The Meaning of 'Present Fairly in Conformity with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles'...," the only three free choice alternatives important enough 
to mention, as a practical matter, are in depreciation (straight-line versus accelerated), inven-
tory valuation (LIFO versus FIFO or equivalent), and investment credit accounting (flow-
through versus deferral). 
The accounting and auditing profession suffers  from anxiety created by the continuous 
suggestion of the existence of many free choice alternatives. Thus, we think that SAS 5 did not 
go quite far enough. Though it avers that the selection of an accounting principle, where there 
appears to be more than one choice, should be substantially dependent upon the cir-
cumstances, it quixotically awaits the specification of circumstances by the FASB. Auditors and 
managements must and do apply circumstances without FASB specification. When cir-
cumstances are taken into account, there are far fewer alternatives indeed. 
In discussing the auditor's relationship to financial statement users (p. 11), the Commission 
indicates that potential shareholders and creditors are not owed the same responsibility by 
auditors as those who have existing financial interests in an entity. In a legalistic or "accounta-
bility" sense (not clearly defined, as discussed earlier herein), this is undoubtedly true. How-
ever, because of the operation of the market system in the United States economy, it does not 
seem useful to make this distinction in any way which would influence the auditor's perfor-
mance. If anything, the auditor's role today is inverted: 
Consider a small company, owner managed, where the independent accountant is asked to 
prepare financial statements only for management's use. Limited audit procedures are often 
employed, and because of the restriction of the financial statements to internal use, generally 
accepted accounting principles (in the area of disclosures) are not followed to the fullest extent. 
Should, however, the accountant become aware that those financial statements are to be 
presented to a financial institution for the purpose of considering whether credit should be 
granted, almost all of the omitted auditing procedures and disclosures must then be performed. 
"Closer,  more  active  cooperation  between  boards  of  directors  and auditors"  - As to the 
auditor's relationship to the board of directors, we emphatically agree that "the role of the 
independent auditor in improving corporate accountability can be significantly strengthened 
by closer, more active cooperation between boards of directors and auditors" (p. 12). Many of 
the comments in our response are directed toward "closer, more active cooperation." We 
believe much has already been achieved, although much more could be done. 
4 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, of the Committee on Government Operations, 
The  Accounting  Establishment:  A Staff  Study,  December, 1976, pp. 134-135. 
5 Financial Accounting Foundation and Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement  of  Position  (on The Account-
ing Establishment, op. cit.) April 14, 1977, p. 32-33 and Exhibit E. 
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We endorse the Commission's recommendations for the use of boards of directors and audit 
committees for the purposes of initial engagement and retention of the auditor and the 
negotiation of his fees. Substantial achievement of these goals is beginning to occur in publicly 
held companies, focused on by the Commission in its Report  (p. xii). 
In the final paragraph of Section 1 the Commission again suggests too great a problem, in our 
view, as to the relationship of accounting standards to a company's circumstances, with the 
statement that: "The possibility of abuse of accounting methods is a key area for outside 
directors to probe." If there are truly available options in material or potentially material 
matters, the audit committee or the board should be apprised of these by management and the 
auditors, who should not have to be "probed." 
We also suggest that greater attention be given in the Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  to the 
qualifications necessary for board of directors' or audit committee membership. The Commis-
sion's statement that "Outside directors should consider the corporation's total audit needs and 
balance the work of internal auditors and independent auditors in evaluating controls and 
management's supervision of them" is vague. Standards of sufficient  specificity are needed to 
assist directors in concluding as to such a balance — and we think few directors have a 




FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— "The  auditor  must  evaluate: 
• the choices  made by  management among alternative  principles, 
• the appropriateness  of  the principles  applied  in the absence of  formal  or  detailed 
accounting  pronouncements,  and 
• the cumulative  effect  of  the decisions  on selection  and application  of  accounting 
principles." 
— "...the  continued  emphasis on 'fairness'  as a standard  is not fruitful  - the word  'fairly' 
should  be eliminated  from  the auditor's  report." 
The Expectations of Users 
The Commission is correct, of course, in giving as a user expectation that the auditor evaluate 
whether financial statements are "misleading." That term appears in the Federal Securities 
Laws and also in the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, Rule 203. Once the financial 
statements have accomplished what we will call "nonmisleadingness," the auditor's responsi-
bility then is to evaluate whether the financial statements are fairly presented in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles. We recognize the frailties of "fairly presents." But 
we think that "nonmisleadingness," while sounding commendable, implies as much as or 
more than "fairly presents," and may be even more subject to misunderstanding by the user of 
financial statements. 
There have been a number of situations (described by the Commission as "audit failures") 
where the auditor believed the financial statements were not misleading; nonetheless he was 
accused of contributing to misunderstanding by the user. Because the judiciary is also not 
uniformly informed, 1 the auditor, along with management, was adjudged to have been guilty of 
"misleading" the users. 
To be critical of "fairly presents" and to recommend excision of "fairly" from the auditor's 
report may give the appearance of improvement, but represents no real progress if the meaning 
of "misleading" as used in the AICPA Code of Ethics and Federal Securities Laws is not 
specified. 
1 While we recognize the Commission's desire to remain reasonably neutral concerning past events relative to 
auditors' responsibilities, we believe it would have been appropriate to take issue with the citation from District 
Court decision in the Herzfeld case (footnote 1, p. 13). To allow to stand without challenge the epitaph of "esoteric 
accounting norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, ... [not presenting] the true financial position to the untutored 
eye of an ordinary investor," leaves some doubt as to whether the Commission accepts such an unbalanced 
criticism. 
The FASB Broad Conceptual Framework project, along with its Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial 
Statements, does not attempt to make financial accounting comprehensible " to the untutored eye of an ordinary 
investor." More realistically, it should communicate with "investors or creditors who have a reasonable understand-
ing of business and economic activities and financial accounting and who are wi l l ing to spend the time and effort 
needed to study financial statements." (Tentative  Conclusions  on Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  of  Business 
Enterprises,  p. 3.) 
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The Commission states (p. 21) that: "Present standards require the auditor to use judgment to 
see that the selection and application of particular accounting principles do not produce a 
misleading result." No challenge by the Commission seems evident. We think it could equally 
be said that nonmisleadingness "is an empty box" and that by nonmisleadingness certain 
advocates mean that something agrees with their biases.2 We urge that the Commission 
consider the continued appropriateness of Rule 203 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, 
and at least conjoin it when concluding (p. 14) that efforts  to analyze "fairly presents" are not 
fruitful.  This is discussed in greater detail below. 
Of course we agree that further  exploration into the nature of generally accepted accounting 
principles and generally accepted auditing standards is necessary, so long as the users of 
financial statements are informed of the results of such exploration. The understanding by 
financial statement users of the many judgments and decisions that must be made about the 
selection and application of accounting principles must be enhanced in the process, so that 
they are in a position to evaluate, as they should, whether they agree with management's 
decisions and the auditor's approbation. It is most important that the user understand what was 
done, and not that he personally agree with it. With understanding, the user is in a position to 
make a rational decision. 
The Guidance Provided by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles3 
We note with approval the Commission's ascribing to management the responsibility for 
using accounting principles that reflect underlying events and transactions. The principles 
must, of course, be appropriate to the underlying events and transactions both individually and 
collectively. Thus, the Commission suggests that the auditor should object when literal, but not 
substantive, requirements of accounting pronouncements have been met (p. 16). The consider-
able difficulty  not addressed by the Commission is in ascertaining when the substance of an 
accounting pronouncement has been served. Obviously at extremes this should be apparent, 
but the gray area is so broad as to make a requirement for substantive observation of accounting 
standards, without more specification, simply unworkable. 
We have already referred  to the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics; Rule 203 requires that, 
should the observation of a promulgated generally accepted accounting standard result in a 
misleading presentation, the financial statements should properly depart from that standard in 
order to avert misleadingness, and the auditor should comment in his report that such departure 
has occurred. 
Our firm, on two occasions, has taken avail of Rule 203 with respect to publicly held 
companies. To our knowledge, this has been done by other firms even less frequently.  There 
seems to be an extreme reluctance to depart from promulgated standards because they are 
2 This is a variation of the citation attributed to Carl L. Nelson, footnote 3, p. 13, of the Commission's Report. 
3 We realize the Commission had to prepare this portion of its tentative recommendations prior to the availability of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board Discussion Memorandum on the second phase of the Broad Conceptual 
Framework project. Certainly we agree with the Commission's recommendation (in footnote 12, p. 16) that the FASB 
should promptly complete its materiality, conceptual framework  and objectives projects. We recommend that 
considerable use be made of the latest FASB material available at the time of the Commission's final report. 
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more and more tightly drawn,4 and misleadingness objections could often appear to relate to a 
disagreement with the concept underlying the accounting standard. 
Until the FASB specifies (as it is now in the process of doing) the Objectives of Financial 
Statements and the Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting, it wil l not 
be possible even by fiat to require that auditors unequivocally be responsible for "substantive 
compliance" with promulgated accounting standards. An example is the FASB's question 
about the proper perspective of financial statements — the income and expense view (match-
ing is all-important and the balance sheet is a residual) versus the asset and liability view (the 
differences  between the values of economic resources and obligations at two points in time, 
after eliminating capital transactions, represent income for the intervening period). This soon-
to-be-settled argument has often given rise to later challenge that substance of an accounting 
standard has not been observed, when in fact the culprit may have been inconsistent perspec-
tives included in a single set of financial statements. 
Touche Ross is certainly in favor of "substance," but "substance" is a term also needing a 
definition. The framework  for that definition will be provided by the FASB, and hopefully soon. 
In referring  to deficiencies in present generally accepted accounting principles (p. 16), the 
Commission may have overstated the case by reporting in a factual style. Some of the 
complaints may not be as serious as they seem. To state that authoritative accounting bodies 
have not specified the primacy of a single method where alternatives exist5 feeds the notion of a 
plethora of alternatives. Accusations of absolute disarray in the objectives of financial account-
ing and reporting are plentiful in the conclusions of the Metcalf Staff  Study.6 There is already 
much agreement on objectives of financial statements as evidenced by the compilation of APB 
Statement No. 4, the Report  of  the Study  Group  on Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  (the 
Trueblood Report) and in the FASB's Tentative Conclusions. 
We agree that no standards can specify all aspects of adequate disclosure. In this regard, the 
Commission's statement (p. 1 7) that adequate disclosure wil l enable the user to understand the 
events and transactions reported on in financial statements is true only in the unattainable 
abstract. We assume the Commission intended that the user must have an ability to under-
stand,7 or no amount of disclosure will do. And there are many other factors, in addition to 
financial statement disclosures, necessary to permit an able user exerting the necessary effort  to 
obtain an understanding. 
As the Commission acknowledges (footnote 14, p. 1 7), auditors often face demands to show 
where it is inscribed that a particular accounting method cannot be followed, or alternatively, 
must be followed. It may not be enough to state that "such demands clearly indicate an 
4 With the advent of accounting standards as detailed as FASB Statement No. 13 on leases, or 14 on segmented 
reporting, it is becoming increasingly difficult  for an auditor to locate substantive concept. In the past, APB Opinions 
beginning with No. 16 contained this statement in the "Notes" appended to each opinion: 
"Covering all possible conditions and circumstances in an Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board is 
usually impracticable. The substance of transactions and the principles, guides, rules, and criteria described in 
Opinions should control the accounting for transactions not expressly covered." 
Experience with those admonitions has shown that individual auditors have not been able to invoke them consis-
tently or with much frequency. 
5 Reducing alternatives in inventory valuation methods and investment credit accounting wi l l also require the 
participation of Congress and the Treasury Department. 
6 The  Accounting  Establishment:  A Staff  Study,  op cit., summarizes these complaints on pp. 20-24. 
7 See footnote 1 on page 2-1, second paragraph. 
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inadequate understanding of the scope of generally accepted accounting principles." We 
suggest that the Commission give more prominence to this in the final report. 
In summary, we are concerned that the Commission's overall discussion of generally 
accepted accounting principles is harsher than is warranted and may lead a reader not 
otherwise informed to the conclusion of a much greater dearth of principle than actually exists. 
This should be correctable in the Commission's final report if for no reason other than the 
FASB's current progress. 
Recommendations on Extension of Guidance in Auditing Standards 
"Direction  in the absence of  detailed  accounting  principles"  — The Commission appears in 
this subsection to have overstated the authority of Statements of Position issued by the AICPA 
Accounting Standards Division (AcSEC). Under the present FASB charter, no other body has the 
authority, enforceable under the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, to establish accounting 
principles. Considerable debate occurs both among practicing accountants and between 
accountants and their clients as to whether the recommendations in an AcSEC Statement of 
Position must be followed in a particular situation. We are aware of situations of non-uniform 
application as among accounting firms. This is not to suggest that any firm is acting in an 
unprofessional manner. We ourselves have not found it advisable to insist on blanket applica-
bility of all AcSEC Statements of Position, because by definition they do not bear the "force of 
[FASB] law." 
Some industry groups are concerned by the "third tier" standard setting (following after the 
FASB and the SEC) by the AICPA Accounting Standards Division. There is a need to clarify the 
AlCPA's role in accounting standard setting. We have already recommended in our response to 
the Metcalf Staff  Study that AcSEC adopt a formal policy of exposing for public comment all 
proposed statements of position, and of permitting qualified representatives of affected  indus-
tries to attend applicable portions of its meetings.8 Beyond that, it may be appropriate to 
incorporate more authority for AICPA Accounting Standards Division resolutions through an 
amendment in the FASB charter or rules of procedure, at least as to matters the FASB does not 
accept for its own agenda.9 
Reasoning by analogy has been and wil l always be necessary in the selection of an 
accounting principle to fit new and unique circumstances. The Commission seems neutral on 
the propriety of this practice. We recommend establishing a refutable presumption of careful 
analogy where a specifically promulgated accounting standard does not exist, as opposed to 
the current practice of selectivity. Procedural guidelines for analogizing would also be helpful. 
Likewise, reliance on precedent is useful, but somewhat riskier than rational analogy. There 
may be circumstantial nuances not known to those wishing to rely on the precedent. 
Guidelines for precedential reliance should be better articulated. With proper guidance for use 
of precedent, and a requirement for analogizing, the dilution of accounting principles often 
attributed to these practices should be minimized. 
8 Statement  of  Touche  Ross & Co. (for the record of hearings by Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and 
Management of the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs)  on Accounting  and Auditing  Practices 
and Procedures,  May 23, 1977, p. 35. 
9 At present, the FASB formally acknowledges receipt of a finalized AcSEC SOP. In its usual declining of the matter for 
inclusion on its agenda, the FASB states (assuming it's true) that the FASB is not aware that the SOP contains any 
violation of GAAP. (Of course, the FASB is aware of the progress of the SOP before finalization.) This seems an 
inadequate and cumbersome approach. 
2-
"Direction  for  selecting  among alternatives''  — To state that the proper selection should 
result in a presentation "more closely in accord with the substance of a transaction or event" is 
not sufficiently  helpful because of the vagueness of "substance" as we have discussed more 
fully earlier in this section. Of course, management and the auditor should document the 
choice made and the reason for it. The only appropriate manner of doing this is to relate to 
specified objectives of financial accounting and reporting. To state that management's business 
judgment and planning should not "supplant" other circumstances is to place a vague addi-
tional burden on auditors.10 
We agree the SEC is in error in its requirement that the auditor believe in the preferability  of 
the new method when an accounting change occurs. If "preferability"  assessment should be 
undertaken by auditors, it should apply to all material accounting principles used by an entity 
whether or not changed. Our agreement with the Report's  statement applies to eliminating the 
SEC's inconsistency; we otherwise have substantial misgivings about preferability  as an audit 
objective. 
"Direction  for  evaluating  cumulative  effect"  — The Commission recommends that the 
auditor make an evaluation of the cumulative effect  of management's judgment in the presenta-
tion of financial statements. We agree that this should be an auditor's responsibility, but only  if 
the additional direction recommended is in fact provided.11 
We recognize that this issue cannot be resolved simply. The FASB needs to provide guidance 
on cumulative effect  assessments even beyond what can be anticipated from its current 
Conceptual Framework project. And the auditing standard setting body would need to con-
tinuously participate so that the resulting guidance is workable. This issue needs prompt 
attention and, no doubt, resolution in phases. 
Elimination  of  "fairly"  from  the auditor's  report  — The summary section (page xviii) of the 
Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  contains a conclusion relative to Section 2 which does not 
appear as such in the section text: that "continued emphasis on 'fairness'  as a standard is not 
fruitful  — the word 'fairly'  should be eliminated from the auditor's report." In a way this 
conclusion is both fitting and enigmatic. It is fitting in the sense that "fairly" must be eliminated 
because the current environment would squelch any reasonable definition proffered  by the 
Commission. If implementation of this conclusion is not feasible a less desirable alternative 
would be an additional standard paragraph in the auditor's report explaining what "fairly" 
10 We have several incidental concerns about this subsection of the Report: 
a. Conservatism is described as a general concept. We believe that "conservatism for its own sake may actually 
introduce bias" (Report  of  the Study  Croup  on Objectives  of  Financial  Statements,  AICPA, 1973, p. 58) and 
should always be discussed in neutral terms. Its 1970 label as a modifying convention (APB Statement No. 4, 
paragraph 171) seems superseded. 
b. Admonishing the auditor to consider whether accomplishing an objective "other than informing users — such as 
reducing or postponing income taxes — has inappropriately predominated in the choice of accounting princi-
ples" suggests there is something inappropriate about lawfully reducing or postponing income taxes. The only 
real threat seems to be in IRS conformity rules — de jure (e.g. LIFO) or de facto (e.g. repairs and maintenance). 
Tax allocation under APB 11 has been an effective  guardian. 
c. The APB did reach a conclusion as to the proper accounting for the investment tax credit; the alternatives were 
forced by government. 
11 If the auditor finds that most of the selections or estimates "had the effect  of increasing (or decreasing) earnings," this 
is not necessarily a misleading picture of the entity's earning power or liquidity. As the Commission earlier observed 
in this Section, substantive compliance is what counts (p. 16). We have already commented on the vagaries of 
"substance" and "misleadingness." 
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means, and explicitly admonishing the reader that it can not be adjudged to comport with his 
own biases. 
But it is also enigmatic because "evaluating cumulative effect"  to avoid "...the overall result 




REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES 
IN FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— ".Subject  to"  and "going-concern"  qualifications  should  be eliminated. 
— A separate  footnote  should  be required  for  uncertainties. 
The Need to Clarify the Auditor's Role in Reporting on Uncertainties 
The user must assume the function of evaluating the risks a business faces, and the auditor 
should properly be responsible for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure of those risks.1 The 
present requirements for the auditor to express a significant uncertainty in terms of a "subject 
to" opinion, and in more egregious cases, the need to express a going concern qualification, 
are inconsistent with the auditor's responsibility for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure of 
risks. 
The auditor is no more able to predict the outcome of many uncertainties than management. 
Ordinarily, he would be less able, because he does not make the decisions needed to operate 
the business and cannot assimilate management's planning and intent as though it were his 
own. 
Uncertainties often involve litigation, and one only need look to the debates2 engaged in 
between the accounting and legal professions relative to the limited extent to which lawyers 
wil l comment on their expectations of ultimate outcome of asserted claims — or the extremely 
minor extent of comment proffered  on unasserted claims. To grant to lawyers, who by 
definition know better than auditors what the outcome may be, an understanding of their 
increasing responsibility for failures in prediction, should be convincing that the auditor 
certainly lacks of clairvoyance. 
Recommendations for Improving Reporting on Uncertainties 
Eliminating  "subject  to"  qualifications  — We agree that the audit requirement to express a 
"subject to" qualification when the financial statements are affected  by material uncertainties 
should be eliminated. We began some research in this area (see summary of the Touche Ross 
research project on page 1 76 of the Commission's Report),  and the Commission has accurately 
reported our belief that, although certain conditions relative to qualified opinions could be 
observed, it would not be possible to ascertain whether the qualified opinion was indeed a 
self-fulfilling  prophecy. Many argue that it is. When the auditor is considering its use, manage-
ment's concern is understandable. 
1 We think the Commission gives an incorrect inference by using the Herzfeld decision as an example (on p. 27) of an 
unheeded uncertainty qualification. The Commission's statement in Section 1 that court decisions "...must be 
considered carefully because a decision is usually closely related to the facts of a particular case" seems especially 
applicable here. If the court had not questioned the substance of the transaction, we speculate that the opinion 
qualification might have been sustained. 
2 See Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, "Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims and 
Assessments." 
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A separate  footnote  for  uncertainties  — Because an unduly negative inference of the quality 
of the enterprise is drawn by readers of qualified opinions, and often beyond the gravity of the 
matter, it would be more beneficial and equitable that the auditor aim toward the appropriate-
ness of disclosure of uncertainties in financial statements. Again, this recommendation must be 
approached with caution: debates over what constitutes adequate disclosure can be as intense 
as those relative to whether or not the auditor issues a qualified opinion. For example, in a 
number of instances in our practice, when concerned about the communicativeness of an 
uncertainty disclosure in the footnotes — often as to the gravity of the matter — we took the 
opportunity afforded  by our qualified opinion to add more specification in the hope that 
financial statement users would better understand the seriousness of the matter.3 
We think the Commission is heading in the right direction in recommending that financial 
statements contain a standardized note, similar to that on accounting policies, relative to 
uncertainties.4 In ascertaining the appropriate content of the note, however, considerable 
guidance is needed. Deliberate obfuscation could occur through standardization without 
materiality guidelines for footnote inclusion or exclusion. For example, major issues can be 
buried in profuse disclosure of miscellaneous litigation; and therefore  the auditor must employ 
some sort of "meaningful communication" filter.  Standards for this test are not, to our know-
ledge, available5 and even the FASB is focusing mostly on what is needed. Materiality standards 
should work both ways. 
The Commission's recommendations for standardized footnote disclosure seem to relate to 
both specific as well as general material uncertainties directly affecting  the reporting company, 
and not to major uncertainties affecting  all business or society. We suggest this be made clearer 
in the Commission's final report. 
In our response to the current FASB Discussion Memorandum on the Conceptual Framework 
for Accounting and Reporting, we have recommended that a means for depicting the degree of 
factuality applicable to financial statement measurements and disclosures be developed. There 
is a scale ranging from the extremes of incontrovertible fact to sheer speculation. We think 
information measurements and disclosures should be so ordered and described that the user 
has an opportunity to make his own qualitative assessment of the financial statement balances 
and net income; presently these are, because of diversity of fact content, substantially "hash 
totals." And while sheer speculation has no place in financial statements, a considerable 
amount of management interpretation of uncertainties is clearly to be expected. 
The Commission's statement that "no uncertainty for which disclosure is required should be 
downgraded in importance" (p. 29) is therefore  problematic. The user may not be able to 
distinguish which uncertainties are more serious than others, unless they are required to be 
3 It could be argued that, since the auditor's report is viewed as a symbol, even the phrasing of the qualification is 
passed over lightly and therefore  should not substitute for even an iota of footnote disclosure by management. The 
Commission's recommendation to eliminate qualified opinions would focus attention where it belongs — on 
management disclosure. 
4 This recommendation would have to be adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which should be 
requested to accelerate consideration; otherwise this wi l l come in a later phase of the Conceptual Framework 
dealing with financial statement presentation. 
5 Existing professional pronouncements are a "one way street." For example, paragraph 430.03 of SAS No. 1 
admonishes that "Verbosity should not be mistaken for adequate disclosure." The paragraph goes on, however, to 
deal with required  disclosure, and says nothing of gratuitous material. Likewise, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5 prescribes disclosure of material uncertainties but avoids proscribing of clutter. Many times the 
genuine limiting factor is the amount of annual report space allotted to the financial statements. 
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ordered in a certain way, for example, by groupings. Ranges of possible exposure as discussed 
in FASB Interpretation 14 of FASB Statement No. 5,6 could be a useful initial step in grouping or 
sequencing the disclosures. 
Eliminating  "going  concern"  qualifications  — The Commission has recommended that the 
"going concern" qualification also be eliminated as a requirement for the auditor's report, as it 
is simply an extension of the "subject to" opinion. We agree with this. Liquidation valuations 
are in conformity with generally accepted accounting standards when liquidation is planned 
or, even if it is being resisted, when it is highly probable. Planned cessation is not contemplated 
in "going concern" qualifications, though it may offer  numerous disclosable uncertainties 
about realizable values. Treading near the brink of disaster with no agreed upon yardstick7 to 
measure its propinquity is an immense problem, however, for both management and the 
auditor.8 
The Commission points out (p. 30) that "certain simple financial ratios" have been shown by 
research to be better than a qualified auditor's opinion on a company's future prospects. But the 
Commission makes no recommendation as to whether any such ratios should be required to be 
published, or whether auditing procedures should necessarily include the computation of those 
ratios. We believe standardized analytical ratios should be required in financial statement 
presentations. A working capital ratio, earnings per share and net assets per share, for example, 
are commonplace ratios taken for granted. More is needed.9 The auditor should, of course, be 
satisfied as to ratio computation accuracy and context of presentation. The auditor should also 
utilize those financial analysis techniques which would indicate long-term as well as current 
liquidity as a means of improving prediction of insolvencies.10 
6 FASB Interpretation No. 14, "Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss," September, 1976. 
7 The SEC's ASR 115 precludes securities registration where there is an imminent threat of liquidation. This condition is 
not defined, but we (and others) have adopted "one year" as the minimum period of imminence during which 
adequate financing must be reasonably predictable. As with most proprietary standards, we are often challenged 
about its arbitrariness and enforcement without "due process." 
8 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 2, paragraph 25, is an indicator of auditor schizophrenia. It says (in part): 
" In cases involving uncertainties, the auditor should be able to form an opinion whether the financial statement 
items affected  have been stated in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles in all respects other 
than those contingent on the outcome of the uncertainties. If he is satisfied that they have been so stated, he may 
appropriately express an opinion qualified by reason of the uncertainties." 
But footnote 8 (perhaps an insert for garnering sufficient  votes) says: 
"The Committee believes that the explanation of the uncertainties and the qualification of the auditor's opinion 
contemplated by this Statement should serve adequately to inform the users of the financial statements. Nothing in 
this Statement, however, is intended to preclude an auditor from declining to express an opinion in cases involving 
uncertainties. If he disclaims an opinion, the uncertainties and their possible effects  on the financial statements 
should be disclosed in an appropriate manner, and the auditor's report should give all the substantive reasons for his 
disclaimer of opinion." 
9 Industry groups and rating services already publish a wide variety of ratios to assist in comparisons among 
companies. Agreement on which are most useful in general purpose financial statements is needed. Auditor 
association would enhance their credibility and indirectly improve the intercompany comparisons. 
10 Two examples of liquidity predictors in audit use today in our firm's "FINALY" (Financial Analysis) time sharing 
program are: 
— "A Gambler's Ruin as Predictor of Business Failure Using Accounting Data" (J.W. Wilcox in Sloan Management 
Review,  Spring 1971) 
— "A Discriminate Analysis for Predicting Bankruptcy" (Edward Altman and Thomas P. McGough in Journal  of 
Accountancy,  December 1974, pp. 50-57). 
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In summary, the auditor should be responsible for providing protection against "information 
risk" — that there is adequate disclosure presented by management of the potential effect  of 
uncertainties on the prospective earnings and financial position of the enterprise. He should not 
have to make the user's assessment of when risk becomes too risky. 
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SECTION 4 
CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF FRAUD 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— The  auditor  "has  a duty  to search  for  fraud  and should  be expected  to detect  those 
frauds  that  the exercise  of  professional  skill  and care  would  normally  uncover." 
— Auditors  should  "establish  an effective  client  investigation  program." 
— Auditors  should  "take  immediate  steps if  evidence  shows that  management is un-
trustworthy." 
— Auditors  should  "observe  conditions  suggesting  predisposition  to management 
frauds." 
— Auditors  should  "maintain  an understanding  of  a client's  business  and industry." 
— Auditors  should  "extend  the study  and evaluation  of  internal  control." 
— The  AICPA should  "develop  and disseminate  information  on frauds  and methods  of 
detecting  fraud." 
— The  AICPA and auditors  should  "be  aware  of  possible  deficiencies  in individual  audit 
techniques  and steps." 
— Auditors  and clients  should  "understand  the limitations  of  incomplete  audits." 
The Expectations of Users 
The Commission notes (p. 31): "In the last ten years, a number of major frauds that 
independent auditors failed to detect have focused unfavorable attention on this aspect of the 
audit function."1 The Report also distinguishes between management fraud and non-
management fraud but does not seem to directly address another way of classifying fraud — 
defalcations, or those acts committed by employees as well as management to convert cash or 
other assets directly to their own benefit (which acts should be guarded against by the system of 
internal controls), and acts committed by management designed to misrepresent the company's 
financial position and results of operations in the financial statements, most often intended to 
produce indirect benefit to the perpetrators. This distinction is very significant; misrepresenta-
tions are much more difficult  to deter and detect through the operation of internal control 
systems, as so much is dependent on management's intention and veracity. The implications 
become significant when assessing the nature of assurance truly to be provided by an auditor's 
attestation concerning internal control weaknesses and efficacy  of illegal act controls (both 
discussed later herein). 
Fraud of any type represents a loss to the shareholders of a company and to the extent 
controls reduce the losses from fraud by an amount exceeding their cost, such control measures 
should be implemented. Clearly, the independent audit is a potentially effective  control 
mechanism concerning fraud. 
1 An abundance of this "unfavorable attention" is found in the Metcalf Staff  Study. Our firm's views on fraud detection, 
in response to the Staff  Study, are contained in Appendix A, page 1. 
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Touche Ross believes fraud detection is an extremely important subject.2 Both users and 
auditors are confused about it and clarification is necessary. However, as explained below, we 
believe the position the Commission has presented needs further  study. 
The Commission's Suggested Explanation of the Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection 
of Frauds 
"A  duty  to search  for  fraud"  — The Commission states (p. 36) that the auditor has a duty to 
search for fraud (with which we agree) and he should be expected to detect those frauds that 
the exercise of professional skill and care would normally  uncover. This specification says 
nothing of materiality although it follows a statement about the need to design audits to provide 
reasonable assurance3 that the financial statements are not affected  by material  fraud. 
We believe the Commission should be unequivocal in delimiting the auditor's reasonable 
assurance to the detection of frauds which would have a material effect  on the financial 
statements. Otherwise, minor peculations could be asserted to fall within the auditor's scope, 
which he would have to extend to be sure he found them. In essence, the application of 
"normal professional skill and care" would continue to mean whatever the courts adjudicate it 
to mean. 
The Commission might have meant a materiality modifier in its suggested requirement, as 
"normal skill and care" could be argued to include it. But we feel it was omitted intentionally 
because of the Commission's recommendations on studying controls (see p. 4-6 herein). 
Because of the importance of materiality as a parameter for the auditor's responsibility to search 
for fraud, we offer  the following comments and recommend their assimilation into the Commis-
sion's final report: 
• Materiality — The designation of "materiality" as a criterion for responsibility is 
essential to avoid confusion. Further, this requires that users (and auditors) must 
know what "material" means. The Commission recognizes (footnote 12, Section 
2) the importance of the FASB completing its study on materiality; this cannot be 
overemphasized. However, the FASB's effort  deals with materiality from an ac-
counting view (that an amount is material to the financial statements). The Com-
2 We are certainly aware of the gravity of management fraud, as we have suffered  the U.S. Financial fraud (ASR 153) 
and have implemented (see page 11-5 herein, concerning "defensive auditing") considerable procedures aimed at 
preventing a recurrence. 
The Commission mentions ASR 153 on pages 32 and 33. On page 32 the SEC homily in ASR 19 (1940) on McKesson 
& Robbins, Inc. is identified as "reiterated in 1974 in exactly the same terms in ASR No. 153." It was not reiterated, 
but was cited, in ASR 153. In any event the comparison seems inappropriate in the context of the Commission's 
Report.  It is our position that the deceptions in U.S. Financial were far more complex than those involved in 
McKesson & Robbins, although relative to the state of the auditing art at each of the respective dates we would agree 
that the detection was beyond what was expected of and normally practiced by auditors until in each instance 
spoken on by the SEC. And on page 33, the Commission indicates that transactions between U.S. Financial and 
related parties, with management not adequately disclosing the nature of the related parties or their existence, gave 
the appearance of income realization when in fact it did not occur. The inadequate disclosure should have been 
emphasized as victimizing both the financial statement users as well as the auditors. We maintain, and ASR No. 153 
agreed, that considerable information was withheld from us, and therefore  it could not be "adequately disclosed" in 
the financial statements, much less employed by us in the evaluation of the appropriateness of accounting principles 
applied. 
A further  feature in the U.S. Financial case was the inability of existing accounting principles to fit the "new kinds" of 
transactions developed by U.S. Financial. Auditors still face this problem in other areas currently, for example in the 
maneuverings to structure new transaction forms having a desired result because of or despite FASB Statement No. 
13. (Refer to footnote 4 on page 2-3.) 
3 Reasonable assurance for material asset "accountabil i ty" is also here ascribed to audit design. We have discussed 
the need for a definition of "accountabil i ty" in Section 1. 
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mission should also discuss materiality from an auditing  view as it is equally 
important and may not be receiving adequate consideration. Auditing materiality 
relates to the extent of tests considered necessary by auditors to obtain reasonable 
assurance that material errors or irregularities do not exist. This aspect of material-
ity has a direct effect,  for example, on the number of items examined in various 
tests. 
• Material Fraud — The independent auditor's program of examination should be 
designed and executed to provide reasonable assurance that fraud (regardless of 
whether committed by management or non-management employees) having a 
material effect  on the financial statements does not exist or has been detected. 
The auditor's efforts  would include a review and evaluation of internal controls to 
isolate areas where material fraud is a possibility, and the performance  of substan-
tive tests of balances and transactions which would provide a reasonable probabil-
ity of uncovering material effects  if they exist. 
• Non-material Fraud — Fraud which is not material is not desirable from any point 
of view. However, since its existence should not cause losses from reliance on the 
financial statements, its consequences are significantly different  than those of 
material fraud. Touche Ross believes that an approach which raises the level of 
audit effort  on all  audits  to a point which would ascertain the existence of 
non-material fraud, is inappropriate. However, if the directors and management 
believe additional effort  by independent auditors to be a cost-beneficial approach 
to controlling non-material fraud, they should be engaged — apart from the 
regular audit — for such purpose. 
• Limitation on Discovery — In those cases where the auditor's tests utilize appro-
priate available procedures, are applied to a reasonable number of items where 
samples are used, and are carried out diligently and thoroughly, his respon-
sibilities should be considered fulfilled.  Nevertheless, failure to detect material 
fraud in these circumstances could occur (1) because audit evidence is effectively 
altered or suppressed, e.g., through forgery  or collusion, so that no reasonable 
audit procedures could expose the fraud, or (2) because the use of sampling 
caused the necessary evidence not to have been selected. 
As to forgery,  the auditor does not presently have, and should not be expected to 
have in the future, an obligation to verify the authenticity of documents in the 
absence of justified suspicions. And skillful collusion will not be detected by the 
use of procedures now used or to become available to auditors.4 
Sampling risk (i.e., not selecting the faulty items for examination) is attendant to 
cost-effective  auditing, especially when viewed for society as a whole. The proper 
application of statistical sampling should be allowed as an effective  defense; but 
the auditor must still answer for the appropriateness of his pre-sampling assess-
ment of the degree of error or fraud possibilities.5 
4 SAS 16, "The Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors and Irregularities," paragraphs 11-13. 
5 Statistical sampling results are easily quantifiable, but measuring the risk of error or fraud needs much more research. 
-
Recommendations on a Standard of Care for Fraud Detection 
"Effective  client  investigation  program"  — The Commission states (on p. 37): "A systematic 
approach to investigating a prospective client before accepting a new engagement, and a 
periodic review of continuing engagements are essential tools of independent auditors." We 
support the view expressed in SAS No. 4, "Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of 
Independent Auditors," that an auditor has no duty other than to himself with respect to the 
acceptance, rejection or retention of clients. We believe we have been among the first  to 
formally adopt detailed standards and requirements for the screening of new clients as well as 
for reassessment of existing clients. Of course, our policies come down to the same conclusion 
as the Commission does: should the auditor have good reason to doubt the integrity of a 
prospective client's management, he should decline the engagement. There are difficult  deci-
sions to be made, and therefore  some latitude in judgment must be expected. 
There is another school of thought that holds that "almost anything" is auditable in that the 
auditor may employ all  the procedures he deems appropriate, and if he finds that there are 
needed procedures he cannot employ (e.g., because of an inability to satisfy himself about 
management's intentions or about completeness of information),  he always has the vehicle of 
his report to make those scope limitations known. 
The proper approach has to lie somewhere in between — a reasonable latitude for the 
auditor to accept new clients, along with an expectation that extraordinary audit procedures 
may sometimes be preplanned for a new client. 
We believe that the auditing standards board should articulate criteria for new client 
acceptance.6 If, in fact, such standards could be challenged because of discrimination, it would 
be better to know that rather than to have each individual auditor set his own rules on sensitive 
issues. Naturally, each audit firm would have to employ detailed approaches consistent with its 
own internal operating philosophies. For example, it may be appropriate to reject a prospective 
client not because of any reason relative to the client, but because the audit firm does not have 
expertise in the client's specialized industry, and it would not be economical to devote the time 
and expense necessary to obtaining a proper level of expertise. 
Prior to the advent of SAS No. 4, little attention was given to the need for the auditor to 
formally address the question of client retention. We have had such a concept in practice for 
many years, but only invoked it when something occurred to raise a question about the 
continued relationship with a client. However, in 1975, we adopted, on an experimental basis, 
6 Touche Ross & Co. has developed extensive, yet balanced, procedures for new client investigations, and we 
synopsize them here in the event the Commission wishes to be more specific in its final report. Our procedures, 
which are more intensive for publicly-held companies, include obtaining and evaluating a list of key officers, 
directors and principal stockholders; talking with key personnel reviewing recent financial statements; talking with 
mutual acquaintances, such as bankers and attorneys; discussing with the prior accounting firm the reason for 
termination and possible reasons why we should not accept the engagement; and preliminarily evaluating the 
conditions of records, the accounting system and the financial personnel. In addition, we may obtain a business 
information report on the company, its key management personnel, directors and controlling shareholders. 
We require that our extensive new client investigation procedures be documented. All unfavorable answers to our 
new client questionnaire must be fully explained and explicit rationale given as to our position with respect to the 
matter and how it wi l l affect  the scope of our audit. 
We recognize that certain companies are not good business risks for our firm and engagements with them should be 
refused. These include companies with an unsavory reputation (such as prior criminal conviction) of officers  or 
directors, use of unacceptable accounting principles, extremely weak financial condition of the company, or 
situations where the proposed client was previously a client that discharged us under unfriendly circumstances. 
Accordingly, our policies require that in accepting any new client in the firm's accounting and auditing functional 
area, we must make a fundamental and thorough evaluation of the proposed client. 
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an annual review by engagement management under the title of "Client Profile and Audit 
Scope" (CPAS form). We require that this profile be completed for every publicly held client 
and it is optionally applied to others. This form represents a detailed review of client charac-
teristics for purposes of assessing retention and assisting in the annual challenge of the scope of 
the engagement. 
Our profile gathers information with respect to nature of the business, the assigned engage-
ment personnel, and summary financial data of the client. Background on the client is included 
which indicates the key management personnel, reasons for changes in management person-
nel, profile of the board of directors, and identity of individuals with whom the client is 
associated. The engagement partner must himself complete certain sections of the form and 
make an overall evaluation of the propriety of retaining the client. 
Public accounting firms render a quality service to society and to their clients, and should be 
dedicated to retaining the value of their firm names in the business community and with the 
general public. We believe that every auditing firm must develop effective  new client investiga-
tion and client retention procedures to ensure that the services of the profession are rendered to 
clients with integrity and credibility. 
We are now in the process of incorporating the experimental CPAS form into the regular 
auditing standards of our firm. We think our experiment was successful, as it did identify a few 
situations requiring close scrutiny. But most important, it gave us the assurance that our audit 
scope was properly tailored to particular client attributes. 
"Untrustworthy  management..."  — The Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  states (p. 38): 
"Doubts about management integrity cannot be 'satisfactorily resolved' merely by the exten-
sion of normal audit tests." And, "...the auditor should consider abandoning his attempt to 
audit; that is, he should consider resignation or other appropriate responses." The Commission 
goes on to state that the only way a resolution of doubts can occur is for the auditor to satisfy 
himself that the doubts were unfounded. It seems unrealistic to state this so categorically: 
"doubts" should not be dealt with as if they were always facts to be proved or disproved. 
While we would agree that a resolved doubt is one that is unfounded, there should also be 
room to adjust audit scope relative to "less-strongly-held" doubts — not as a means of proving 
there was no substance to the doubts — but simply to assure by appropriate audit procedures 
that whatever the possible inimical effect  of the doubt on proper financial reporting could be, it 
is not likely to occur. As an example, a doubt about a client's representation of no "relation-
ship" with a major customer may not be disprovable, but the auditor can establish many 
procedures to audit for this factor. 7 
"Predisposition  to management frauds"  — The Commission recommends (on p. 38): "In 
planning and conducting his examination, the auditor should take into account unusual 
circumstances or relationships that may predispose management to commit frauds." As this 
recommendation seems already called for by SAS Nos. 6 and 16, we think that should be 
acknowledged in the Commission's final report. If an extension of existing standards is con-
templated, that should be made clear and the standards should be explicated. 
7 We have suggested a number of procedures in our Technical Letter No. 149 on "Management Involvement in 
Material Transactions." None of the procedures are guaranteed to prove the point, but they wi l l cause penetration to 
a considerably greater extent that if they were not applied. Note that SAS No. 6 on "Related Party Transactions" is 
also more advisory than prescriptive when it comes to specialized auditing procedures. 
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"Understanding  of  a client's  business  and industry"  — We agree that a prerequisite for 
performing  a satisfactory audit is a knowledge of the client's business and peculiarities of the 
industries in which it operates. This Commission recommendation is within the subsection 
"...on a Standard of Care for Fraud Detection," but it is not clear what special knowledge of 
industry practices specifically contributes to fraud detection. 
Within industry groups, there are wide differences  from company to company and these are 
as important to understand as "industry peculiarities" in performing  all phases of a satisfactory 
audit. For example, many companies may have business segments in more than one industry.8 
A greater depth of knowledge of industry peculiarities is probably needed in auditing overall, 
and not only for fraud detection. Accordingly, we believe that the focus should be on requiring 
the auditor to understand the economic factors underlying the particular business, given the 
products and services it provides and the markets in which it operates. Sharing industry 
characteristics with many other independent entities may simply facilitate the previously 
experienced auditor's understanding of the business. 
Overall, the Commission's recommendation as an objective in every audit makes sense. To 
make it more helpful and to place it in the proper perspective, we suggest the last paragraph9 of 
this subsection be rewritten to de-emphasize the industry slant, as follows: 
Knowledge of substantial financial or business-related risks deliberately or unwit-
tingly accepted by the company under examination is important to the auditor. Such 
risks can represent instability in the company's financial position. Thus, related audit 
areas may be more sensitive and require extended procedures to properly evaluate 
them; and there may be significant uncertainties requiring disclosure. 
Though all of the steps required to understand the company's business in the conduct 
of a satisfactory audit are also necessary in determining substantial financial or 
business-related risks, the Commission believes additional steps are required as well. 
Presently, the profession has not, to any significant extent, defined such risks and 
appropriate methods of revealing them. Definition should be undertaken on a formal 
basis as soon as possible and incorporated in generally accepted auditing standards. 
"Extend  the study  and evaluation  of  internal  control"  — The Commission states (p. 39) that: 
"The auditor should be concerned with all controls that have a significant bearing on the 
prevention and detection of fraud." Because fraud is fluid, there is no way to create the 
"ultimate" prevention controls particularly if collusion is involved. The present requirement 
that the auditor study existing systems of internal control to determine the extent of reliance 
thereon in the setting of audit scope is, in our opinion, the proper standard which should not be 
disturbed. SAS No. 16, which requires that an audit be planned and carried out in such a way 
8 Attempts to establish explicit standards for industry competence would require resolving a fundamental question — 
what is an industry? This is more difficult  than it might appear. In some industries there are close similarities, for 
example, commercial banks, mutual savings and loan associations, and life insurance companies. However, 
especially outside of the financial services area, industry categorization can become extremely difficult.  For example, 
is manufacturing an industry? A brief  review of the SIC codes within manufacturing wi l l demonstrate how difficult 
classification can be. Companies subjected to comprehensive government regulation tend to be more easily 
classifiable. 
What this all points out is that although industry knowledge, in a general way, is important to understanding a 
business, other factors such as size and diversity of the operations are at least as important. 
9 The Commission has overstated its point by asking the auditor to "make every  effort  to acquire all  readily available 
knowledge that might  lead to the perception of substantial financial or business related risks..." (emphasis added). 
We are not aware of what "readily available" means in the final analysis, and some reasonable limit should be set. 
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as to provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are not materially affected  by 
errors or irregularities, does not specify a single approach. We think that the auditor should not 
assume responsibility for all systems, when there can be no assurance that "perfection" in 
those systems will prevent material fraud. 
It is an incorrect assumption, if made by the Commission, that the auditor already studies and 
evaluates "all controls, at least in publicly-held companies, that have a significant bearing on 
the prevention and detection of fraud." He wil l study a description of controls in areas having 
the potential to materially affect  the financial statements, but he will not necessarily perform 
tests of compliance (we think this is what the Commission means by "evaluation") in all those 
areas. Often he will choose a mostly substantive (year-end verification) approach. 
The Commission may be recommending a substantial addition to the cost of auditing without 
commensurate benefit, as well as suggesting to those who rely on auditors' services that a 
substantially greater protection will be given against material fraud. We believe the present 
standards are adequate, and we urge the Commission to reconsider this recommendation. 
"Disseminate  information  on frauds"  — We wholeheartedly agree, subject to protecting the 
rights of those who may be accused but not adjudged guilty, that "methods and procedures 
should be adopted for public accounting firms to exchange information on developments in the 
perpetration and detection of fraud. The AICPA should establish means for regular dissemina-
tion of that type of information." 
A wider distribution of the perpetration details in previous material frauds wil l, at least, 
confine other potential perpetrators into narrower, untried avenues; and such publicity by itself 
might make new fraud opportunities more easily detectable. 
The report on Equity Funding is a good example of the kind of analysis suggested by the 
Commission. However, considerable effort  was required to produce that report, and if this level 
of effort  is needed every time fraud information is to be disseminated, knowledgeable prac-
titioners will have insufficient  time to contribute. Therefore,  perhaps the method to be used 
should be more factual and mechanical, than evaluative. Evaluations should be left to the 
courts. 
We believe the AICPA is the appropriate vehicle for the dissemination of this material. A 
standing committee could be charged with responsibility for this function, although it could just 
as easily be made a part of the auditing standards board, such as a subcommittee thereof.  In this 
manner, the possible need for improvements in auditing standards could be more timely 
observed. 
"Effectiveness  of  conventional  auditing  techniques"  — The Commission asks (p. 40) that 
"constant attention should be given ...to the effectiveness  of conventional auditing techniques 
and to the development of new ones." This is an appropriate recommendation and should 
probably be repeated in (or moved to) Section 10.10 Most of the research efforts  have been 
related to financial accounting and reporting in recent years with little research and guidance 
on auditing methods. 
10 Care should be taken to avoid the inference, however, that the "proper" combination of auditing procedures wi l l 
invariably "provide complete assurance of validity." 
4-
"Limitations  of  incomplete  audits"  — It is exceedingly important that a client understand the 
limitations on an auditor's engagement whether it be a normal audit engagement or one of the 
seemingly limitless special engagements for internal purposes. The greatest difficulty  auditors 
have is communicating the extent of their responsibility, and this is especially evident in areas 
where the auditors are or may be in a position to issue a report other than the standard audit 
report for general public use (for example, reports on internal control and on limited reviews of 
interim financial information).  To assure a minimum of misunderstanding, limitations should be 
required to be stated in the auditor's formal report. 
The Commission's acknowledgement (on p. 40) that there are "inherent limitations" in 
"undertaking special engagements that contain an element of fraud detection" does not resolve 
the fundamental problem of a lack of specificity as to what the auditor ought to accomplish by 
the employment of a given procedure. Although finality can never be achieved in these matters, 
a great deal more attention needs to be paid to procedural "cause and effect"  relationships. 
Most auditors will devise valid procedures if the objective is attainable and clearly stated. 
Having done that, the auditor should not have immense difficulty  in communicating (even if 
lengthily) such information to a knowledgeable user of his report. 
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SECTION 5 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— There  is a need for  clear  specification  of  illegal  or  questionable  acts. 
— Corporate  statements  of  policy  and monitoring  thereof  are  needed. 
— Auditors  should  detect  those illegal  or  questionable  acts  that  the exercise  of  profes-
sional  skill  and care  would  normally  uncover. 
• Adequate  consideration  to a detected  illegal  or  questionable  act  must  be given 
at the appropriate  level  of  authority. 
• Auditors  should  review  management's  guidelines,  policies  and monitoring  pro-
cedures,  to evaluate  whether  they  contain  material  weaknesses. 
— Management  should  include  in the annual  report  a statement  of  policy  on illegal  or 
questionable  acts  and that  procedures  have been implemented  to monitor  com-
pliance. 
— Legal  counsel  should  have increased  involvement. 
An Evolving Public Concern 
We can not help but observe that the title of this Section contains the word "accountability." 
We earlier discussed (p. 1-2 and footnote 2 thereon) the need for a uniform description. At 
that juncture the emphasis was on financial statements being useful in demonstrating manage-
ment's "accountability." Here in Section 5, by linking "corporate accountability" with law, the 
proposition can be made that law-accountability is therefore  to be served by the financial 
statements. As explained in our remarks which follow, we think this is a proper direction to 
explore, but we are concerned that present financial accounting and reporting are not ready for 
the burden. Auditors are not lawyers, though they may be expected to have some knowledge of 
legal concepts, certainly not in a depth sufficient  to identify and assess or adjudge illegality 
without advice of (or reliance on) counsel competent in the particular issues. So-called 
questionable acts are even more elusive of identification — both to auditors and lawyers (these 
include acts not provably illegal and acts, while legal, which are offensive  to the public's moral 
tenor — all as interpreted by the public constituency's elected representatives in Congress and 
appointed governmental regulatory agents. 
In our remarks which follow we agree in principle with most of what the Commission 
recommends, but with these general qualifications: 
1. Materiality for purposes of financial reporting should not be uniformly established at 
a level so quantitatively or qualitatively low that, in addition to capturing all detected 
illegal and questionable acts as they are to be defined, profuse other detail is swept 
in, possibly making financial reporting unintelligible. 
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2. The Commission's acceptance of reportability within financial statements of detected 
illegal or questionable acts might be somewhat premature.1 The public clamor for 
auditor guardianship, of itself, is not in our view a proper reason for adoption of 
disclosure requirements. Yet the SEC has not generally felt financial statement 
inclusion needed — though disclosure in SEC filings outside of financial statements 
has been the SEC's reasoned remedy. Only where the enterprise and its auditor have 
assessed that effects  of the events have a reasonable probability of materially  affect-
ing the financial statements has financial statement and (sometimes) auditor report 
inclusion been deemed necessary. 
3. Focusing by the Commission on illegal or questionable payments, but not on civil 
rights or other social accounting topics,2 along with the fact that this Section is 
virtually the only one in the Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  not having been 
debated for years by auditors, seems to underscore the contemporary nature of the 
subject. Once added to the auditor's responsibilities, it wil l not likely be removed, 
though its importance may diminish by the advent of later "public" concerns. A 
future cause celebre, for example, might be energy efficiency. 
4. In general, we are in favor of publicly held corporations adopting codes of conduct 
with respect to illegal and questionable acts. Surely such codes are useful to prevent 
misunderstanding by officers  or employees, but we think that most instances forbid-
den by such codes are already well-known to employees ("ignorantia  juris  neminem 
excusat").  Thus, monitoring becomes the critical factor,  and cleverly designed ap-
proaches to avoid "being caught" in violation of corporate standards may nonethe-
less evade detection by even the most penetrating of audit techniques. 
It has often been alleged that auditors should have an additional "sense" permitting 
them to perceive the existence of a missing ingredient where others would fail. While 
the auditor should use logic in piecing together all of the information coming to his 
attention, he is not clairvoyant as the Commission admits, and the Commission 
carefully avoids overemphasizing what will be achieved by codes of conduct and 
compliance auditing. 
5. The Commission should prepare to identify how future topical matters become 
incorporated in the auditor's function and how matters no longer topical are elimi-
nated or relegated to others. 
6. The Commission's recommendation for the establishment of a proper auditor's role 
in the area of illegal or questionable acts has to be given very cautious regard, simply 
because of the electrified atmosphere created by disclosures of such acts. 
1 Similarly, SAS No. 17, "Illegal Acts by Clients," is reactionary in dealing with this subject, as is our firm's proprietary 
Technical Letter No. 154 on "Illegal Payments." We think reaction is better than no action, but this is not a 
deliberative way to steer the course of a profession. 
2 Social Accounting is mentioned briefly in the Commission's Report  at pp. 69-70. The AICPA Committee on Social 
Measurement has since published The  Measurement  of  Corporate  Social  Performance,  which delves into the subject 
in depth. 
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7. Law is practiced by lawyers, geology by geologists, property valuations by apprais-
ers, and on and on. We must be extremely careful  not to assume every responsibility 
no one else wants.3 
In the subsection on "Confusion Over the Auditor's Responsibilities..."4 the Commission 
remarks (on p. 44) that the guidance provided by SAS No. 17 is not enough. We agree. In 
particular it was expanded to cover "illegal acts" when it should have dealt with "illegal 
payments" which are more closely related to financial statements,5 and therefore  could have 
been more incisively dealt with. 
Further, the action expected by the auditor under SAS No. 17 in obtaining assurance of 
"appropriate consideration" as to detected illegal acts even though immaterial, such as 
withdrawing from the engagement, is a commendable idea in concept but lacks specificity — 
thereby making such a requirement dangerous when later challenges arise. Given the short 
duration between releasing SAS No. 1 7 and the issuance of the Commission's Report,  however, 
the opportunity to improve on SAS No. 17 is timely. 
In the subsection on "Limitations on the Auditor's Ability to Deal with Legal Matters," the 
Commission notes that auditors "...are not lawyers nor are they criminal investigators, and they 
do not presently  possess the training or skills of either group" (emphasis added). We are 
concerned about what the Commission has in mind for the future. If the auditor is, over a period 
of time, to assimilate other disciplines having a bearing on social accountability (the Commis-
sion's thrust in Section 1) there is no discipline or expertise which may escape the auditor's 
comprehension. Rather than overemphasize what will be achieved by codes of conduct and 
compliance auditing, we suggest that there be a concerted effort  to involve legal counsel to the 
fullest extent of their expertise. 
3 Refer to our comments on p. 1-3 on auditors not being "panacean equalizers." 
4 The Report says: "For example, auditors are familiar with the federal  income tax laws and would be expected to 
recognize tax evasion by a client." The discovery of tax fraud is subject to the same limitations as exist in the auditing 
area, e.g., collusion and forgery. 
5 In our technical letter, we define "il legal payments" as "direct or indirect payments (in cash or in kind) for the 
express or implied purpose of  obtaining  favor,  in an illegal  manner.  ('Favor' should be understood to include both 
active and passive matters. Forbearance (failure to prosecute, for example) is, therefore,  included. 'Illegal manner' 
refers  to either or both the payment or the means used in bestowing favor.)  Such payments would encompass the 
broad categories of direct or indirect political contributions, bribes, kickbacks, and payoffs.  These matters have been 
the subject of a number of recent SEC actions. The use of the phrase 'illegal payments' should be understood as 
having applicability only to the payments mentioned in this paragraph. 
"We believe the auditor should not be held responsible for failure to identify and or properly evaluate all payments 
which are or could be alleged to be illegal, provided he has performed his audit in conformity with generally 
accepted auditing standards. He should, however, be alert, during his audit, for illegal payments which could have a 
material effect  on the financial statements." 
By contrast, SAS No. 17, paragraph 3 states: "The determination of whether an act is illegal is usually beyond (the 
auditor's) professional competence. The auditor's training and experience, however, ordinarily should provide a 
reasonable basis for an awareness that some client acts coming to an auditor's attention in the performance  of his 
examination might be illegal. Nevertheless, the further  removed an illegal act is from the events and transactions 
specifically reflected in financial statements, the less likely the auditor is to become aware of the act or recognize its 
possible illegality. For example, violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act are not ordinarily specifically 
reflected in financial statements, and the auditor ordinarily does not have a sufficient  basis for the awareness needed 
to recognize the possible illegality of such violations." 
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A Framework for Auditor Participation to Help Achieve Corporate Legal Accountability 
Specification  of  illegal  or  questionable  acts"  — We agree wholeheartedly with the Com-
mission's recommendation that a clear specification of illegal or questionable acts is an 
essential prerequisite to assure the reasonable success of any program to obtain disclosure of 
clients' questionable and illegal acts. However, the Commission's point needs to be expanded. 
Specification of illegality and questionability can be meaningful only in the context of the 
intended usefulness of the information. 
For instance, if the principal concern is to assure that adequate disclosure is made to 
investors and creditors, there should be postulated what their interest is, and why. Parking 
violations by officers  would not be included, as some measure of magnitude would be adopted. 
In many cases, the amounts paid would probably be immaterial in relation to the financial 
statements, but legal actions which could follow from public disclosure of the problems might 
be material. We believe that reasonably workable standards could be developed for identifying 
illegal acts which might have to be disclosed and financial measures for determining whether 
they should be disclosed. 
Questionable acts (those legal acts thought to be unethical or to possibly be illegal), on the 
other hand, need to be defined much more specifically. There are presently no objective 
criteria for questionable acts, as there are for illegal acts upon adjudication. Legality can be 
evaluated by comparison of the activities at hand with the law (regulatory, legislative, and 
judicial), but there is no comparable basis for establishing questionability. 
In any event, it is most important that criteria be developed for distinguishing, from among all 
the questionable and illegal acts which could occur, those which would require disclosure. 
Otherwise, economical means for disclosure cannot be devised, as managements will not be 
able to systematize the gathering of information. The high cost of meticulous scrutiny of many 
different  areas for illegal or questionable items through special investigative efforts  can be 
minimized only where a systematic approach is used. Cost savings which can flow from 
systemization can be felt at several levels: 
1. Managements can operate by exception rather than by personal investigation; 
2. Those charged with detection (under the Commission's proposal, internal auditors, 
independent auditors, and lawyers) could test systems and rely on existent controls as 
a means of restricting investigative scope; and 
3. The disruption to normal activities created by management's attention to nonproduc-
tive activities would be reduced. 
SAS 17 interprets generally accepted auditing standards to require auditors to be alert for 
illegal acts needing disclosure in a client's financial statements and recognizes that other 
nondisclosable illegal acts may also be discussed. The SAS also avers that detection of illegal 
acts is not the primary purpose of an audit and thus some may go undetected, simply because 
of limitations inherent in auditing techniques. It wil l be essential that the specification of illegal 
or questionable acts and their disclosure criteria be balanced with the requirements of gener-
ally accepted accounting principles. To specify relatively inconsequential threshold limits for 
disclosure of illegal or questionable acts within the framework  of generally accepted account-
ing principles could eventually bring down other accounting materiality limits, and possibly 
result in an immense increase in society's cost for auditing. 
Careful  consideration should be given to where and how questionable and illegal matters not 
material in relationship to the financial statements should be disclosed, if in fact they should be 
disclosed. 
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Another key issue is to identify who is to decide the specific disclosure criteria for illegal and 
questionable acts. We believe this responsibility should lie with regulatory agencies and should 
be based on specific enabling legislation. The objectives of having disclosure of illegal and 
questionable acts should be set by Congress which should also parcel out enforcement 
authority to appropriate regulatory bodies. The Financial Accounting Standards Board should 
then delineate criteria for reporting of illegal and possibly of questionable acts in financial 
statements. 
"Necessary  corporate  actions"  - The  Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  states (p. 46) that 
"Corporations must also adopt procedures to provide for effective  monitoring of compliance. 
To the extent that independent auditors are to be involved in monitoring compliance with such 
policies there must be an understanding and identification of the parts of the policy statement 
that can be audited." 
The Commission correctly concludes that developing means of monitoring corporate ac-
countability ought to accrue to the corporations themselves, and that not all aspects of 
corporate codes of conduct would be susceptible of effective  compliance monitoring by 
auditors. Auditors can be helpful in designing audit techniques applicable to companies' policy 
statements. Where the aim is to test compliance with a client's code of conduct, auditors can 
do so reasonably efficiently  for most provisions. But auditors cannot be expected to provide 
assurance as to inherent effectiveness  of conduct codes to satisfy imprecisely stated societal 
goals. Thus it should be stated that auditors should not be expected to monitor compliance with 
an unspecified general standard6 far more vigorous than many corporations could realistically 
adopt as policy statements. The auditor's expertise should lie in evaluating the probable 
effectiveness  of certain of the company's controls intended to assure compliance with its stated 
conduct code. 
Nonetheless, certain elements are becoming tacitly understood to be essential ingredients of 
corporate conduct codes. For instance, one could hardly argue that codes of conduct should 
not prohibit the making of illegal political contributions or bribery of officials  of foreign 
governments. 
The problems are that not all clients have codes of conduct, not all codes of conduct are the 
same, and the objectives that the codes of conduct should achieve have not been specified 
anywhere. Thus, the effectiveness  of the use of independent auditors in monitoring compliance 
with corporate codes of conduct cannot be expected to surpass the inherent effectiveness  of the 
codes themselves. 
In order to assure that corporate codes adopted by companies meet satisfactory standards, 
such standards, including materiality specification, will have to be developed and disclosure of 
deviations from those standards (i.e., detected noncompliance) should be required by law or 
regulation. 
Conduct  Code Considerations  — The problem the Commission and the profession are 
grappling with will not be resolved through the single dimension approach of requiring policy 
statements. In fact, overemphasis of the value of policy statements could hamper the develop-
ment by companies of a more comprehensive approach to near-elimination of the future 
occurrence of illegal payments. We considered this factor in designing our firm's approach to 
6 For example, an imputation of "whatever" a code of conduct is popularly expected to encompass, regardless of what 
it says. 
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assessing the risk of illegal or questionable payments being made and in considering the nature 
of controls or policies that might prevent or delimit them. Many factors other than codes are 
involved. 
The general framework  of controls and policy developed by us in the area are the following: 7 
"Internal control features supplementing the usual accounting controls which may 
normally be considered to minimize the likelihood of illegal payments are consid-
ered in the following sections. 
General 
1. Existence of a policy8 requiring compliance with all laws and regulations which 
apply to the company. 
2. A requirement that all significant contractual arrangements which entail an obliga-
tion on the part of the company be written and/or approved by counsel. 
3. A requirement that all material transactions in which management is involved be 
specifically approved by the board of directors. 
4. Existence of outside counsel or a reasonably autonomous legal department 
charged with the responsibility to determine and monitor compliance with laws 
and regulations to which the company is subject. 
5. Existence of a formal conflict of interest policy which is adequately policed. 
6. Existence of an appropriate policy (and administrative controls designed to de-
monstrate compliance with the policy) requiring an investigation of the business 
reputation of persons having the authority to represent the company, with the 
extent of the investigation commensurate with the authority of the representative. 
The policy would usually apply to consultants and agents, but should also encom-
pass employees. 
Currency Transactions 
1. Transactions in currency except for petty cash, payroll, and other normal business 
transactions always paid in cash should be prohibited except where a specific 
need is clearly demonstrated, documented and approved at an appropriate level. 
2. A strict accounting should be kept of all corporate currency funds and transac-
tions. The currency for each transaction other than petty cash, payroll or other 
normal business transaction always paid in cash should be provided by cashing a 
check specifically drawn for that purpose. 
3. Adequate review by internal audit. 
Soft Expenses 
1. Invoices submitted to the company for payment of soft expenses should detail the 
service rendered, including, as appropriate, hours worked, billing rates, etc. 
7 The source of this data is our firm's Technical Letter No. 154, "Illegal Payments," November 30, 1975, and is 
provided in the event the Commission intends more specifics in its final report. 
8 We provided our auditors with samples of actual published policy statements; we did not require that the policy be 
published outside the company. 
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2. Formal written contracts should exist for all agency arrangements which include 
provisions which prohibit the agent from acting illegally in the corporation's 
behalf and which require a strict accounting for all corporate funds over which the 
agent has custody. 
3. The company should provide an engagement letter to or receive a proposal letter 
from all professional firms and consultants describing in detail the services to be 
provided. 
4. Regular written reports should be forthcoming from agents and consultants in 
conjunction with significant long-term projects, and the significant content of 
project-related meetings and phone contacts should be documented in file 
memoranda. 
Management Compensation 
1. Existence of formal undertakings by management personnel to comply with corpo-
rate policies and applicable laws and regulations when acting on behalf of the 
corporation, and also perhaps contracts indicating the amount of compensation or 
the manner in which it is to be determined. 
2. Non-standard management bonuses and special compensation arrangements 
should be specifically approved by the board of directors." 
We think that if the Commission emphasized a spectrum of controls as the corporate 
requirement, this would have the added benefit of inculcating in management and the board of 
directors their primary responsibility to prevent or delimit illegal payments. Whatever formal 
and publicized conduct code follows from that is, then, the product of doing the basic work, 
and not the object in itself. 
"Exercise  of  professional  skill  and care"  as a standard  for  uncovering  illegal  or  questionable 
acts;  adequate  consideration  of  detected  illegal  acts  and auditor's  review  of  company  policies 
and procedures  - In discussing "Recommendations of the independent auditor's respon-
sibilities," p. 46, the Commission states: "In the course of an audit, ... the independent auditor 
should be expected to detect those illegal or questionable acts that the exercise of professional 
skill and care would normally uncover. Additional guidance is necessary on the meaning of the 
appropriate exercise of professional skill and care in this area. Important elements would 
include guidance on the evaluation of areas of risk and exposure to illegal acts, recognition of 
warning signs of the existence of such acts, and development of audit procedures applicable to 
those circumstances." 
We agree that guidance additional to that already contained in SAS No. 1 7, "Illegal Acts by 
Clients," is needed. We have studied the issue and have advised our firm's auditors to consider 
the following matters9 for each of the identified items: 
1. Recognition of warning signs of such acts: 
In addition to the matters included in SAS No. 1 7 that may raise questions about the 
possible existence of illegal acts, when auditing material transactions, also consider 
the following: 
9 The remaining comments in this subsection are paraphrased from Touche Ross TL No. 154. 
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— Examine large currency (as opposed to check) transactions as they are not as easily 
controllable or auditable as check transactions. Further, the necessity for making 
large currency payments should be established by reference  to the company's 
normal business operations. 
— Watch for unusual credits to receivables and unusual bonuses paid to employees. 
(Employees or customers may be reimbursed through such transactions for politi-
cal contributions or other payments made on behalf of the corporation.) 
— Investigate purchases from vendors whose names do not appear on the approved 
vendor list or from whom services (rather than goods) charged to cost of sales are 
purchased. 
— Identify and examine contracts, invoices and similar evidential matter supporting 
service expenses — including consulting and management fees, professional fees, 
advertising, promotion and public relations. Consider the reasonableness of 
charges for services received. Also, consider company controls which assure that 
services billed were actually provided. 
2. Evaluation of areas of risk and exposure to illegal acts: 
In all audit engagements our auditors are to: 
— Assess whether the nature of a company's business or the existence of warning 
signs of such transactions would suggest a need for instituting specific accounting 
and/or administrative controls designed to prevent or delimit the occurrence of 
illegal payments and/or the adoption of corporate policy statement; if so, com-
municate such a recommendation to the company. If such controls or policy 
statement exist, evaluate and test compliance, as part of the review and testing of 
the system of internal control, whether such controls or policy statement seem to 
be effectively  designed and operating. 
3. Development of audit procedures applicable to those circumstances: 
When matters are identified that require additional attention, we have developed 
corresponding procedures. For example, when amounts paid for services appear 
unreasonable, we request both a representation from the client as well as the 
recipient of the payment concerning the pertinent facts surrounding the payment. 
We have also specified the additional procedures to be performed by our auditors 
when any of the following conditions exist: 
— Inability to complete procedures (for example, receive a satisfactory representa-
tion from the client or the recipient of the payment for services in the above 
example). 
— Audit evidence obtained is either contradictory or inconclusive. 
— A matter the auditor believes is illegal. 
— A matter that is illegal. 
These conditions include all of those delineated in SAS No. 17 and incorporate the 
following additional procedures: 
(a) Board  of  Directors  — inform client management and the board of directors of the 
matter. SAS 17 does not require this treatment of all  such matters. 
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(b) Within  our  firm  — all such matters must be brought to the attention of designated 
specified personnel in our firm to assure adequate consideration. Ordinarily, our 
firm's internal legal counsel wil l also be notified. 
When we are aware of a material possibly illegal act or a material illegal act, we 
further  require that the company obtain the written opinion of outside counsel. The 
company, in such a case, should request counsel to address the following elements: 
— Pertinent facts or assumed facts as counsel understands them. This documents the 
basis on which counsel wil l be rendering an opinion. Further, our auditors are 
required to perform appropriate auditing procedures with respect to the facts and 
assumed facts on which counsel's opinion is based. 
— The legal counsel's opinion should consider (1) whether there is a penalty which 
might attach to the payment, and if so, the amount; and (2) whether the transac-
tions in question have significance with respect to income tax deductibility or 
other circumstances such as "cost plus" contracts. 
— Based on the stipulated facts and legal counsel's assessment of the legal ramifica-
tions, counsel versed in U.S. Securities Laws should be asked to explicitly state 
whether he has recommended that the client disclose the circumstances and 
whether non-disclosure by the company would cause him to withdraw from 
representing the company. 
— The advice of counsel concerning possible or proposed rectification. 
We have just described, in summary form, the guidance we had developed for the review of 
controls or policies adopted by companies to prevent or delimit the occurrence of illegal 
payments. This guidance, we believe, is congruent with the Commission's suggestion to 
develop specific guidance concerning the "exercise of due professional skill and care." As this 
guidance also requires our auditors to review and monitor compliance with a company's 
adopted policy statement and/or controls, we not only agree with the Commission's suggestion 
but have substantively implemented it. 
Reporting  on Corporate  Codes of  Conduct  — The Commission states that "If the company 
has adopted a policy on illegal or questionable acts, the report by management in the annual 
report should include a statement that such a policy exists and that procedures have been 
implemented to monitor compliance." 
Mandatory publication of codes of conduct may appear overly pious; therefore  we suggest 
voluntary publication, with emphasis on controls and their probable efficacy.  We are also 
concerned about whether the auditor should be required to indicate in his report whether 
material weaknesses exist in the company's system in this area. We discuss this further  in 
Section 7. 
We believe that auditors should not be expected to evaluate the adequacy  of corporate 
policy statements. They can report that provisions of a specific type are not included in a 
client's code, if there is some established standard for use in identifying omitted provisions. As 
we have previously recommended, we believe that such standards should be established by 
legislation or regulation. 
Legal  counsel  involvement  — We are strongly in favor of legal counsel being in a key 
position as to determinations concerning illegal and questionable acts. And we agree with the 
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Commission's indication that legal counsel has a greater role than he is now will ing to fill, in 
the area of legal uncertainties, litigation, and claims both asserted and unasserted.10 (In general, 
we favor a separate report by legal counsel, but wil l discuss this in Section 7.) 
* * * * * 
Earlier in this section we summarized the procedures pursued in our firm in marshalling the 
advice we and a corporate board of directors need in addressing illegal and questionable acts. 
It is only fair  to state that our success in accomplishment of those procedures has not always 
been total, and never without some debates with lawyers in significant cases. 
This problem has been too long awaiting a resolution. Auditors, attorneys, management and 
the board of directors should cooperate in arriving at the best possible consensus in a given 
situation. With today's governmental rhetoric about "wants" but vacuum in specifics, no one 
of these four groups should succumb to extending beyond his appropriate level of participation. 
Categorically, auditors should not be the victims of a bilateral squeeze by lawyers and 
government. 
It goes without saying that the relatively small number of companies disclosing illegal or 
questionable payments should recant and others should not begin — all in the framework  of a 
workable definition of acceptable and unacceptable business practices — here as well as 
competitively abroad. 
As the "abuse" of corporate perquisites now comes under the government's microscope, it is 
more important than ever that the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities recommend a 
limiting line of the auditor's role. The business community should organize to support the 
auditor's proper role rather than to allow the auditor to become the target and shield. 
10 Touche Ross encourages the Commission to recommend a separate report by legal counsel included in the annual 
financial report. Counsel should go "on the l ine" for the adequacy of disclosure of uncertainties and as to the extent 
of the corporation's compliance in all material respects with applicable laws and regulations. If need be, this can 
begin by having the lawyers' letter required under SAS No. 12 published; after all, much consternation over the 
content of this letter related to its probable discoverability, and therefore  that it had to be written with the utmost 
care. That being the case, we see no reason why lawyers' audit letters should not be further  worked into a "lawyer's 
certificate." Of course, the lawyer may appropriately state that he is an advocate for the client and therefore  has an 
interest in the outcome of the matters he is addressing. 
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SECTION 6 
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE 
AND ITS EXTENSION 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions on the Audit Function 
— The  audit  is a function  to be performed  during  a period  of  time,  not only  as to a 
particular  set of  financial  statements. 
— Auditors  should  review  and test  the entire  system  of  internal  control  and form  a 
conclusion  as to the absence of  material  weaknesses  during  the year. 
— Management  should  report  on the adequacy  of  its  system  of  internal  controls, 
material  weaknesses  therein,  and its  response  to the auditor's  suggestions  for  im-
provements. 
— The  auditor  should  report  on his agreement  with  management's  descriptions  and 
should  describe  material  weaknesses  not disclosed  by  management. 
— The  audit  function  should  expand  to encompass financial  information  released 
regularly  during  the year;  tests  throughout  the year  would  be required.  In particular, 
reviews  of  published  quarterly  financial  statements  would  be part  of  the audit. 
— Reporting  of  timely  auditor  involvement  apart  from  annual  reporting  is needed,  but 
an audit  base should  be prerequisite. 
The Setting of the Audit Function and Considerations Affecting  Its Extension 
The Commission recognizes that although auditing is an economic function, government, 
mostly through the SEC, has interceded to assure minimum audit requirements for publicly held 
companies. Though cost-benefit analysis is considered and the Commission agrees it is appro-
priate to apply in principle, the inability to develop a practical method for application of 
cost-benefit analysis to auditing is a serious problem. The Report  concludes that: "If society 
needs new services, the public accounting profession should meet those needs within its 
abilities to deliver the requested services." 
In the absence of cost-benefit measurements, the Report  attempts to provide a framework  to 
guide the evolution (although there are a few "immediate" recommendations) of the audit 
function into areas beyond the annual audit of financial statements. The main consideration is 
that a great deal of information reported by corporations and assimilated by users is released 
throughout the year, not in connection with the annual report. It is, therefore,  logical to the 
Commission that the audit function be continuous — applied to the processes used to generate 
financial information, as well as to the information itself. If the auditor "attests" to these 
processes throughout the year, users wil l be given greater assurance that non-annual financial 
information has improved in reliability. 
We believe Section 6 is important and useful, especially in recognizing the importance of 
benefit-cost analysis as an underlying concept, and in establishing workable criteria for 
deciding when an extended service is within the auditor's province. We too have no immediate 
answers on costs overall, but we think the Commission might have been able to obtain cost 
ranges for certain of the specific suggestions contained in this section as well as throughout its 
Report. 1 
1 On occasion, the SEC requests that respondents to its proposals comment on implementation costs. Responses to the 
SEC might provide a start. 
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We believe that, although the SEC is acting conscientiously in establishing many audit and 
related requirements for publicly held companies, the market concept should be the basic 
concept observed in all cases where it has not been clearly demonstrated that regulation is 
necessary. And regulatory necessity should require a showing that instances of significant loss 
to users would have been avoided by extension of the audit function or that losses could 
reasonably be expected to be prevented or minimized in the future through regulation. 
The difficulty  with even this kind of standard is that the situations which impel greater audit 
effort  often gain great notoriety, and thus may be viewed out of perspective. They often result in 
increasing the cost of all audits to avoid problems of a breadth yet to be demonstrated. To allow 
this without cost-benefit deliberations seems to us to be wrong. 
At this point in time, given recent improvements in auditing standards in the areas of 
management fraud, illegal acts and review of quarterly financial statements, we see no other 
potential areas of extension of auditing services which should be made mandatory for either 
publicly or privately held companies. We believe current practices augmented by a require-
ment that the auditor's report regarding quarterly statements be filed with Form 10-Q,2 establish 
a responsive minimum. 
Accordingly, companies should at their discretion engage auditors to perform additional 
services which the directors and management believe wil l enhance their position with users. 
Or users (shareholders, creditors and others) may prompt such additional services on their own 
behalf. These market-based approaches are entirely appropriate and can be disclosed and 
reported upon in compliance with the Commission's recommendations. Companies not elect-
ing such services could indicate their responsibilities for controls and financial information and 
state they do not believe auditor association is necessary.3 Because much of the data will be 
subject to audit annually, a "track record" will be established to provide a measure of 
reliability about those assertions lacking timely auditor involvement. If instances of misrep-
resentation emerge, the Federal Securities Laws seem to us to be more than an adequate 
redress. 
The Boundaries of the Audit Function 
While it is true that relationships between the auditor and client tend to be continuous, 
there must be considerable specification before the auditor becomes the centurion of corporate 
"propriety." That auditors cannot be oblivious to events occurring between annual audits was 
established long ago.4 Accordingly, the specific responsibilities the auditor has in his continu-
ing relationship must be spelled out; and as additional responsibilities are added, we are sure 
the Commission agrees this should be done deliberately, rather than by a broad sweep-in. 
The idea of reestablishing the boundary5 of the audit function based on "the auditor's 
competence and the existence of operational criteria"6 may not, however, be an entirely valid 
2 If this were to be done, we concur in the Commission's opinion that such reports should communicate in a positive 
fashion, as contrasted to the negative assurance report now prepared in accordance with SAS No. 13. 
3 The "me too" syndrome is a difficult  one to deal with. We are not prepared to fully explain how a management 
dismisses a competitor's more extensive auditor involvement; this underscores the possibility of the Commission's 
recommendations eventually covering all business even if not now intended. 
4 For example, Yale  Express,  SAS No. 1, Section 561. 
5 "Boundary" connotes a fixed position. The Commission seems to be in favor of a floating fence, as the needs of 
society vary — usually expanding. 
6 Here the Commission cites the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, A Statement  of  Basic  Auditing  Concepts, 
Studies in Accounting Research No. 6 (Sarasota, Fla.: American Accounting Association, 1973), p. 5. 
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approach. In Section 1 the Commission suggests a societal value role, yet in Section 5 there is a 
hint that later, though not presently, auditors can become versed in many disiplines. The only 
way to extend boundaries is to consider each matter on its own merits in a logical sequence.7 
The Commission recognizes that the competence criterion must be limited (p. 57), but could 
be more assertive in its final report, not relying on the assumption that illogical ascriptions to 
auditors will not occur. 
As we have already discussed in Section 2, financial information needs identification as to its 
inherent degree of factuality or interpretation. The Report  recognizes this distinction in dis-
cussing "the importance of verifiable information" (p. 58) but leaves the impression that the 
audit function should heavily lean toward the verifiable. In our response to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board on the Objectives of Financial Statements, we recognize that 
financial statements must include the range from factual through interpretive, but exclude the 
speculative. Our broader view, therefore,  makes us somewhat more sensitive to the extension 
of the auditor's role. Verifiability will be a test, but we predict not a compelling one. 
Need and Mechanism for Expansion of the Audit Function 
The Commission recommends ultimate extension of the auditor's involvement to the entire 
reporting process. We agree in concept, so long as there is specification of the elements of the 
financial reporting process in which the auditor gradually becomes involved over time, along 
with standards for his involvement, and a measure of protection acknowledging that the further 
involved he becomes, the less reliable his assurance is going to be. 
"Auditing  the financial  reporting  process"  — We agree that the auditor's relationship with 
publicly  held  clients should be a continuous function, including perhaps areas beyond those 
discussed by the Commission in the ensuing subsections. We have several overall suggestions 
to make at the outset: 
1. As an objective, the annual audit should be completed and reported on within 90 
days after year-end.8 
2. Quarterly statements should be reviewed in accordance with SAS No. 10 and 
reported upon as part of Form 10-Q using a positive-assurance report. 
3. Management should indicate in its report (as recommended by the Commission in 
Section 7) its responsibility for the company's internal control and financial informa-
7 An example of such a decision model is: 
1. Identify the societal malady. 
2. What seems to be needed within the limits of financial accounting, reporting and auditing? 
3. If the need were fulfilled,  to what extent would the malady be corrected? 
4. What specific recommendation is apropos? 
5. Is it feasible? How? Any side effects? 
6. Who is to carry out the recommendation? 
7. When should it be done? 
8. What wi l l it cost, considering all the above? Is it more expensive than the malady? If so, what compelling reason 
is there to do it anyway? 
8 However, in our discussion of time pressures in Section 9, page 9-16, we consider obtaining additional 10-K 
flexibility from the SEC. 
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tion, and the extent and consequences of its election to have the independent 
auditors extend their procedures beyond mandatory levels. 
4. The independent auditor would address in his report the quality of content of 
management's report. 
"Expanded  study  and evaluation  of  internal  control"  - The  Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions 
asserts (p. 60): "The first  step ... which should be adopted immediately,  would be to require the 
auditor to expand his study and evaluation of the controls over the accounting system to form a 
conclusion on the functioning of the system during the year." And on p. 61, the recommenda-
tion continues: "The auditor should be required to review and test the entire system. The 
objective of this study and evaluation would be to enable the auditor to reach a conclusion on 
whether controls over each significant part of the accounting system provide reasonable, 
though not absolute, assurance that the system is free of material weakness." 
Implementation of these recommendations on all publicly held companies would be ex-
tremely costly, in our opinion. Although many audits are done in a way that facilitates this 
approach, we think most are not. The approach now taken, sanctioned by professional 
standards, is usually based on an economic analysis. A preliminary evaluation of internal 
control for material weaknesses is made in all significant areas, but systems testing may or may 
not be performed depending on many practical considerations relating to substantive tests.9 
When systems tests are performed,  a greater amount of detailed systems information is required 
than when performing  only a preliminary review of the system without testing. 
Requiring systems tests in all significant areas will increase total audit effort  greatly and could 
detract from a more effective  overall annual audit result. It is conceivable when auditors are 
forced to extend systems (compliance) testing to comply with this recommendation, that they 
will be motivated to reduce other (substantive) tests as much as possible. This may cause 
excessive risks in auditing year-end financial statement balances, despite the fact that the audit 
of the annual financial statements must remain the primary focus of the audit function. 
As we have stated in Section 4 regarding fraud detection (p. 4.8) the Commission's apparent 
assumption that the auditor studies and evaluates all internal controls, at least in large publicly 
held companies,10 is not quite correct. The thought that this recommendation should be 
adopted immediately  also suggests the Commission views the undertaking as a relatively easy 
one, and therefore  may misunderstand the effect  we think it would have on audit planning 
practices. 
The Commission could be very helpful if it were to give its basis for reaching this conclusion. 
We would appreciate the opportunity to provide a constructive critique in this area, based on 
our firm's current research and recent adoption of a more conceptualized audit approach. 
The objective stated by the Commission (p. 61) — to enable the auditor to reach a conclusion 
and provide reasonable assurance that each significant part of the system is free of material 
weaknesses — is a desirable one, but in itself is based on the idea that control systems should 
deter and detect material management fraud and illegal or questionable acts. In most respects, 
internal accounting control systems work best as safeguards against defalcation of assets and 
border on impotence when standing guard against collusion and unique management ac-
tivities. 
9 Our firm's recently adopted conceptual auditing approach is described in Section 9, page 9-10 and footnote 1 3. 
10 Several Commissioners remarked at the public meeting on June 22, 1977 that they felt this recommendation would 
not be too problematic on large audits. 
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Thus the reporting on this subject anticipated by the Commission in its discussion of "The 
Effect  on Reporting Practice" and in Section 7 could tend to overassure audited financial 
statement users, especially by the proposed requirement that auditors now begin to evaluate all 
significant systems. 
Auditors now make recommendations to management concerning material weaknesses. It is 
true that these could be disclosed by management along with an indication of whether they 
were received as part of the regular audit or as the result of a special extension of services. But a 
missing ingredient in the Commission's analysis seems to be failure to confront the prospect of 
extreme variability in 
— auditors' perceptions of what constitutes a material weakness11 
— the incisiveness of auditors' "suggestions" for the correction of weaknesses. 
Thus, the acceptability of management's response to auditors' suggestions — particularly if 
management opines that the suggestions deal with immaterial areas or simply do not make 
sense — will be as difficult  to assess as the validity of the auditors' perceptions in the first  place. 
We recognize that, eventually, objective standards for identifying, describing, cost-evaluating 
and rectifying material internal control weaknesses must come, but considerable advance 
preparation is needed. There is, simply, a need to avoid contests with management over 
published  words until all parties know what they are talking about, and until managements and 
auditors know how to say it straight. 
Further, the Commission should also consider how users might interpret this information. 12 
Many users do not understand the nature of financial statements and financial reporting.13 We 
have serious doubts that they would understand anything as technical and circumstantial as 
internal controls. We believe research on communicating such matters to non-accountants 
should be conducted before details are included in all published annual reports. If the 
Commission nevertheless believes in immediacy of action, our example of what management 
could say is as follows: 
"We have engaged our auditors to extend their review of internal controls beyond 
the levels normally required for their annual audit. We intend to cycle this review so 
that full coverage is accomplished every three years, as part of our program to 
reasonably maintain the effectiveness  of our accounting and control systems to be 
responsive to changes in our business and administrative practices. 
"Because internal control systems design and effectiveness  is a highly complex 
matter we have not included a copy of our auditors' report on internal controls 
herein. However, it is available and can be obtained by writing our corporate office. 
We have reviewed all of its contents with our auditors and have either implemented 
or begun implementing all those recommendations where, in our judgment, the 
actual or potential benefit from the recommendations will outweigh their related 
costs." 
11 Even SAS No. 1, paragraph 320.68, defines a material weakness as the auditor beholds it: "...condition he believes  to 
be a material weakness for  his purpose."  (Emphasis added.) 
12 On page 62, the Commission supports by a citation from  The  Philosophy  of  Auditing  that "Users have the right to 
expect the independent auditor to inform them of any material uncorrected weaknesses...." The disclosure activator, 
"sufficiently  important to influence the judgment of one reading and acting on the financial statements" is a prime 
example of auditor circumfluence. It seems to us especially in the area of studying, testing and reporting on all 
significant internal control systems, the Commission has little concrete evidence of need, utility and communicabil-
ity, and is responding to a valid concept still in an embryonic stage. 
13 See Objective One of FASB's Tentative  Conclusions  on the Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  of  Business  Enter-
prises,  discussed in Section 2 hereof. 
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"Timely  involvement  in the financial  reporting  process"  — The Commission discusses at 
some length (pp. 62—67) that "... the audit function should expand to include obtaining an 
understanding of the process used by the company to prepare significant financial information 
regularly throughout the year ..."(p. 62); that "... tests throughout the year would be required 
..."(p. 63); and that "... auditors (will) change the traditional approach to reporting," to 
dislodge the user's fixation on auditors' reports as a stamp of approval (p. 66). An illustrative 
interim report is given. 
We agree, as stated earlier in this section, that the auditor should be involved in the quarterly 
reporting process of his publicly held clients. The optional approach provided under SAS Nos. 
10 and 13 seems inappropriate when under ASR No. 177 many companies are required to 
present, in an "unaudited" footnote, four quarters' financial data (substantially a Form 10-Q 
tabulation); and the auditor would be required under SAS No. 13 to remark in his report if he 
knew of any material misstatements therein. 
Paragraph 31 of APB Opinion 28 (1973) has required disclosure of unusual, infrequent and 
year-end adjusting items in the absence of a separate fourth quarter report. Thus, auditors have 
for years paid careful  attention to this, and therefore  have given at least some attention to the 
proper dispersion of accounting events in all four quarters. 
The idea of timely involvement is not new, and it need not be elaborated that auditors' 
reluctance to acknowledge formal attestation stems from the litigious environment — one that 
demands a rigorous standard the auditor can observe lest the standard be as flaccid as plaintiffs 
allege and courts adjudge. This is the problem to attack; yet the Commission seems to have not 
fully addressed it.14 
For example, on page 63, a limited review under SAS No. 10 is described as something less 
extensive than an audit. We all know that. Since it is not possible to precisely define an audit, 
anything contrasted in relation to it is also not definable. Yet the Commission suggests an 
expansion, but still less than an audit of quarterly information. 15 
The Commission's exemplary discussion on the content of interim reviews (p. 64) adds 
thought16 to the recommendation, but not definition. If anything, this discourse deals with 
known problems susceptible (as are most auditing topics) to continuous debate. 
We urge the Commission to define a limited review separate from considerations of auditor 
risk, so that it can be viewed in a truly conceptual state. We think that the proliferation  of 
negative assurance — which in our view is an inappropriate attestation blended for defensive 
purposes — might even be reversible if concept could be distilled for discussion purposes. 
All this leads us, therefore,  to agree with the goals stated by the Commission on page 68: 
— "... it may be possible to determine the probabilities that the procedures in each form 
of assurance wil l detect various errors, omissions or misrepresentations." 
— "... the distinctions between audits and reviews should gradually become less 
significant and the lack of understanding them less of a problem." 
14 The "safe harbor" concept (p. 147) does not even mention interim reporting association. 
15 Some auditors favor no quarterly involvement unless it were to be an audit. This tempts us conceptually, were it not 
for cost and manpower considerations. 
16 Here the Commission suggests that increased knowledge of a company's budgets, earnings plan and operating 
activities would assist the auditor in evaluating the cumulative effect  of the selection and application of accounting 
principles. No doubt every little bit helps. But the need for accounting principles to be made more specific to 
circumstances is the most important ingredient. We have discussed this subject at length in Section 2. 
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Separating jeopardy from the reasoning process could help in achievement of these goals. 
The exemplary "interim report of independent auditors" (p. 66) is certainly an improvement 
over those now sanctioned by SAS Nos. 10 and 13. It would be even further  improved by 
substituting the following wording for the first  and second sentences of the third paragraph: 
"We have reviewed the Company's process of preparing quarterly financial informa-
tion; we believe the process is adequate for that purpose, and we have observed that 
the process was used in preparing the accompanying quarterly data." 
Note the absence of negative assurances in our wording and the avoidance of "material 
weaknesses," which we have challenged earlier in this section. 
Need  for  an audit  base — to accomplish the recommendations made so far in this section, it 
will be necessary that the Auditing Standards Board in cooperation with the SEC develop the 
"auditor of record" concept (p. 66). We wonder whether continuous involvement means that 
at least an entire year must be dealt with by an auditor and that there should be no midstream 
changes in auditors. If so, there could be considerable difficulties  in implementation.17 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions — Beyond the Audit Function 
— Auditors  should  be consulted  on current  releases  of  material  financial  information 
but  should  not separately  report  thereon. 
— The  audit  function  must  be extended  to other  interpretive  information  in the annual 
report  not contained  within  the financial  statements;  present  requirements  in SAS 
No. 8 are  too limited. 
— Auditor  reviews  could  be made of  the forecasting  process  if  it  becomes standardized 
to the same extent  as other  accounting  information. 
— Auditors  should  not become involved  in evaluating  managements decisions  or 
performance  as to efficiency,  economy  and effectiveness. 
"Current  releases  of  material  information"  — We agree that public reporting based on a very 
limited degree of involvement is an inappropriate and undue fragmentation of the audit 
function. But we believe it prudent to continuously consult internally with clients regarding all 
complex and significant financial accounting and reporting matters. For example, press re-
leases and Form 8-K disclosure of material financial events are best addressed when they may 
yet be revised. 
The Commission could also have addressed certain other requirements for fragmentary 
reporting, for example — 
— ASR 138 — the auditor's letter stating that large or unusual changes are treated in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
— New York Stock Exchange letter on the appropriate use of pooling of interests 
accounting for a business combination 
17 The Commission's comment on page 67 that a new auditor's audit must have progressed sufficiently  to provide a 
base equivalent to what would have existed if no auditor change occurred raises the question of interim auditor 
changes. More specific transitional details need to be worked out. Naturally, uncompleted "cycles" could be 
commented upon by the superseded auditor, along with a statement of the extent to which any of his earlier work 
might be affected  by failure to serve out his " term." Or, arrangements might be made for the succeeding auditor to 
reassume responsibility for the earlier, uncompleted cycle. 
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— Instruction H-(f) of Form 10-Q (and SAB 6) requiring an auditor's preferability 
expression for an accounting change (though this is alluded to in Section 2). 
We recommend that the Commission in its final Report  take a position against these and 
similar situations, in favor of the developing continuing association concept. 
"Other  annual  report  data" 18 — It is easy to support the recommendation of "... an 
immediate extension of the audit function to other information in the annual report" (p. 68) 
because there is little specification of what the Commission wants beyond the existing require-
ments of SAS No. 8. If it is simply a matter of embracing that material in the report on the audit 
function (Section 7), that can be done, though care must be taken to be specific about what is 
included and what responsibility the auditor takes for it as its content of management interpre-
tation increases. The auditor should deal with information "within the limits of financial 
accounting"19 and avoid only marginally related areas such as marketing and personnel 
achievements and qualifications. 
Our recent experiences with SAS No. 8 point out a weakness that perhaps could be rectified 
by the Commission being more specific in its final report. We have observed differences  in 
annual report textual, tabular and summary descriptions of financial statement information, but 
the presentation outside of the financial statements is so clearly explained as differing  that no 
reader could misunderstand it — though he might be utterly confused about the reason for the 
difference.  One example is the presentation of foreign currency translation gains and losses, 
neither an extraordinary item nor to be stated net of tax or per share on the face of an income 
statement, but sometimes explained and presented so to appear elsewhere in the annual report. 
It is not clear that SAS No. 8 requires any auditor action in such a situation — and partly at 
fault is the lack of guidelines or standards for summarizing, or what constitutes an unacceptable 
summary of, financial information. 
"Financial  forecasts"  — A distillation of the Report's  three paragraphs on forecasts is: "Not 
now!" The Commission probably has little choice but to stand aside, given the burden of all 
past and present oriented matters to deal with. Touche Ross is in favor of experimental 
publication of financial forecasts, along with auditor association. Among our reasons are: 
1. The profession has made more inroads than acknowledged by the Commission: 
— The Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA has issued its 
Statement of Position No. 75-4 on "Presentation and Disclosure of Financial 
Forecasts." 
— The AlCPA's Management Advisory Services Executive Committee has published 
"Guidelines for Systems for the Preparation of Financial Forecasts (August 1975)." 
— The SEC has proposed approaches to forecast presentation in securities acts filings. 
2. Touche Ross is a strong proponent of current value accounting which in ideal 
concept would incorporate present value of future cash flows. Experience with 
forecasting would assist in achieving recognition for current value accounting. 
This missing link is what the auditor/attestor should say about the forecast.  Considerable 
efforts  have been expended in the Auditing Standards Executive Committee and continue in a 
ask Force — and part of the dilemma is the ubiquitous litigation spectre. We have developed 
18 We presume the shareholders' report, not the 10-K, is meant. 
19 Defined in the FASB's Tentative  Conclusions  on Objectives  of  Financial  Statements  of  Business  Enterprises. 
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our own "positive assurance" form of reporting (not vouching, of course, for achievability), 
awaiting AudSEC resolution. 
We urge the Commission to reconsider the proper place of ongoing financial forecasts, as it is 
a matter on the near horizon of auditors' responsibilities. 
"Efficiency,  economy  and effectiveness"  — The Commission recommends that the audit 
function should evolve to include these kinds of disclosures required by business enterprises to 
the extent produced by the accounting system but no mention is made of materiality. Of 
course, not all governmentally required disclosures are of a materiality warranting auditor 
involvement. 
Touche Ross has publicly urged the Financial Accounting Standards Board to step up to the 
delineation of accounting standards for governmental units.20 We believe the Commission may 
have erred in concluding that, as part of the auditor's necessary involvement in governmental 
units, efficiency,  economy and effectiveness  should not be dealt with; the accounting standards 
to be developed may contemporaneously incorporate aspects of this subject. As has been 
pointed out in the "GAO Yellow Book" and the AlCPA's explanation of it21 auditors can 
perform against sufficiently  specified quantitative standards. 
If the auditor may have to confront requirements for evaluation in audits  of governmental 
units, the Commission's current conclusion that such activity is incompatible with commercial 
enterprise auditing may not be sustainable. At the outset we admitted that the auditor is a 
reporter and not an evaluator of financial information, but auditing against objective standards, 
however defined by bodies empowered to do so, is eminently within the auditor's domain even 
for private enterprises. 
We think the incompatibility issue can be resolved by careful  definition and appropriate joint 
participation of other appropriate professions. Much the same is true of reporting on the 
effectiveness  of social programs. 
We recommend that the Commission restudy this area and if possible delineate the compati-
ble, feasible services from the subjectively evaluative judgments which must be made by users. 
20 Touche Ross & Co., "Public Financial Reporting by Local Government; Issues and a Viewpoint." 
21 United States General Accounting Office,  Standards  for  Audit  of  Governmental  Organizations,  Programs,  Activities  & 
Functions,  1972 and Committee on Relations with the General Accounting Office,  Auditing  Standards  Established  by 
the GAO: Their  Meaning  and Significance  for  CPAs (New York: AICPA, 1973). 
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SECTION 7 
THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— A report  on the entire  audit  function  is required. 
— Management  is encouraged  to present  a report  acknowledging  its  responsibility  for 
the representations  in the financial  statements. 
— A reference  to consistency  should  be eliminated  from  the auditor's  report. 
— Accounting  changes should  be described  in a standard  note to the financial  state-
ments. 
— The  present  method  of  referring  to other  auditors  should  be eliminated. 
— Users  of  unaudited  information  should  be informed  about  the work  done and the 
assurances  intended  rather  than merely  that  an audit  was not done. 
— The  auditor  should  be present  and available  to answer  questions  at the annual 
meeting  of  the shareholders. 
Major Communications Deficiencies 
In some respects what the Commission perceives as deficiencies in auditors' communica-
tions is a reaction to user disinterest bred by years of familiarity with the "same old words." 
True, there are many needs for better communication, and we are inclined to agree that 
improvements are achievable simply as a result of significant reformatting.  At a minimum, the 
"seal of approval" misperception will be dealt a well deserved blow, and at best, users will pay 
careful  attention to the auditor's message, especially if its content can be kept somewhat 
flexible and evolving. 
A New Approach to Reporting 
"A  report  on the audit  function"  — The overall thrust of this section is to create a longer, 
more informative auditor's report, so as to impel users to read it in order to obtain an 
understanding of the auditor's responsibilities and assurances. This is in contrast to the standard 
two paragraph short-form report, now viewed as a seal of approval. 
We suspect that some users will take the same approach to most anything the auditor 
proffers,  but agree that some improvement is achievable as a result of a basic reconstruction of 
the auditor's report for the first  time in almost thirty years. 
The Commission's recommendation that "A report on the entire audit function is required to 
provide sufficient  flexibility to convey the required information to users" is, however, a 
mammoth undertaking, which will require considerable efforts  of the Auditing Standards Board 
and the indulgence and participation of the SEC. 
Though we support it, we have misgivings about the suggested "standard/variable" para-
graphing. In the last analysis, it seems the Commission, in attempting to get the readers' 
attention, is not advocating a total free-style;  we agree that would not be desirable simply 
because people communicate in different  manners and some are more successful at it than 
others. 
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The Commission's concept, therefore,  is good. But we perceive difficulty  with "standardized 
alternative phrases or paragraphs" that change with the circumstances, as these too could 
become contentious with clients if they are highly subjective as to when they are used or 
omitted. Naturally, a paragraph concerning the existence of an audit committee wil l not be a 
problem so long as one exists, but a paragraph dealing with material weaknesses in the system 
of internal controls not adequately disclosed by management wil l bring on debates no less 
heated than sometimes now occur in acclimating clients to the need for a qualified opinion. 
Specifically, because "material weakness" wil l be a subjective determination1 its mention in 
the auditor's report wil l be considered a negative factor by managements; difficulties  are bound 
to ensue. We cannot, of course, avoid this given the role occupied by the auditor, but we 
recommend that the Commission address this problem to provide additional guidance for the 
auditor if possible. 
In general, the illustration of a revised auditors' report on pages 77-78 seems appropriate as 
a general direction. Although it is an illustration and the Commission may not attach vital 
significance to any of its exemplary factors, we have several comments about it: 
1. Some recognition should be given (if it is a fact) that the auditors assisted manage-
ment in the preparation and presentation of the financial statements; this is not 
covered by the first  paragraph. 
2. In the third paragraph, the auditor is asked to state the obvious: "We believe our 
auditing procedures were adequate in the circumstances to support our opinion." 
The user is entitled to rely on that whether or not stated. When he believes his 
procedures were not adequate, the auditor should make that clear by expressing a 
non-standard opinion. 
2. The paragraph concerning the review of information appearing in the annual report 
outside of the financial statements seems innocuous. We believe more specification 
of what was reviewed should be given. 
4. Finally, in referring  to meetings with the audit committee, qualitative phrases such as 
"met with...sufficiently  often" should be avoided but the facts should be stated. If the 
auditor believes meetings or contact have been insufficient,  he should so state. 
In sum, the auditor should make a series of positive, reasonably factual statements. The user 
should be entitled to expect that all significant deviations or dissatisfactions wil l be reported by 
the auditor. 
In a sense, this report format suggests a conglomeration of issues which are of contemporary 
interest. We do not fault the Commission for selecting items of current popularity, as long as the 
Commission recognizes the content of the report would necessarily change from time to time. 
Presumably, the Auditing Standards Board would identify important subjects as they emerge, 
and create new "standard" paragraphs to be used if applicable; at the same time, they could 
decide on the proper time to abandon2 an existing topic. 
1 Refer to our comments on page 4-6 and 4-7 regarding the problems of having the auditor evaluate all significant 
fraud controls, and on pages 6-4 - 6-5 regarding the inappropriateness of evaluating all internal controls annually. 
2 Experience shows that disclosures once adopted are virtually impossible to eliminate. Barnacled auditing and 
accounting disclosures seem moved only by major undertakings such as the Commission's Report  and the FASB's 
Conceptual Framework Project. 
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"A  report  by  management"  — The Commission recommends that"... management [should] 
present a report with the financial statements that acknowledges the responsibility of manage-
ment for the representations in the financial information, ... provide management's assurances 
that the information is presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
appropriate in the circumstances and that all material uncertainties have been appropriately 
accounted for or disclosed." This recommendation also suggests that management make a 
statement concerning the involvement of legal counsel; as we have indicated earlier, our 
preference  is that legal counsel's report actually be published. 
The Commission also recommends that management assess its accounting system and its 
controls over it, and describe the company's response to material weaknesses identified by the 
independent auditor. If this is to be done, it should not be limited to only those weaknesses 
identified by the independent auditor; knowledge of weaknesses could come from many 
sources, especially including the company's own internal auditors. 
The illustration of a report by management appearing on pp. 79-80, is a good one. We think 
it should be kept reasonably neutral and factual in tone, and that management should not be 
permitted to "puff"  (e.g., "impress users with the quality of management"). Considerable care 
needs to be taken so that rhetoric does not govern. 
Since the adoption of such a report could be an expensive undertaking by the corporate 
community, experimentation would be advisable, based on guidance provided by an organiza-
tion such as the Financial Executives Institute. We suggest that, thereafter,  the SEC first  require 
this of larger publicly held companies, with a minimum content and no limit on maximum 
content other than the need to maintain factuality. The minimum content should be reasonably 
parallel to matters to be deemed by the Auditing Standards Board as necessary in the auditor's 
new standardized but flexible reporting format. 
This seems an appropriate point to suggest to the Commission that, because the auditor as 
well as management are not experts in all disciplines and must therefore  make reference  to 
other experts in connection with financial presentations, the reports of such other experts be 
included, or at least paraphrased, in management's and/or the auditor's reports. We have 
already mentioned lawyers, but we believe the list could be extended to geologists, actuaries, 
appraisers, architects, engineers — whichever professions are appropriate, given materiality to 
the financial reporting process. 
In this regard, we believe that SAS No. 11, "Using the Work of a Specialist," is incorrect in 
stating that the auditor should not express reliance on other experts, but should be sufficiently 
familiar with their disciplines so as to be satisfied that they performed appropriately. We may 
be deluding ourselves about the abilities of auditors; other professionals should be ready to step 
up to their own responsibilities. Of course, the auditor should assure that the information used 
by other experts in their disciplines is supported by the company's records, and that the 
resulting information from the expert is incorporated into the company's records and/or 
financial reporting process as required. 
"...Reporting  on consistency"  — We agree that the reference  to consistency should be 
eliminated from the auditor's report. When an approved accounting change is made, its 
recognition in the auditor's report is usually referred  to as a "consistency exception" when it is 
not an exception in the usual sense of that term. 
"A  standard  note...covering  accounting  changes"  — APB Opinion 20 should indeed be 
amended for more matters than this. We agree with the Commission's recommendation, 
pointing out our concern that proliferation  of "standard footnotes" is an activity that should 
proceed with caution. 
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As long as the FASB is at it, Opinion 20 should be amended to give criteria for the manner in 
which accounting changes should be made, rather than continuing the prescription that all 
should be made by cumulative catch-up adjustment. The FASB's brief  history itself shows that 
almost all promulgated changes are prescribed retroactively. 
Even when changes are made retroactively, we do not think it necessary for the auditor to 
state that the currently presented comparative financial statements are not those previously 
presented. The standard footnote could be augmented by adding "(Restated)"  to column 
headings. 
"Use  of  the work  of  another  auditor"  — The Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  (p. 82) 
identifies the approaches presently available to principal auditors in this area and offers  two 
substitute possibilities: 
1. Do enough work so that the secondary auditor need not be mentioned (that is, accept 
responsibility for the secondary auditor's work). 
2. Require management to present the reports of the other auditors of material compo-
nents of the financial statements. If the other auditors' reports are not included, the 
principal auditor would take exception to the adequacy of disclosure. 
We believe that the present form of reporting when there is divided responsibility between or 
among auditors should be eliminated. There is little wonder why financial statement users are 
confused and believe such a report is a qualified opinion. Especially those users having little 
knowledge of the auditing profession and its professional standards must find it difficult  to 
assess the meaning of the opinion. 
There exists another level of confusion arising out of the shared responsibility concept. Other 
professionals do not understand the reason why an auditor can share responsibility with 
another auditor but not among others such as lawyers, actuaries and geologists. Other profes-
sions having rigorous standards for admission and high educational requirements for their 
disciplines can not appreciate the reasoning in current auditing literature for allowing an 
auditor to rely only upon another auditor. 
The present auditing standards regarding shared responsibility have ancient origins. Many 
developments in the auditing profession have increased the scope of the auditor's role even 
before the Commission began to study it. Auditors are now involved with unaudited data 
contained in financial statements such as interim data and replacement cost data, are responsi-
ble for consistency of other information appearing in financial reports, must perform proce-
dures to attempt detection of errors and irregularities and illegal acts, and more. Yet our 
auditing standards have not been updated with respect to the concepts and standards of shared 
responsibility. 
We believe that, today, shared responsibility brings with it inefficiencies  and possible risks in 
the audit process. These inefficiencies,  and extra auditing to guard against the risk of informa-
tion lost in a crevasse between the dual auditors, are passed on to clients in the form of higher 
audit fees. We believe that the time has come for the profession to reassess the concepts of 
shared responsibilities — to step up to the need for only a single auditor to be involved in the 
audit of an entity and its controlled subsidiaries (i.e., those which are not nonsubsidiary 
investees).3 
3 We believe that the Institute has retained the concept of shared responsibility out of deference to the sensitivities of 
smaller firms, and that may not be sufficient  in the face of the overwhelming need for coordination of all elements of 
an audit engagement — particularly when the auditor is to be held responsible for the matters recommended by the 
Commission. 
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"Inconsistent  and uninformative  reporting  on unaudited  information"  — The Commission 
recommends (p. 83) that "users should be informed about the work done and the assurances 
intended rather than merely about the audit that is not done" when independent accountants 
are associated with unaudited financial statements. We agree that the implication given by the 
accountant when he affixes  his name on an unaudited report is not understood. The comfort 
taken by the users of such financial statements usually bears little relationship to the degree of 
the assurance intended by the accountant (who may himself not be sure of what he is expected 
to convey). 
We believe that this matter requires intensive and careful  study, at the same time (hopefully 
soon) as the FASB or some other body gives the proper attention to the application of generally 
accepted accounting principles to smaller or closely held businesses. Additional guidance is 
needed on how to describe procedures performed along with what limited though positive 
assurance can be given therewith.4 
"...Communication  with  interested  parties"  — We agree that informal and selective access 
to the auditor should be discouraged, and that a "requirement that the auditor be present and 
available to answer questions at the annual meeting of the shareholders" is the proper 
approach. Present SEC requirements provide that companies state in their proxy statements 
whether the auditor wil l be present at the meeting to answer questions. Although we haven't 
researched this, we assume that many if not most publicly held companies follow this practice, 
and also invite the auditor to make a statement to the shareholder assembly. 
Difficulties  arise, however, in ascertaining what questions are appropriately directed to the 
auditor, or what kind of statement the auditor should make in the absence of questions. It is not 
sufficient  to simply make an announced appearance, as that is a mere formality. 
We recommend that the auditor be encouraged to review potential major questions with 
management and the meeting chairman prior to the shareholders' meeting, to agree on the 
nature of questions properly answerable by the auditors, and what the auditors' probable 
answers would be, so that management, the directors and the auditors have an organized 
approach. Furthermore, we recommend that, as a minimum, when there is nothing else to 
report (this wil l often be the case), the auditor make a statement to the shareholders paraphras-
ing his auditor's report so as to both serve an official  function and to stimulate the thought 
process of the audience. 
4 On page 66, in referring  to timely reporting on unaudited interim financial information, the Report  states: 
"Eventually, after experience is gained, it may be possible to determine the probabilities that the procedures in 
each form of assurance wi l l detect various errors, omissions, or misrepresentations." 
This objective is, of course, viable in the context of all unaudited information with which the auditor is associated. 
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SECTION 8 
THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— "A  four-year  liberal  arts  undergraduate  program  and a three-year  graduate  profes-
sional  program...should  be the long-term  goal." 
— Accounting  educators  who are  not CPAs should  be permitted  to take  part  in state 
CPA society  and AICPA activities. 
General Remarks 
The Commission's introductory remarks state that many new accountants have found that 
their education did not adequately prepare them for the responsibilities they face upon entry 
into the profession, and that the firms (primarily the large firms) spend substantial sums on the 
entering professionals who have just been graduated. Formal education can rarely provide all 
the needs of a beginning professional whether he be a civil engineer who cannot build a road in 
his classroom or a lawyer whose mettle must be tested in the courtroom. The scientist may 
complete his formal education in the classroom and the laboratory, and readily transfer  his 
educational process to industry, but accounting and auditing are not sciences. The auditor's 
studio is the business enterprise and the economic system, and the skills developed there must 
be translated and synthesized insofar as possible into the textbooks of formal education. 
The fundamental problem between the practitioner and the educator has been created by a 
lack of understanding and agreement on which part of the educational process belongs with the 
educator in the classroom, and which part is best satisfied by the practicing professional.  A 
clear sign that the professional believes the educator has satisfied his role is evidenced by the 
extreme competition to employ the best graduating students. The practitioner does not ignore 
what the educator has accomplished, but builds on it by continuing with his firm's educational 
professional development activities and programs. 
The Adequacy of Educational Preparation for the Profession 
The Commission asserts that "The public accounting profession has been unable to rely to 
the same extent as other professionals on formal education for the development of competence 
to practice (p. 85)." It is our position that the educational process for the most part is being 
discharged in a satisfactory manner and that the additional education supplied by our firm adds 
that element which cannot be taught in the classroom. 
The Commission also states "that accounting has not been given full professional status 
within the university by establishment of separate colleges such as those for law and medicine" 
— thus presuming that the establishment of separate colleges is in fact needed. There are many 
arguments about the value of separate professional schools of accounting, and no unanimity 
can be found among either educators or practitioners. The myriad of issues is beyond the scope 
of our response, but just a few of our reasons for not favoring separate professional schools of 
accounting are given below: 
1. The economics of higher education at the present time and for the foreseeable future 
make it doubtful that proper and sufficient  financial support could be found within 
state governments or would be forthcoming from the profession for the establishment 
and expansion of separate professional schools or programs. This may also be true in 
many areas, including business, science, education, or the profession. 
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2. Some serious problems may result in obtaining academic support from faculty 
members in other disciplines e.g., arts, science, mathematics or other business areas 
necessary for the appropriate enhancement of accounting education. 
3. There is a risk of developing a narrow-gauged accounting professional who may 
have concentrated excessive efforts  and resources in accounting subjects to the 
exclusion or deemphasis of subjects required to educate the "whole man" — those 
subjects in science, language and the arts. 
4. There appears to be a greater need to improve the quality of education in the 
business schools than there is a need to change the structure of an educational 
institution, unit, or department. 
5. There is already an excess of accounting students and students with graduate de-
grees. Yet there would not be enough qualified accounting professors  to meet the 
projected demand of separate professional schools of accounting. 
6. Professional programs in accountancy have not been articulated in a manner so as to 
enable appropriate dialogue among practitioners and educators. This is unfortunate, 
since it impedes analysis of what is needed and what roles the practitioner and the 
educator should have. Some open questions concerning professional schools of 
accounting include: 
a. Should the faculty be limited only to accounting professors? 
b. Should practitioners be included as faculty members? If so, how many and in 
what ratio? 
c. Would the proposed school be independent 
— of the business school dean? 
— for budgetary purposes? 
— from State Boards of Accounting? 
— of state educational requirements for the CPA exam? 
— to recruit faculty members who are not PhDs? 
d. Would a separate physical building be required, as is the situation at most law 
schools today? Would the professional schools exist in name only and use 
facilities of the present business school? 
e. Should it be strictly a graduate program, or might it also be an undergraduate 
program, or perhaps a Doctoral program? 
7. If many separate Professional Schools of Accountancy are established throughout the 
country there wil l be little status. This would nullify one of the major supporting 
reasons and the schools could develop into "cram" courses to pass the CPA exam. 
We realize that we have addressed above Professional Schools of Accountancy in general, 
rather than the precise long-term goal given by the Commission. There are enough points of 
convergence, however, that the exercise may be helpful in bringing out our points. 
Status of Accounting Education in Schools of Business 
In this section the Commission states: "In many business schools, particularly at the graduate 
level, this means that accounting is primarily a service subject in an environment that views 
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education for business as education for business management." This statement may be true, but 
fails to recognize that for several decades, many of the leading national business schools have 
also offered  "tracts," or majors, in accounting as part of the MBA program. In such programs, 
the student who concentrated or majored in accounting benefitted from working with senior 
faculty members having advanced degrees and considerable academic and often substantial 
practical experience. Touche Ross believes that the MBA graduate with an accounting major or 
an accounting tract is a better educated person fully qualified for an entry level position in the 
profession. If all schools were able to train the entry level professional within the MBA 
programs now offered  in these leading schools, our profession's entrants would compare 
favorably with, or perhaps exceed the preparation of, some entering the legal and medical 
professions. 
In discussing the "Effect  on Faculty," the Commission makes the statement that "The 
academic accounting community, which had a substantial concern with the profession and 
financial accounting in the 1930s, has moved in recent years principally to managerial 
accounting or financial analysis with a heavy mathematical emphasis." We are unaware of the 
facts underlying this statement. A cursory review of accounting faculty listings published by 
AVISO Publications for the 1 976/1977 period indicates that a large majority of those who teach 
accounting teach financial accounting, not financial analysis. Mathematical analysis is also 
categorized in this publication, and the number of professors  working in this area is certainly 
very small. Our experience indicates that most senior faculty members continue to be in-
terested in the same financial accounting matters as the practicing professional,  and that 
further,  most of the senior faculty members at the major universities throughout the country are 
both PhDs and CPAs. 
Touche Ross has been in a unique position of presenting seminars for professors  on current 
financial accounting problems over the last ten years (presently called "The Trueblood Profes-
sors' Seminars"). We have thus had an opportunity to work with nearly a thousand accounting 
professors,  and our observation is that there is a continuing intense interest in the financial 
accounting problems of the practicing professional accountant and not by any means a 
preoccupation with managerial accounting or mathematical quantitative analysis (which of 
course, does have its place in practice). 
The Commission describes the "Effect  on Students" this way: "Since education for business 
management has been the focus in business schools, prospective independent auditors receive 
their first  exposure to the nature of their future duties in an environment closely identified with 
corporate management." This is an advantage — CPAs have to understand business manage-
ment to audit it! Other than the unsupported statements contained in the American Institute 
publications cited in footnote 1 on p. 86, there has been no researched evidence that students 
are biased towards business management and away from accounting and auditing areas 
because of the actions of business school programs. The evidence is overwhelming that 
superior students still pursue an accounting major, and of that group their first  career choice is 
often that of the practicing professional accountant. The brighter student has not been deflected 
by the fact that accounting is not taught in a separate school; and as the Commission knows, 
many graduate students consider the outstanding and best career to be that of the practicing 
professional accountant. 
As to "Effect  on Research," the Report  asserts (p. 86) that "Current problems of immediate 
concern to the practicing accountants have attracted little interest among academic re-
searchers, and auditing — which represents the bulk of public accounting practice today — 
receives scant research attention in most business schools." Our general remarks at the outset 
of this section pointed out that the educator by choice was not in the mainstream of the 
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business and economic system, thus disabling him from working in the business research 
"laboratory." Auditing research is significant if it is performed in the environment of the 
practicing professional.1 
The accounting educator nevertheless has an opportunity to make a major contribution to 
accounting and auditing research if he does it in cooperation with the practicing professional. 
Educators are now making a contribution in the computer auditing and statistical areas, highly 
important subjects for auditors. We and other firms have offered  significant professorial 
research opportunities in accounting and auditing, with the availability of the full resources of 
firms available.2 Finally, we have in our employ at the present time a number of educators 
involved in research areas. 
Thus, there is little evidence to support the Commission's statement that "The resulting 
influence on student career choice and the contribution of the academic research to improve-
ment in practice has been less than is desirable." We recommend that the Commission 
publicize the data supporting its statement that a lack of research by the accounting educator 
has had an adverse influence on candidates for entry into our profession. 
Lack of Professional Identity 
"New entrants to the profession lack professional  identity....  A program of learning imbed-
ded in a school that views its mission primarily as educating the student for business manage-
ment is unlikely to produce in him a highly developed sense of identity as a member of the 
public accounting profession (p. 86)." As in other professions identity develops as one prac-
tices. It is speculation that entry level work is more overwhelming to new accountants than to 
new JDs or MDs. The entry level accountant when out in practice benefits from exposure to 
others' diverse backgrounds and disciplines. 
Those identity characteristics needed by the practicing professional come with practice in 
the real world. Nevertheless, some improvement could be made in the educator's environment, 
though this may require a significant change in the educational process for those intending to 
be accounting educators. More on this later. 
Entry  Level  Training  of  the Professional  Accountant 
This subsection emphasizes that: 
— Large firms spend great sums of money training entry level professional accountants, 
and the smaller firms must spend more on a per capita basis to provide similar 
training. 
— To alleviate some of the training costs, smaller firms have joined together to receive 
training materials from the AICPA and other societies. 
— Educational programs of the large firms are potent recruiting tools. 
— The body of knowledge for accounting is growing at a dramatic rate, and keeping 
abreast of new developments is difficult. 
1 Refer to our comments on pages 10-5 and 10-6 regarding the desirability of focusing all auditing research — 
academic and professional — under a newly constituted Auditing Standards Board. 
2 Our philosophy is contained in a 1976 publication by the Touche Ross Foundation, entitled "The Touche Ross 
Program To Support Accounting Education." 
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— The response of formal educational programs to developing professional needs has 
been limited. 
— Business schools have had little involvement in continuing education programs. 
— Entry level training is slow on current problem uptake. 
The implied oppression of the smaller firms is a somewhat specious consideration. Today's 
national firms were spending considerable sums on entry level training programs when they 
were as small as some of the smaller firms of today. In the case of Touche Ross, entry level 
training programs were offered  30 years ago when fewer than 50 persons were recruited for the 
entire firm from universities throughout the country. While many young men and women today 
are attracted to the larger firms because of their training programs it is our experience that 
graduate students do not make employment decisions based solely upon training programs. 
Rather, a controlling factor appears to be the variety of client experience offered  by the larger 
firms. Advanced degree holders generally feel saturated with formal classroom education and 
are anxious to begin professional practice. 
Many business schools have little involvement in continuing educational programs related to 
public accounting; the academic environment lacks the real life decision-making orientation. 
But many practitioners participate in the broader continuing educational programs known as 
"Management Development." It appears as if the practicing professional looks to reentry of the 
formal classroom environment for broadening his experience and outlook but not for more 
professional accounting training. 
Touche Ross believes that more can be done to incorporate current problems in the entry 
level training in business schools. Our contribution, through our Professors'  Seminar Program, 
of actual practice current case material is a step in this direction. 
Continuing professional education in most disciplines is in its infancy and undoubtedly will 
grow. The Commision's seemingly negative assessment is, perhaps, unjustified. 
Improving the Educational Process 
Professional  schools  - the long-term  goal  — Touche Ross has already spoken out on the issue 
of professional schools. It is our preference  that professional schools of accounting remain 
within schools of business and not be free standing; and earlier in this section we have 
enumerated arguments against professional schools of accounting as the regimen. Excerpts 
from our firm's brochure3 further  explain our reasoning: 
"Our concern is to insure continued quality educational preparation for entry into 
the profession. It is our conviction that this quality education can continue to 
manifest itself within existing educational structures, or emerge as new programs 
within the scool of business. 
"The complexity of our environment need not be interpreted as requiring the 
development of one — and only one — specific educational program for profes-
sional accountants. 
"In our view, quality educational preparation for the profession may occur: 
• Within existing schools of business 
3 Ibid. 
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• Through traditional accounting departments 
• As a part of the professional program or a professional school within the school of 
business 
Moreover, the preparation which is offered  may be a four-year  program, a five-year 
program, or an MBA or doctoral program. Each of these may be appropriate when 
examined as individual units and when tested by the demands of the profession. 
"It is also our view that each school of business is best able to determine its structure, 
assess its administrative requirements, and allocate the resources required to meet its 
responsibility for quality accounting education. A school of business should not have 
to look to others who may seek to force changes which it may consider unsound for 
its particular circumstances. Thus, we believe it unnecessary for a school to obtain 
approval of its organizational structure or accreditation of its program from non-
educational institutions. Each school of business must strive, in the way it believes 
best, for excellence in preparing students for entry into the profession. 
"To support our concern for quality accounting education and to assist those schools 
of business which strive for excellence in preparing students for entry into the 
profession, we pledge a financial commitment of $1,000,000 to be disbursed over a 
five-year period. 
"In addition to our financial commitment, we also pledge 1,000 days per year of 
partner time to be made available for projects as short as one day or programs as 
comprehensive as a partner in residence for a full semester. It is anticipated such time 
commitments wil l be used in on-campus activities for classroom teaching, seminar 
participation, independent assistance to students in honors or graduate programs, or 
in research projects." 
The Commission has nevertheless concluded that graduate schools of accounting similar to 
law schools will instill in students an appropriate professional identity and expose them to the 
pressures and problems of public accounting practice during their formal education process. 
It is undeniable that for students aspiring to the practice of accountancy this is a desirable 
goal. However, we are not convinced this can be done in a professional school of accountancy. 
Evidence that other professions, having separate schools, better educate to withstand the strains 
and pressures inherent in their professions, is also lacking. 
The Commission's research shows that "Audit failures have not, for the most part, resulted 
from a lack of knowledge of accounting or auditing requirements." What more evidence is 
needed that educational preparation for the profession is not at fault? It is highly unlikely that 
skills in dealing with stress and poor judgment are teachable in the classroom, whether in a 
professional school or in the prevailing present system. 
Professional  Society  Affiliation  for  Academics 
An increasing number of teachers of accounting proceed directly through the educational 
process, unfortunately without a period of practice experience. It is our recommendation that a 
more cooperative effort  between the practicing professional and the educator is needed; before 
the PhD degree is awarded, a reasonable period of time in the practicing profession should be 
required for the candidate. Cooperation between the educational institution and the firm in 
designing and executing a program which would provide the necessary professional experi-
ence for the PhD candidate is a goal deserving high priority. Touche Ross stands ready to 
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cooperate with educational institutions in experimenting with the redesign of PhD programs to 
incorporate appropriate practical experience. 
While it would be desirable for educators to belong to state CPA societies and to the AICPA, 
membership would not, in our view, significantly change the participation of academics in the 
affairs  of CPA societies. Nevertheless, we support the Commission's recommendation that the 
AICPA and state CPA societies develop a form of membership which would open membership 
to non-CPA accounting educators. 
Uniform CPA Examination and Continuing Education 
We concur in the Commission's plaudits for the uniform CPA examination, and point out that 
it is under continuous study and review. We also support the Commission's comments on 
continuing education. 
Summary 
Touche Ross does not agree with the long-term goal stated by the Commission that there 
should be "a four-year  liberal arts undergraduate program and a three-year graduate profes-
sional program, similar to that of law." We have publicly stated our view in opposition to that 
of the AICPA and of another major accounting firm. While there may be special situations 
where professional schools are appropriate, in general the existing undergraduate and masters 
programs are more than adequate for the training that is feasible prior to entry into the public 
accounting profession. 
Our concern is built on the premise that academic instruction cannot replicate "on the line" 
experience necessary for understanding auditors' responsibilities and objectives. If academic 
institutions could obtain the services of seasoned professionals as instructors, and if the student 
could be given "real time" experience, the additional years of education might pay off.  But 
because the best professionals and the best opportunities will forever  remain out in actual 
practice, they will not be transferable  to classroom use. 
An apprenticeship program would be useful, provided it could be with an organization that 
had a broad range of experience and versatility of professionals.  We think the Commission has 
reacted favorably to the in-house educational programs of the major CPA firms and is desirous 
of transferring  such programs to academia, to afford  those intending to enter the profession, but 
not in the large firm circuit, the same opportunities. While the idea is commendable, we do not 
see how it can be practicably accomplished. 
We believe improvements can be made in AICPA and state society courses designed to 
partially compensate for the "disadvantage" visited upon members of other than the major 
firms. At least the AICPA and state societies do obtain the services, as speakers, lecturers and 
discussion leaders, of many experienced large firm personnel, who seem very will ing to give 
their time in this manner. 
We are in favor of the AICPA and state societies creating an associate membership status to 
admit non-CPA accounting educators. The subject has been discussed before by the AICPA and 
should have been approved at an earlier date. It seems obvious that those teaching entrants to 
the public accounting profession should have access to, and be given, all of the information on 
current developments to assist them in proselytizing professional standards. 
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SECTION 9 
MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— Auditors  should  decline  any  accounting  advocacy  engagement  that  may  bias the 
audit  function. 
— Public  accounting  firms  should  avoid  appearance  of  conflicts  of  interest  by  not 
engaging  in employment  recruiting  or  placement  of  individuals  directly  involved  in 
selecting  or  retaining  auditors. 
— The  audit  committee  should  be aware  of  all  services  provided  to a publicly  held 
company  by  its  independent  auditor. 
— Knowledge  of  a material  deficiency  in published  unaudited  financial  information, 
acquired  by  the independent  auditor  in performing  other  services,  must  be recog-
nized  in persuading  client  rectification  or  disclosure. 
— Knowledge  gained  from  other  services,  including  by  consulting  personnel  who are 
made aware  of  the responsibilities  of  independent  auditors,  must  be transmitted  to, 
and its  implications  considered  by,  the audit  partner  in charge. 
— Providing  advice  on appropriate  accounting  principles  should  not be extended  to the 
point  of  advocacy. 
— Public  companies  should,  in proxy  statements  that  call  for  auditor  selection  or 
ratification,  describe  other  services  provided  by  their  auditors. 
— Independent  directors  should  recommend  the appointment  of  auditors  and evaluate 
the auditor  management relationship. 
— Audit  fees  and timing  should  be considered  by  the audit  committee  in direct  dis-
cussion  with  the audit  partner. 
— The  type  of  disclosure  in financial  statements  now required  by  the SEC concerning 
disagreements  when a change in auditors  occurs  should  be required  for  all  audited 
financial  statements. 
— The  auditor  should  not accept  an engagment  if  permission  for  dialogue  between  old 
and new auditors  is not granted. 
— The  audit  committee  should  inspect  the personnel  rotation  program  of  the inde-
pendent  auditor  and evaluate  its  effectiveness. 
— Time  pressures  have an overriding  effect  on the quality  of  the audit;  there  is a need 
for  improved  use in accounting  firms  of  budgeting  procedures,  for  evaluation  of 
variances  and in attitudes  toward  personnel  ratings. 
— "Individual  public  accounting  firms  should  immediately  undertake  to conduct 
studies  to determine  the extent  of  conditions  revealed  by  the Commission's  [Survey 
of  the Influence  of...  the Auditors'  Work  Environment  on Professional  Performance] 
and the effects  on their  practices." 
— Early  earnings  releases  merit  a stringent  warning  about  the possibility  of  revision 
upon audit. 
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— Auditors  should  refuse  to accede  to annual  report  and 10-K  deadline  pressures  when 
their  judgment  would  suggest  that  audit  thoroughness  could  suffer. 
— Auditors  must  be consulted  on registration  statement  deadlines  and reject  unrealistic 
impositions. 
— The  AICPA Ethics  Division  should  consider  the appropriateness  of  anticipating  the 
recoupment  during  future  audits  of  initial  engagement  fee  shortfalls. 
— All  firms  should  develop  carefully  drawn  limitations  on gifts,  discounts  and special 
favors  from  clients. 
Introductory Remarks 
Independence is an extremely important topic, as the auditor has nothing to offer  if he does 
not have his independence and objectivity — the hallmarks of our profession. The Metcalf Staff 
devoted a considerable portion of its Study to describing the public accounting profession as 
not truly independent of its clients. Touche Ross has responded to the Metcalf Staff  Study, and 
excerpts relating to independence are included in Appendix A, pages 2-5. 
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities seems to have taken a totally different  tack, 
however, approaching the question of independence substantially from the viewpoint of audit 
environment, policies of major CPA firms and time and fee pressures. It is imperative that this 
subject be thoroughly considered, and the Commission's perspective is perhaps a better 
approach for the auditor's understanding. 
We have some disagreements with the Commission's commentary on professional deficien-
cies. We are worried that the impression given of the integrity of the public accounting 
profession may be unfairly critical. We therefore  offer,  for the Commission's reconsideration in 
preparing its final report, our remarks on those aspects of Section 9 which we think have the 
potential for focus and magnification by outsiders anxious for "documentation" of professional 
faults. 
Restriction of Services Incompatible with the Audit Function 
The Commission's summary conclusion (p. 92) states: "There is no evidence that provision 
of services other than auditing has actually impaired the independence of auditors. However, 
the belief of a significant minority of users that independence is impaired creates a major 
problem for the profession. Decisions on the other services offered  and used should be made by 
individual public accounting firms and boards of directors of clients." 
We concur in this conclusion, though we have several recommendations on the proper 
remedies for non-independent appearance. 
— Management Services 
• Although management advisory services provided to an audit client may have the 
appearance of being inconsistent with the auditing function, we are convinced 
that this is not the case with respect to those consulting services performed by 
Touche Ross, and probably by other large firms. In conducting our management 
advisory services we are careful  to make a clear distinction between advising  a 
client — which requires objectivity and independence — and making  manage-
ment decisions  — a role which is  inconsistent with independence. 
-
Apart from these safeguards, we have also found that performing  management 
advisory services for an audit client tends to facilitate our ability to render our 
audit opinion because of the understanding about the company's business and 
procedures obtained in the course of that work. We already require coordination 
of all client services under a general services partner and have adopted certain 
specific requirements for interfunctional information exchange, cited later. Man-
agement services are discussed further  in Appendix A, pages 2-4. 
— Alleged Conflicts 
We agree with the Commission's conclusion that the following alleged conflicts are 
not sustainable, and we offer  further  commentary: 
• Reviews of a company's internal accounting procedures (Yale Express) cannot be a 
conflict, as the Commission calls for this as part of the continuing audit function, 
especially in connection with interim quarterly reviews and evaluations of internal 
controls. 
• Comfort  letters (National Student Marketing) are the placebo of underwriters, who 
quite rightly under SAS No. 1, Section 630 (SAP No. 48) must specify what 
procedures they wish to have the auditors perform. 1 We would not object to 
abolishing comfort  letters especially if the auditor's function continuing through-
out the year could be developed as a more desirable substitute. 
• Design of new systems ("Wall Street Back Office  Mess") is within an auditing 
firm's bailiwick2 (assuming it has acquired the proper expertise in the industry or 
area). The knowledge needed to do an audit of the systems is a substantial part of 
the ability to design them. 
• Advising on the accounting effect  of prospective merger transactions (Westec) is a 
part of general accounting advisory services indispensable to clients in today's 
complex rule-oriented environment (more of this below). It is also necessitated by 
New York Stock Exchange "pooling letter" requirements. Involvement in arrang-
ing mergers and acquisitions is problematic and Touche Ross does not act in this 
capacity.3 If accountants cannot operate in an "advise and consent" mode, then 
they cannot effectively  operate only in a "consent" or "challenge" mode, which is 
their primary activity. 
— Tax Services 
We totally agree that tax services provided in an advocacy mode by public account-
ing firms does not in any way affect  independence in the provision of audit function 
services. We have two observations: 
1 Many procedures "requested" by underwriters are somewhat standardized based on the content of SAS No. 1, 
Section 630, or are formulated based on the accountant's proferrings  — but they nevertheless remain the choice of 
the underwriter in fulfilling  a part of his "due" diligence." 
2 We note that the Commission's Survey of Audit Partners and Staff  disclosed (p. 174) that only six percent of the 
respondents "had experienced resistance from supervisory audit personnel or 'felt reluctant to identify internal 
control weaknesses in a system adopted by the client as a result of consulting services provided' by their firm." 
3 The Commission might also point out that the AICPA Code of Ethics specifically precludes a member from assuming 
the role of management. The involvement in negotiations between the parties in a merger seems clearly a 
management role. 
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• LIFO causes problems because of the conformity rules. That the SEC and IRS do 
not see this the same way is evident from the several ASRs and complementary 
Treasury Department releases in recent years. The SEC's attitude of concern over 
"acceptability for LIFO tax purposes," not necessarily prevailing for financial 
reporting despite conformity rules, is emphasized by the recent SuCrest case.4 
• Staunch defense by auditors of their work papers evaluating adequacy of clients' 
tax accruals and provisions, but not nearly so strong a defense of information 
bearing directly on the content of returns, as amply demonstrated in the recent 
Johns-Manville case, underscores the symbiosis of auditing independence and tax 
service advocacy. 
Accounting  advocacy  engagements  that  may  bias the audit  function  - The Commission 
presents a balanced view in arriving at its general conclusion that "Auditors should decline any 
engagement that may bias the audit function. Also in all advocacy engagements the auditor 
should excercise care to make it clear to users that his work and opinions are not presented in 
his capacity as independent auditor." We agree with the conclusion, believing, however, that it 
can only be applied on a case by case basis. 
The Report  mentions "testimony at regulated industry rate hearings" in the context of audit 
client advocacy, much as did the Metcalf Staff  Study. We in Touche Ross are perhaps unique in 
that the great bulk of our rate work has been for the public sector, even though the firm does 
provide auditing  services for some utilities and does occasionally represent utilities in rate 
cases. The firm has also handled substantial fact-finding  assignments for federal  regulatory 
agencies, such as an investigation of a significant segment of the telecommunications industry 
for the Federal Communications Commission. A current project — reviewing for the Interstate 
Commerce Commission the costs of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System for the purpose of setting 
rates — is discussed further  in Appendix A, page 5. 
We also point out the truism that once a regulatory agency finalizes its ruling, with or without 
without the acceptance of an auditor's advocacy, the subsequent audit judgments will be 
independent because they can then be related to the objective regulations as adopted. 
In summary, the Commission's general recommendation should be read only as a concern 
over appearance of non-independence, and not as a challenge to the auditor's integrity. 
"Executive  search  services"  — The Commission states (p. 99) that "Public accounting firms 
should, however, take measures to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest...(by not 
engaging) in employment recruiting or placement of individuals who would be directly 
4 In SEC v.  SuCrest  Corporation  reported in SEC Litigation Release No. 7 7 - _ , May 31, 1977, the SEC acted in relation 
to certain inventory transactions in which the LIFO vs. FIFO question was central. The Litigation Release states: 
The Complaint alleged that SuCrest and Rionda had engaged in sham transactions when SuCrest orally agreed with 
Rionda to resell to Rionda after SuCrest's year-end the same quantity of raw sugar which SuCrest had purchased 
from Rionda prior to SuCrest's year-end at a price which would assure both companies of no monetary gain or loss 
between them, except for fees which SuCrest paid to Rionda. The Complaint alleged that these transactions 
materially affected  SuCrest's year-end inventory quantities and the income computed therefrom for its fiscal 1975 
and 1976 years, and resulted in the dissemination of false and misleading press releases stating SuCrest's income, 
and in the filing of false and misleading reports with the Commission. The Complaint further  alleged that officers  of 
both SuCrest and Rionda made materially false and misleading statements to SuCrest's auditors, S. D. Leidesdorf 
and Co. ("Leidesdorf")  in order to conceal the existence of the oral agreement from Leidesdorf. 
The Complaint further  alleged that SuCrest generated false and misleading documents in order to give the 
appearance that certain raw sugar purchased by SuCrest should be accounted for under the First-in, First-out 
("FIFO") accounting method, instead of under the Last-in, First-out ( " "LIFO") method of accounting, since the 
FIFO accounting treatment would have enabled SuCrest to report less earnings and thereby incur a correspond-
ingly lower income tax liability. 
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involved in the decision to select or retain independent auditors." Although there is widespread 
agreement on the desirability of auditors being selected or retained on the advice of the audit 
committee, we realize that financial officers,  controllers, and similar executives who may not 
be directors are very influential. 
With respect to "placement" with clients of former  employees of the accounting firm, we 
believe the former  association has virtually no effect  on the auditor's independent frame of 
mind in carrying out subsequent audits.5 Whether the former  employee is "working out" as a 
member of management wil l be much more apparent to his superiors than it wil l be to the 
auditor; further,  the auditor's best interests would lie in an early identification of any manage-
rial weaknesses in his former  employees before his client's welfare can be adversely affected  by 
poor performance.  Insofar as placing "unwarranted reliance on the representations" of former 
employees is concerned, the auditor's personal knowledge of the former  employee may in fact 
permit him to assess more reliably the extent to which such representations are valid. 
Although the AICPA has consistently taken the position that executive search activities as a 
professional service to clients does not create a conflict of interests which would impair 
independence, our firm would accede to a profession-wide rule precluding firms from engag-
ing in executive recruiting, including mere client accommodation efforts. 
We have reached this conclusion because of allegations in the Metcalf Staff  Study, described 
in Appendix A, page 4. 
— No Fundamental Change is Necessary 
We are pleased with the Commission's conclusion (p. 99) that "On balance, ... the relevant 
facts do not support a prohibition against any particular services that auditors are now 
permitted to offer."  As we said in our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study, substantial safeguards 
in our firm assure that we do not lose our objectivity and effectiveness  either as independent 
auditors or as independent management consultants. Tax advocacy has long been understood 
as not an audit independence threat, and accounting advocacy engagements are carefully 
controlled. Our MAS activity is a separate function within the firm through which we advise our 
clients but do not make their management decisions. 
The additional knowledge gained in the course of MAS, tax and audit advocacy engagements 
facilitates our audit work. To preclude auditing firms from these kinds of activities would in our 
view bring more harm than good to audits by hampering additional and valuable sources of 
audit information. Furthermore, given the expectation that auditors will ultimately become 
involved in broader services for society by relating to more subjective information such as 
forecasts, it makes eminent sense for auditors to assist their clients in all professional ways so 
long as independence in fact exists in the audit activity. 
"Board  and audit  committee  involvement"  — The Report  recommends active participation 
of the board or audit committee as a way of lessening users' concerns about the potential 
conflicts of services besides auditing. The Commission states that boards of directors or audit 
committees of publicly held companies "should be aware of all the services provided to the 
company by the independent auditor (who) should take the lead in informing them of those 
services and their relationship, if any, to the audit function, the fees for those services, and ... 
that information acquired in ... these other services must be considered by the auditor in 
fulfilling  his audit responsibilities." 
5 The Commission's Survey of Audit Partners and Staff  indicates (p. 174) that only four percent of the respondents "felt 
there was 'pressure from supervisors to accept the representations by former  members of (their) CPA firm now 
employed by the client or from those individuals placed with a client following an executive search by (their) f irm.'" 
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Touche Ross since the mid-sixties has advocated the establishment of corporate audit 
committees as an effective  step in assuring auditor independence. Such committees should be 
made responsible for ascertaining that the auditor's professional standards are met as to their 
company. Our firm has published several monographs and a film on this subject. We are now 
updating all of our earlier information, as we believe the time has come for audit committees to 
recognize the major responsibilities being thrust upon them, and for auditors to realize that it is 
necessary to have two-way communications with the audit committee, not just to heap 
information on them. 
We believe audit committees have considerable responsibility to monitor the propriety of 
their corporation's activity, as well as to understand whether the auditors they have selected 
have performed adequately. While it may be difficult  to obtain a sufficient  number of audit 
committee members having the necessary skills and expertise to deal with all the contemporary 
complex issues, we see little choice but to proceed in that direction. 
"Knowledge  of  deficient  financial  information"  — The Commission states (p. 100): "If 
information acquired in performing  other services indicates a material deficiency in unaudited 
financial information issued by an audit client, the independent auditor should persuade the 
client to correct the information or, failing that, assure that the necessary disclosure is made." 
This recommendation complements the earlier recommendations that the auditor immediately 
extend his audit function to the other information in an annual report and to more formalized 
association with interim financial reporting. 
There are often considerable difficulties  in ascertaining what is a material deficiency. For 
instance, managements have the prerogative to explain information outside of the financial 
statements in formats different  than that contained in the financials. For example, summarized 
financial information is commonly given elsewhere in the annual report, and the auditor's 
obligation is to ascertain that there is no inconsistency with the audited financial statements. 
However, standards for the proper summarization of data have not been promulgated and 
therefore  the auditor is sometimes confused about whether an inconsistency exists. 
Thus, we recommend that the auditing standards board, in cooperation with representatives 
of management and financial executive groups, delineate appropriate standards for financial 
information presented outside the financial statements, insofar as possible. 
As to the prompt communication of interfunctional knowledge of a client's affairs,  we 
believe all firms should adopt and publicize appropriate requirements. We have such under-
standings in our firm, formalized in the practice policy manuals of our three major functions — 
auditing, tax and management services. 
Knowledge from other services which could be important to the audit  is, perhaps in terms of 
today's standards, even more crucial than that relating to unaudited data (above). The Commis-
sion recommends (p. 101): "Public accounting firms should establish policies and procedures 
to assure that knowledge gained from other services is made available to the partner in charge 
of the audit so that he can consider its implications for the audit function, including assuring 
that consulting personnel who are not CPAs are made aware of the public accounting firm's 
professional responsibility as independent auditors." We wholeheartedly agree with this rec-
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ommendation, and have had this as a matter of firm policy for several years.6 We think the 
appropriate way to formalize this is the manner we have chosen — making the audit partner in 
charge of the engagement inquire of those in charge of nonaudit services for audit clients, as to 
the nature of information they may have which bears on the audit function, being careful  to 
assure "being on the same wave length" in communicating. 
"Providing  advice  on accounting  principles"  — We agree that professional guidance is 
needed on the circumspect advising of clients on accounting principles without assuming a 
role of advocacy7 or usurping management's prerogative. We believe the Commission might 
find, if it attempts a search, that at least several firms have semiformalized policies in this area 
that could be synthesized into a draft  recommendation. We have statements of policy, for 
example, on 
• Non-client requests for services, 
• "Shopping" for accounting principles, 
• Regional and national technical consultation on these matters, 
and we issue an annual detailed reminder of our audit role as amicable skeptics rather than as 
advocates. 
"Proxy  statement  disclosure  of  other  services"  — The Commission recommends (p. 101) that 
public companies disclose in proxy statements (that includes election or ratification of the 
selection of independent auditors)8 "information on the nature of other services provided to the 
companies by their independent auditors." In our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study, we 
emphasized how audit committees could assure that management services and other services 
in addition to auditing do not compromise the independence of the auditor. Accordingly, we 
do not agree that major non-audit services provided by auditing firms should be disclosed and 
described in proxy statements. Extremely minor items could be reported, and lengthy explana-
tions would be necessary for users to be able to properly assimilate this information. And 
simply stating them would seem to raise an unnecessary "red flag." The Commission deals 
extensively with the issue of appearance of non-independence, and therefore  we suggest 
deleting the recommendation of a practice that could aggravate that admittedly unfounded 
concern. 
6 Our firm's policy (Technical Letter 149) requires the following: 
"Inquire of Tax and MS personnel assigned to the client as to their knowledge of management involvement in 
material transactions. 
" In a large majority of situations, our audit clients engage the services of our Tax function to prepare, or advise in 
connection with the preparation of, income tax returns. Also, client executives often engage our Tax Department 
to prepare their income tax returns. Accordingly, a direct  inquiry  must  be made of  the partner  responsible  for  tax 
services  to the client  and its  executives  (or other tax personnel he designates as being knowledgeable with respect 
thereto) as to whether  the Tax  Department  has found  any  evidence,  not already  known  to the Audit  function, 
concerning  management involvement  in material  transactions.  Recognizing that tax return preparation almost 
invariably postdates the audit completion, tax personnel should be asked to bring to the audit partner's attention 
relevant information arising after completion of the audit. 
"I f we provide management consulting services to the client, the partner responsible for such services (or others he 
designates as being knowledgeable with respect to those consulting engagements) should be asked whether, 
during the course of the consulting engagement, any information came to his attention concerning management 
involvement in material transactions which may not already be known to the Audit function." 
Initially, we encountered some difficulties  with Internal Revenue Code Section 7216, but we believe that that matter 
has been appropriately resolved. 
7 Refer to our comments on Westec on page 9-3. 
8 Why only in these proxy statements? Though we are not in favor of the Commission's recommendation, we can see 
only a SEC jurisdictional distinction, and not one justifiable conceptually. 
-
Protecting the Independent Auditor from Management Pressure 
As to having "independent auditors approved, assigned or compensated by a government 
agency or to have audits conducted by a corps of government auditors" (p. 102), we absolutely 
agree with the Commission's rejection of such an approach. We and others responding to the 
Metcalf Staff  Study believe we presented a strong case that structural changes of this nature are 
neither necessary nor warranted. We are not nearly so convinced that legislators and regulators 
see it the same way; we suggest the Commission in its final report emphasize its conclusion and 
be reiterative in stating its reasons. 
The issue of who pays the auditors' fee is not the crucial factor,  especially in view of the price 
competition referred  to by the Commission on page 117. 
"Audit  committees  and boards  of  directors"  — The Commission recommends (p. 103) that 
"Independent members of the Board of Directors should be responsible for recommending to 
shareholders the appointment of independent auditors and for evaluating the relationship 
between the auditor and management." We completely agree with this recommendation and 
we have, wherever possible, encouraged not only the formation of audit committees, but the 
need for an executive session of the auditors and outside members of the audit committee at 
each meeting. In this way audit committee members can evaluate the relationship with 
management without concern that the auditor wil l feel constrained in his responses. 
There is no reason that the chief executive officer  and the chief financial officer  should not be 
present except during the executive session, as their input and discussion on complex matters 
will often be useful to the audit committee. 
"Audit arrangements  and fees"  — The Report  states (p. 104) that "Matters of fees and timing, 
in particular, should be carefully considered by the board or audit committee, in direct 
discussion with the audit partner." We agree that the audit committee should inquire into the 
adequacy of fees and the timing of audit work, in order to obtain frank assurance from the audit 
partner in charge that fee limitations if any did not affect  audit scope (and therefore  possibly its 
quality).9 However, it may be unrealistic to expect the audit committee to fully evaluate fees, 
especially in major engagements; but the committee should be offered  a summarization, on a 
comparative basis, of the auditor's charges. The auditor should also indicate what total time 
charges and expenses were on the engagement, how much "restriction" he has taken, and be 
prepared to explain the reasons why the restriction was advisable. Auditors are businessmen 
operating in a competitive environment, apart from their obligations to serve society. The 
auditor should generally know when inefficiencies  occur on his audit, and be prepared to 
adjust his fees accordingly. 
".Scrutiny  of  auditor  changes for  disagreements"  — We agree that the type of disclosure 
called for by Item 12 of Form 8-K of the SEC would probably be useful for all audited financial 
statements, but additional specification is required of what constitutes a disagreement and how 
its effects  are measured for purposes of inclusion in subsequent financial statement disclosure.10 
We also suggest that, for companies not subject to the SEC, there be a formal letter from the 
client, when terminating the auditors' services, in which any disagreements of the type 
contemplated in ASR 165 are described, and an acknowledgement letter from the terminated 
auditor in which concurrence would be indicated or other explanation given. 
9 The Commission states here that its "research suggests  that time pressure generated by unduly  low  fees  and by 
arbitrary deadlines are the most significant cause of substandard performance  by auditors" (emphasis added). We are 
concerned over how such a statement is understood by the laity. This is covered in our discussion of the 
Commission's Survey beginning on page 9-11. 
10 See Robert S. Kay, "Disagreements Under ASR 165," The  Journal  of  Accountancy  (October 1976). 
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Need  for  dialogue  between  changed auditors  — There is little question that auditors who are 
not permitted access to the prior accountants will, in scrupulously observing professional 
standards, refuse to accept that engagement except in rare circumstances. Communications 
between auditors should cover more than the minimal matters required by SAS 7; this SAS 
should be revised to give additional and specific guidance on the nature of matters to be 
communicated: though dialogue should be required to include all significant matters, if the 
succeeded auditor has subjective, unresolved doubts" to convey to the succeeding auditor, 
provision should be made for the client to be present to explain his views on the matter. In 
some instances, auditors may have suspicions they are unwilling to divulge, perhaps on the 
advice of their own legal counsel, at the time they are resigning. This area surely needs further 
study for the adequate protection of the client and the new auditors, without placing the 
resigning auditor at serious legal risk for his commentary. 
We also agree that disclosure of auditor changes should be included in the recommended 
report by management covered by the Commission on page 77. 
"Rotation  of  auditors"  — As we have pointed out in our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study, 
there is already intense and healthy competition, and we do not believe that mandatory 
rotation of auditing firms or placing two firms on the stockholder ballot would serve any useful 
purpose. In fact, such an approach could lead to even more concentration by taking away from 
smaller firms a portion of the public companies presently audited by them. Forced rotation 
would certainly increase total costs to society for the audit function, because of the increased 
incidence of start-up costs inevitable in first  audit engagements. 
We recognize the value of an auditing firm scheduling changes in personnel on specific 
engagements, to provide the substantial advantage of a fresh perspective and to help assure that 
the audit team would not become too familiar with the assignment, losing its sense of 
challenge. That fresh outlook would be available within the continuity of the historical 
perspective of the auditor-client relationship and the attendant familiarity with the client's 
operations. 
Therefore,  we agree with the recommendation of the Commission that there should be 
rotation within an individual firm of partners and staff  assigned to audit engagements. And we 
agree that the audit committee should be required to monitor the audit firm's rotation plan, 
evaluate its effectiveness  and only then consider whether selection of new auditors for a fresh 
viewpoint is required. 
Management Policies and Procedures of Public Accounting Firms and Their Effect  on 
Independence 
Competition and independence 
We agree that the user has no opportunity to evaluate audit quality differences  (p. 107), if 
indeed there are that many in the audits of publicly held companies. Likewise, users do not 
have an opportunity to impact audit price except very indirectly. This is an appropriate reason 
for audit committees to pay attention to audit fees, audit scope, and the relationship of one to 
the other. 
But the Commission states (p. 108) that if "purchasers of audit services are more conscious of 
price than quality, auditors will be tempted to compete on the basis of price and to make 
11 The Commission uses unresolved doubts as a trigger for resignation. Although we mildly challenge that (on p. 4-5 
herein), we are certain that the Commission would not want the succeeding auditor oblivious to unresolved doubts. 
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necessary adjustments in the extent of work performed."  The unavoidable inference is that 
audit quality will suffer. 
In our American economy, processes are continually revised (auditing is a process) to strive 
for optimum efficiency.  As auditors become increasingly aware of valid societal needs, there is 
little doubt in our minds that appropriate procedures for efficiently  fulfilling  those needs wil l be 
devised or will evolve. 
Although the potential for degrading of quality by excessive fee competition exists, the 
Commission should not overly suggest that quality is suffering.  There is no evidence (not even 
in the Commission's Survey described later) that fee pressures result in substandard auditing 
any more so than price competition among auto makers produces substandard cars. 
In our firm, even while faced with intensive price competition, we have added procedures12 
in recent years which have increased overall audit costs 5 to 7%. To ameliorate the effects  of 
price competition we have recently adopted a conceptualized audit approach13 which will 
result in eliminating vestigial audit procedures, trying to do only the work that "counts" and do 
it only once for however many purposes it is needed. Our Touche Ross Audit Process, while 
unique, is one of several such processes developed by major CPA firms. The amount of 
research and financial investment in such programs is immense, but our firm has been more 
than will ing to undertake this investment in order to maintain and improve audit quality in the 
face of fee pressures. 
As the Commission admits (p. 109), there is a need for large client base (the "critical mass") 
to support the costs of complex services and specialists.14 The Commission's conclusion on fee 
12 These were principally in the areas of "Management Involvement in Material Transactions" and the auditor's 
consideration of "Illegal Payments." 
13 The Touche Ross Audit Process can best be described as a logical, analytical method for determining the most 
efficient  and effective  approach to each audit engagement. It allows us to do three things: 
1. Minimize the redundancies in audit procedures performed.  (We have noticed that using the procedures taught in 
schools and widely applied in practice yields duplicate information.) 
2. Identify the least costly (least time-consuming) of the valid alternative audit procedures for accomplishing each 
specific aspect of the audit. 
3. Take better advantage of the statistical and other scientific auditing techniques we have developed. 
When employing this process, we expect to shift a greater portion of our audit time from performing  procedures to 
planning and analysis. The net effect  of this shift wi l l , in most cases, result in a reduced total audit time in that we 
more efficiently  gather the same audit information we have always needed to make audit judgments. In addition, the 
potential is there for quality improvements. 
Our approach is neither highly structured nor loosely structured. We have particularly stayed away from too much 
structure for some very important reasons. First, although a highly structured or "cookbook" approach is, in certain 
circumstances, easy to teach and to apply, in circumstances other than those anticipated by the approach, it wi l l 
either be inefficient,  or perhaps even fail. Second, the control over audit quality in other than anticipated cir-
cumstances is the auditor himself— he must recognize in advance what to do. The highly structured approach limits 
the auditor's control over audit quality. It does no good to proceed down the wrong path and then discover that time 
and effort  have been wasted. 
Our experience has been (and this is also based on outside behavioral research) that the highly structured approach 
may encourage auditors to become "mechanistic" in their attitude and the performance  of their work. Our 
philosophy is to motivate them in the opposite direction — toward awareness and healthy skepticism. 
Thus, our approach has a structure which establishes a logic process to the audit of each set of circumstances. We 
stay away from the use of forms, but we do document our plans, judgments and conclusions in a standard way. This 
assures that all critical judgments are made, and facilitates an effective  review process. 
14 Displacement of smaller CPA firms because of price competition is questionable. Perhaps that phenomenon may be 
occurring in a few instances today, but we believe it has always been a fact that the large firms have reason to charge 
more because of their high central overhead. 
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structure wil l do nothing to change this phenomenon. Marginal cost pricing and building a core 
of clients in a particular specialized industry are both beneficial to society, as well as in the 
latter case, necessary to acquire the specialized industry knowledge the Commission has 
suggested in Section 4, page 39. 
As the Commission is aware, the Metcalf Staff  Study included the conclusion that "The size 
of the major firms permits them to dominate the profession and there should be more 
competition among them." Our summary view stated in response to the Staff  Study is repeated 
below as it is equally appropriate to the Commission's deliberations:15 
"The Staff  concludes that the large size of the Big 8 firms is at variance with the 
public interest. In fact, the exact opposite is true. Large multinational clients can only 
be handled by firms with the breadth of offices  and specialized expertise adequate to 
the demands of those engagements. Further, a small accounting firm could have a 
signficant independence problem with respect to a client which represented a 
dominant or substantial portion of its practice. 
"The Study also states that the larger accounting firms are not sufficiently  competitive 
to suit public need. ...(T)hat conclusion is simply not correct, which is undoubtedly 
attributable to a substantial misconception of the environment as it really exists. 
Actually, in few industries is there such an abundant number of strong, aggressive 
competitors as in the accounting profession. This aggressiveness stems in large part 
from the firms' individual needs to grow in order to support the training and quality 
control demands of the business world which they serve as well as the increasing 
public expectations they are asked to meet." 
In summary, we believe that firms are not limited by their ability to expand geographically or 
to enter new technical fields except to the extent they are unwilling to invest in additional 
personnel who possess the requisite characteristics and technical expertise.16 Our own firm is 
an indication of ability to grow, as we were formed since World War II and have achieved a 
position within the Big 8. Although we believe competition is intense today, we believe it to be 
healthy and reflective of the free marketplace. 
With the Metcalf Staff  believing there is insufficient  competition and the Commission 
suggesting there is too much competition, this may be an indication that the nature of services 
and their quality — and not competition — are what's at issue. 
The Overriding Effect  of Time Pressures on the Quality of the Audit 
We believe this is the most incisive portion of the Commission's Report,  but we have 
concerns over some of its content. The Commission states its belief that, in general, audit 
15 Our firm's detailed comments on "Concentration and Competition" are included in Appendix A, pages 5-8. 
16 We note the Commission's citation of an article concerning our firm which appeared in the Wall  Street  Journal  on 
October 5, 1976: "Touche Ross Openly Strives for Growth as Accounting Firms Turn Competitive." It is unfortunate 
that this citation is included in a section in which the Commission describes its concerns over fees and other factors 
as causes of time and budget pressures; later in this Section, these "pressures" are transmuted into pernicious "audit 
failures." 
A recognition of the content of that news article would have shown our strong view that, despite significant fee 
pressures and fee competition, there is pressure only to become more efficient  in auditing, and not to reduce audit 
scope beyond what is reuired. No one denies there can be disagreement on how much testing is necessary in an 
audit or how much reliance may appropriately be placed on internal controls; but the Commisson may have the 
unfounded concern that every minor audit procedure not performed,  or procedure eliminated from the prior year's 
audit program, is an improper reduction in audit scope. A broader perspective would recognize that there are many 
vestigial audit procedures needing elimination, as they add little to the overall audit objectives. We believe that the 
countervailing problems of inflation and fee pressures are properly serving to produce more efficient  audit ap-
proaches. 
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failures are due to mistakes in judgment because of excessive reliance on client representa-
tions. But in searching for "the underlying cause of audit failures," the Commission seems to 
move away from the issue of excessive reliance17 by stating (p. 111) that: "Although there are 
other factors, the Commission believes that excessive time pressures are the most pervasive 
cause of audit failure." 18 
We believe the Commission could have been helpful in advising what the auditor should do 
when faced with representations extremely difficult  to substantiate or perhaps not at all 
susceptible of external evidence. The extent of reliability of representations is a major problem, 
and one that has not been moved much nearer to resolution by the newly issued SAS No. 19, 
"Client Representations." 
— The Commission's Survey of Audit Partners and Staff 
Ever since we became aware of it in early 1976, we have paid careful  attention to the 
Commission's "Survey on the Influence of Selected Aspects of the Auditors' Work Environment 
on Professional Performance  of Certified Public Accountants" (often referred  to as the "Rhode 
Survey"). Information is made available by the Commission in three strata: 
— The Commission's selective summarization and tentative conclusions on pages 
111-115 of the Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions. 
— A more complete summarization by the Commission of the survey questions and 
results, along with conclusions drawn therefrom,  in Appendix B, pages 167-174 of 
the Report. 
— The entire 353 page research report by Professor  John Grant Rhode, dated February 
24, 1977, available for study only in the AICPA library. 
We have reviewed all of these segments and have many thoughts on their content. We are 
will ing to discuss our thoughts in personal conversations if the Commission so desires. We have 
the feeling, however, that the Commission understands our overall concern, as stated in the 
Summary section of this response (p. v). Therefore,  we will generally restrict our remarks here to 
a few overriding matters: 
1. The Survey most certainly was valid in purpose. Because it was substantially an 
attitudinal survey tolerating rather broad perceptions by respondents of what qualita-
tive factors were implied in the questions, the Survey could not, of course, deliver 
factually on what its title implied ("Influence ... on Professional Performance"). 
However, the Commission described its purpose more aptly (p. 111) — "... to 
determine (auditors') attitudes and practices related to the quality of their work and 
independence." 
2. In addition to asking respondents about their own performance,  the Survey contained 
a number of questions about the respondents' perceptions of the performance  of 
others. (We understand that ordinarily these questions are designed as validity 
17 The Commission appears to believe that time pressure influences the auditor to accept a representation too hastily. If 
that is the reasoning, a great deal more explication is needed. 
18 The Commission notes (p. 112) that " In some cases auditors were persuaded to give an opinion before the 
completion of what eventually turned out to be false transactions." This is only part of the problem. We realize it is 
difficult  for the Commission to segregate all the features involved, but an extremely important feature is the state of 
the accounting art. An element of representations that needs to be dealt with is defining the "effective  date of a 
transaction." The FASB plans to deal in a later phase of the Conceptual Framework with timing of recognition of an 
asset, liability, income or expense. They should be encouraged to do so more promptly. 
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checks.) There were significant differences  between personal admissions and percep-
tions of others' activities in the area of "substandard" practices, discussed further 
below. 
3. The Commission undertook two other major endeavors relating to the effect  of time 
pressures: 
— A study to determine the underlying cause of substandard performance  in selected 
cases involving auditors. 
— A series of meetings with SEC enforcement staff  and other SEC staff,  and with 
selected technical partners of public accounting firms. 
Accordingly, the Commission's conclusions are a synthesis of three sources, two of 
which were not by their nature subject to empirical constraints. The third, the Rhode 
Survey, appears to us to be statistically valid, but its design of questions could, in our 
view, produce many more inferences than those chosen by the Commission. This 
becomes clear upon study of and reflection on the entire research report. 
4. The concerns identified by the Commission are real but we are worried that the 
Commission's identification of possible causes and the resulting recommendations 
could be viewed by the public as solid fact. It is our impression that this subsection of 
the Report  could give a more negative depiction of auditors than is justified, espe-
cially when giving cognizance to the inferential  range of the responses to the Rhode 
Survey. 
5. The result of the Commission's treatment of this very important section of its Report 
could be, in our view: 
— A misunderstanding by the public of the Rhode Survey, given its detailed content 
and its own recognition of inferential  possibilities. 
— A misunderstanding of the recommendation that firms conduct internal studies of 
the extent of unsatisfactory practices and conditions. 
An element of publicity given to the Commission's Report  is found in the column by 
Frederick Andrews on "Taxes and Accounting" in the New  York  Times  on April 5, 1977. The 
column (full text is given at the end of this section of our response) notes: 
"In total, of 1,441 responses to a question asking 'the primary motivating factor'  for 
individual auditors to sign off  on — or mark as completed — on a required audit step 
they actually had not carried out, 533 cited time budget pressures." 
This is a fair  reflection of the time and fee pressure statements made by the Commission in 
Section 9 and Appendix B of its Report.  But we wonder if it is balanced, based on the following 
analysis we performed. 
The synopsis quoted in the press is drawn from Question 35 of the Survey, which does not 
ask a respondent why he himself omitted a step; it simply asks for his opinion on why someone 
would do it. Although 40% cited time budget pressure, 23% felt the primary reason was 
immateriality of the step. 
But more importantly, there were but 887 persons out of 1,526 respondents (58%) who 
admitted that they personally signed off  on an audit step without completing the work. Of these 
only 52, or 3%, did so even though they were not satisfied with the extent of the examination in 
the particular area. 
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Why do more (1,441) have an opinion on causes of the impropriety than those (887) who 
admit to having performed it? The answer may be found in Question 29 (perhaps a validity 
check question), which asks whether the respondent has ever known of others in his firm who 
were guilty of the impropriety. 1,182 respondents (or 73%) out of 1,630 said they knew of such 
conduct, and 20% said it occurred despite non-satisfaction with the audit of the area. 
It has often been demonstrated that misconduct is alleged of colleagues much more so than it 
is of oneself,19 and that may partially explain the matter. Or it may leave some unanswered 
questions about the respondents' understanding of the Survey. 
We have performed other cross comparisons and analyses of the Survey results, but we are 
certain that Commission members have also done so in arriving at a synthesis of the several 
information sources for this subsection. Further comments on our part might therefore  seem 
presumptuous. But our view on a matter so critical to the profession as its integrity is that no 
amount of detail could be too abundant in describing in the Report  the information sources, 
their factual vs. opinion content and the broad range of possible inferences. However, we can 
appreciate that the Commission chose not to inundate its audience, and we therefore  suggest 
on p. 9-16, an even briefer  treatment of this subsection. 
Comments on the Commission's conclusions and recommendations 
1. We do not believe that unreasonable client time demands cause the auditor to 
compromise his independence. Because auditors perform a service, many wil l strive 
to perform it at the highest speed. In no way do they believe they are shortcutting the 
necessary procedures, and the Commission may underestimate the energies of 
dedicated professionals to both do it right and do it fast. 
2. It is to be expected that surveyed auditors believe time budgets have an effect  on 
auditors' performance.  In most human endeavor, a time constraint causes a perfor-
mance pressure, but such tension may be beneficial rather than detrimental. 
3. In view of the belief of a large proportion of respondents that sign-offs  without 
performance  did not affect  their audit satisfaction, what could have been conscien-
tiously addressed by the Commission is the issue of appropriate and truthful 
documentation.20 It stands to reason those work elements not affecting  the quality of 
the audit could be regarded with expendability — though we would not for a 
moment condone that approach. 
4. We strongly agree that all time worked should be recorded by the auditor. Audit 
scope planning must be based upon full knowledge of previous time input. However, 
there are so many variables involved in ascertaining audit efficiency  and competitive 
pricing that failure to record hours is but one element of the total problem. 
Touche Ross has long had a policy requiring that personnel charge all time worked. 
No doubt some of our personnel who were included in the Commission's Survey 
may have answered that they did not always charge all their time. We consider this a 
serious problem, but one of internal administration rather than of quality control. 
19 Steven N. Brenner and Earl A. Molander, "Is the Ethics of Business Changing?" Harvard  Business  Review  (Jan.-Feb. 
1977) pp. 64-66. 
20 Documentation is, of course, important, as its absence or incompleteness has contributed to unfavorable results for 
accountants in problem cases which may not have been, in the final analysis, "audit failures." 
9-14 
The practice of working additional hours without charging them also seems an 
anomalous response from individuals who may have admitted signing off  for audit 
procedures without performing  them. A high degree of professionalism in taking the 
time to complete the job properly, despite time pressures, is likely to be more 
important to most auditors than taking "shortcuts." 
5. A major factor involved in suppressing tendencies to sign-off  audit procedures 
without performing  them was indicated by Survey respondents as being the level of 
review in their practices. Touche Ross has had an in-depth "professional standards 
review" throughout its entire 30-year history. 
This independent preissuance review of the financial statements, auditors' report and 
audit work papers has, we hope, counterbalanced any significant tendency to 
shortcut audit procedures. Such a preissuance review procedure should be encour-
aged for all firms. 
6. The  need for  improved  use of  budgeting  procedures  in accounting  firms  — Despite 
our differences  of opinion over some of the Commission's comments about the 
adverse effects  of budgeting practices,21 we agree that time budgets should be 
realistic. All of the purposes ascribed to time budgets stated on page 113 of the 
Commission's Report  are valid. We have already included in our newly released 
conceptualized audit process a provision that time budgets and time expenditures be 
incorporated directly into the audit working papers. This was decided upon before 
the Commission released its Report,  as conditions seemed propitious to adopt this 
step as a natural part of our firm's audit control evolution. 
7. The  need for  further  study  of  audit  staff  members  — The Commission has recom-
mended that "Individual public accounting firms immediately undertake to conduct 
studies to determine the extent of the conditions revealed by the Commission's study 
and the effects  on their practices." 
As the Commission is aware, SAS No. 4 requires that firms maintain an inspection 
program to monitor conformity with professional standards. All of the larger firms 
perform some type of periodic review of each office's  practice quality. In our firm, a 
"Task Force Review" (in-depth review of selected engagements) is alternated bien-
nially with a "Technical Center Review" (a more limited coverage of overall quality 
aspects) so that each office  has annual consideration of its professional standards 
compliance. 
We believe this approach should be emphasized, but we wonder whether the 
Commission believes such programs are insufficient  to minimize the occurrence of 
the problems revealed by the Survey. We hope the Commission did not have in mind 
a study of the integrity of a firm's professional staff  as a means of ferreting  out past 
defects, or to see if the Survey results are really as reported. It seems to us that the 
emphasis should be on high standards of conduct, with the admonition (based on the 
Commission's Survey results) that disregard of those standards should be summarily 
dealt with. 
Firms which have not already done so would be well-advised to state a code of 
conduct in Staff  Manuals issued to their employees so that there can be no misun-
21 We agree with the Commission's statement of fact on page 114 that "problems of time budgets, as opposed to time 
pressure in general, would probably be revealed only by interviews of the staff  involved..." 
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derstanding that ethical standards take first  prominence, far in excess of any consid-
erations of meeting time budgets — which, after all, are and should be only estimates 
in advance of encountering specific audit circumstances. We think that sufficient 
publicity of the Commission's concerns along with fortified  internal inspection 
programs wil l be an adequate remedy. 
We recommend that the Commission, in its final report, briefly restate its valid concerns and 
its recommendations. We suggest that causative factors be restudied by the Commission and 
those not supported by reasonably factual evidence be minimized or removed. We are certain 
the Commission's final report will receive very broad attention and it is important that this most 
sensitive area of integrity be dealt with in a way more favorable to the profession, to the fullest 
extent the Commission believes justified. 
Early  earnings  releases  — we do not believe that additional warnings are needed as to the 
possibility of change upon audit. Companies with good "records" would be penalized un-
necessarily. 
Time  deadline  pressures  — If the SEC were to adopt more flexible deadlines for 10-K reports, 
or if it were to adopt a continuous disclosure approach with varying auditor attestation dates, 
even though the company's fiscal year is not changed, this could alleviate time deadline 
pressures. Perhaps the initial action might be to convince the SEC to grant more extensions for 
10-Ks. At present, it is difficult  to obtain an extension. 
Part of the answer must lie in the public accounting firm structuring itself to operate within 
existing time constraints. If it does not, the competition may be able to do so. This is a fact of 
professional life. 
A matter we believe deserves attention more than the intended publication date of a 
company's annual report is the scheduling of board and audit committee meetings. The auditor 
should not meet with the audit committee until the financial statements are drafted, all major 
audit conclusions reached and the auditor is prepared to report. Audit committee scheduling 
should therefore  remain more flexible. 
Time  pressures  and registrations  — We do not understand the Commission's statement (p. 
117) that "On some occasions, request for haste (in registration) may evolve into substantial 
time pressure, and, with some frequency, an audit failure." We are only aware of one situation 
where a registration time pressure caused a "failure." 22 We do not understand where the 
Commission obtained its view of "an almost excessive willingness of some auditors to be 
pressured in registrations." Specific cases would be instructive in the addressing of this issue by 
the profession. Finally, use of the phrase "to be pressured" is vague — if it means that the audit 
firm is will ing to do everything possible to be of service, but not to compromise its standards, 
that kind of pressure should be tolerable. 
Of course, we agree that the auditor should not concede to excessive pressure to complete 
his work, and for that reason there should be adequate independent review of the engagement 
and of the decisions of the partner in charge. 
Pricing  practices  and independence  — We, of course, agree with the AICPA ethics rulings 
concerning unpaid fees. A more formalized approach, however, should be taken to recoup-
22 The National Student Marketing registration statement problem was not an "audit failure," but as finally adjudicated, 
created a retroactive requirement that the audit firm had an obligation to disclose or see to the disclosure of its 
dissatisfaction in connection with unaudited statements. 
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ment of first-year  audit costs, to mitigate the problems which may be created by excessive price 
competition. While the major firms in general are willing to make it financially painless for 
companies to change auditors, and while we agree that first-year  overruns should not be 
deemed a receivable, it would be well to deliberately recognize the need to absorb such costs 
in overall gross margin of public accounting firms, without preclusion of recoupment if 
subsequent auditing efficiencies  occur. 
The  need to adopt  policies  on gifts  and discount  purchases  from  clients  — We totally agree 
with the Commission's recommendations. Our firm has long had a policy in its Administrative 
and Staff  Manuals that gifts should not be accepted, and discount purchases from clients can 
not be made unless there is an Executive Office  approved plan applicable to the entire firm, 
offering  no greater benefits that would be expected in view of the volume involved. 
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Taxes & Accounting 
Pressures on the Independent Auditor 
By FREDERICK ANDREWS 
Always and inevitably, the independ-
ent auditor gets off on the wrong foot 
concerning credibility. At first blush, 
the practice—as old as the public-ac-
counting profession—of hiving the 
company being audited pay the audi-
tor's fee seems to fly in the face of 
common sense. "He who pays the piper 
calls the tune," as the saying goes. 
In fact, however, the auditor's jig 
is a bit more complicated. According 
to an extensive and probing survey of 
2,000 certified public accountants, all 
with auditing experience, the critical 
cause of shoddy audit work is much 
more likely to be the sheer press of 
time. 
closely supervised by a senior staff ac-
countant, who is usually in his early 
30's or younger. 
But the great bulk of audit checking 
is carried out by junior accountants, 
many straight from college. 
According to Professor Seidler, the 
draft questionnaire on auditors' atti-
tudes toward their work frightened the 
big firms with " a bunch of 'did you 
stop beating your wife?" questions. In 
Mr. Seidler's view, the draft "was a 
disaster; It didn't help us." On the 
bright side, however, by virtue of re-
lying on the institute membership, he 
believes "the results have even more 
value—we have i bunch of senior guys 
telling us this. " 
This page has no 
been reproduced 
the Web version 
due to copyright 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
SECTION 10 
THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— The  present  Auditing  Standards  Executive  Committee  "should  be replaced  by  a 
smaller  full-time  Auditing  Standards  Board..." 
— The  form  of  guidance  provided  by  promulgated  auditing  standards  should  be 
changed to recognize  auditor  association  with  much newer  information  that  will  not 
be audited. 
— There  is a need for  formal  outside  participation  in the process  of  setting  auditing 
standards. 
— The  Auditing  Standards  Board  must  somehow raise  the unacceptable  level  of  partici-
pation  by  many  practicing  members  of  the profession  (the  silent  majority)  in estab-
lishing  auditing  standards. 
— The  Auditing  Standards  Board  should  identify  researchers  competent  in auditing  and 
arrange  for  public  accounting  firm  financial  and practice-oriented  assistance. 
— Periodic  reassessment  of  the Auditing  Standards  Board's  operation  should  include 
consideration  of  desirability  of  publishing  dissents. 
The Critical Question: Who Should Set Auditing Standards? 
Several years ago, the Wheat study group1 concluded that accounting standards setting 
should not be performed by a government agency. The Commission on Auditors' Respon-
sibilities believes this conclusion is even more persuasive in the area of auditing standards 
setting. We agree. There are many problems with the proposal that auditing standards should 
be developed and established by the government. For example, the government, in necessarily 
responding to political pressures, would not act on the need for promulgation of auditing 
standards on a timely basis, would not be likely to attract the type of professional person 
capable of creating conceptually sound auditing standards, and has shown no evidence that it 
can do a better job than the private sector. 
If the government were to establish auditing standards, political considerations would play 
too great a role in their development. Two cases out of many are discussed below. 
— The first  is the development of the Internal Revenue Code and its related regulations 
and revenue rulings. Since 1913, these have exponentially expanded to the point of 
incredible complexity. Many of these laws and regulations have little economic or 
conceptual accounting basis but were created to serve as economic development 
incentives. The net result, including court decisions and interpretations, is more 
corpulent than anything ever created by the accounting and auditing profession. The 
Internal Revenue Code is a bureaucracy which is cumbersome to administer and 
short on logic. 
1 Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles, Establishing  Financial  Accounting  Standards  (New York; AICPA, 
1972) pp. 21-24. 
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— The second situation is the government's intervention in accounting for the invest-
ment tax credit.2 In 1962 Congress established the investment tax credit as an 
incentive to business development in a then faltering economy. The Accounting 
Principles Board, using due process, concluded that the appropriate accounting was 
to spread the investment credit benefits over the useful lives of the assets which 
generated the credit. Those who desired to record the investment tax credit im-
mediately as income lobbied and won. Congress legislated that no one could 
prescribe a single method of accounting for the investment tax credit, and the APB 
had to back down. 
We believe that setting auditing standards is important enough to require the complete 
attention of those who are charged with its development. No governmental branch — the SEC, 
the General Accounting Office,  the Congress — has the prerogative to solely concern itself with 
auditing standards. Since auditing would be only a part of their concerns, they could not be 
totally responsive on a timely basis. Even the SEC, most prominent among the outside influ-
ences of auditing standards setting, spends relatively little effort  in the development of auditing, 
preferring  to suggest needs and having others (such as AudSEC and individual firms) develop 
the ideas. 
Nor can government attract, in our opinion, personnel of sufficiently  high talent to create 
auditing standards. Only those are who are experienced in the auditing arena can reasonably 
set auditing standards. This experience is not obtainable in government service. 
We believe that the process of establishing auditing standards must remain with those most 
qualified to determine these standards — those who have had extensive practice as auditors. 
They must be able to deal with the problems of implementability of auditing standards — a 
dimension of considerable importance. 
The Present Process and Its Weaknesses 
The accomplishments of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee and its predecessors 
are to be highly commended. In less than forty years the profession has created an impressive 
auditing heritage. Touche Ross & Co. has continuously participated in this process, expending 
substantial talent resources and money. We especially believe that the recent record of the 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee provides overwhelming evidence that the profession 
has acted with considerable responsibility in establishing high professional standards and 
procedures, responding well in emerging problems areas. 
In less than three years, the Committee has issued 18 statements on auditing standards, as 
well as having authorized many interpretations and industry audit guides. These releases cover 
a wide spectrum of auditing issues, for example: 
— SAS No. 4 is a landmark in auditing literature since it achieved specification on the 
quality control elements for all firms of independent auditors; any gaps in a firm's 
preexisting system were thus filled in. This statement has become the foundation for 
the profession's intensive peer review program being vigorously pursued by the 
AICPA. 
— SAS No. 6 discusses accounting for related party transactions. This SAS, which took 
several years to develop, was issued in response to the critical litigation problems the 
profession faced in this area. 
2 Refer to our footnote 10c on page 2-5. 
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— Other SASs have expanded the role of the auditor to require his involvement with 
other information in documents containing audited financial statements and with 
unaudited data contained in financial statements, such as interim financial informa-
tion and replacement cost data, and have dealt with communications between 
predecessor and successor auditors. 
— SAS No. 12 deals with inquiries addressed to a client's lawyer and represents two 
years of debates with the legal profession over the conflict of privileged communica-
tion with the need for adequate financial statement disclosure of a mutual client's 
contingencies and uncertainties. 
— Recent SASs have discussed the independent auditor's responsibility for the detection 
of errors or irregularities and illegal acts by clients, perhaps greatly adding to 
auditors' responsibilities as well as legal liability exposure. 
These accomplishments in establishing high professional standards have not come easily. 
The government, primarily through the SEC but of late by a covey of Congressional Committees 
and Subcommittees,3 has sought to attach new responsibilities to the auditing profession, 
without recognition of the limitlessness of current legal exposure. 
On the other hand, more can be done.4 The Auditing Standards Executive Committee is now 
composed of 20 part-time volunteer members, who can do little more than react deliberately — 
not swiftly — to problems as they arise. Thus there has been a somewhat random pattern to the 
development of auditing standards — firefighting  rather than forward,  effective  planning. 
Ideally the auditing standards setting process should also have a conceptual framework,  in 
addition to envisioning emerging areas and acting on them before they ignite. We agree with 
the Commission that the process of setting auditing standards should operate more quickly and 
responsively to emerging needs. To accomplish this, the process must remain within the 
profession. 
3 Several of these instances (there are more) are current: 
— "Report on Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform," issued September 1976 by the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, John E. 
Moss, Chairman (The "Moss Report"). 
— The  Accounting  Establishment:  A Staff  Study,  prepared by the United States Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, Lee Metcalf, Chairman (The "Metcalf 
Report"). 
— H.R. 3815, "The Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977," sponsored by the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, Bob Eckhardt, Chairman. This bill 
does not contain direct auditing requirements. 
4 Our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study, op. cit., stated (p. 8): 
"As to auditing, ...the profession has been responding aggressively to legitimate increased public expectations 
and to the heightened challenges imposed by the increasing incidence of corporate fraud and improper 
corporate payments. Although we believe that the process of setting auditing standards could be made to 
operate more quickly and more responsively, we cannot agree that that function should not continue to be 
carried out within  the public  accounting  profession,  for only that group has the expertise necessary to perform 
the task. Moreover, the problems involved are apolitical in nature, so that the process need not be expanded to 
involve a broad spectrum of outside viewpoints and influences. This contrasts with the process of setting 
accounting  principles,  which merits participation of persons from inside and outside the profession because of 
the variety of callings in which expertise is available and the need to balance the elements of varying viewpoints 
and divergent self-interest. 
"The tentative report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities reveals an insight of the profession and 
makes a number of recommendations for improvement which merit attention. This is further  evidence of the 
continuing efforts  made by the profession to examine need for change. It appears clear to us in these 
circumstances that no significant purpose would be served in changing a system which continues to operate 
effectively." 
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Recommended Changes in the Auditing Standards Setting Process 
"A  full  time  board"  — We have studied the Commission's recommendation that the Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee be replaced by a smaller auditing standards board composed 
of full-time members.5 We agree with this proposal. We believe that the new board should 
consist of nine members since this number is small enough to operate effectively  and effi-
ciently, and large enough to provide an exchange of ideas among high caliber professional 
auditors. We believe that all members should be highly experienced professionals — either 
from public accounting practice or from academia. 
The auditing standards board should be empowered to issue statements on auditing stan-
dards on its own authority by affirmative  vote of a single majority and without prior consulta-
tion with any other body — substantially the same authority held by the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee which requires a two-thirds vote — but within a continuing dialogue with 
the SEC. 
We also believe, as a natural conclusion to self-regulation, that the auditing standards board 
should be part of the AICPA. We agree with the Commission's recommendation that a larger 
staff  would be required to assist the proposed board. Self-regulation has its privileges and it also 
has its responsibilities. Since the profession is charged with its own self-regulation, it should 
support, through general membership dues, the salaries of the board members and staff  and 
other operating expenses. 
The term of board members should be three years, on a staggered basis. However, we 
believe that a board member should not be reappointable for an additional three-year period. 
This would assure a fresh insight in the standards setting process, and as to current problems. 
We also agree with the Commission that a board member may maintain arrangements to return 
to public accounting practice after his term. Independence is, of course, required of an auditor 
in his relationship with his clients. However, independence from his prior firm should not be 
required by a member of the auditing standards board. Indeed, these firms will be called upon 
by the board to contribute the talent of their senior people, and the firms themselves have a vital 
and unavoidably altruistic interest in the creation of workable auditing standards. It would not 
even concern us that a board member remained as a member of his firm, so long as his full-time 
efforts  could be devoted to the board. However, appearances and administration would 
probably make this unworkable. In any event, arrangements to return to a firm wil l not, in our 
view, impair a member's objectivity; such a prerogative indeed may be necessary to ensure that 
highly qualified individuals wil l be eager to serve. 
As a first  step in establishing the auditing standards board, we propose that a review 
committee composed of representatives from the profession and other appropriate sectors be 
created promptly, study the matter in the manner recently done for the FASB by the FAF 
Structure Committee,6 recruit the new board members, and determine that the board will be 
responsive to the needs of the public in establishing auditing standards. We envision that this 
review committee would be autonomous of the AICPA, but unlike the recent change in FAF 
composition rules, we think a majority of the review committee should be AICPA representa-
tives. 
5 Suggestions have been made to retain AudSEC as a volunteer group, reducing or rotating the membership of the "Big 
Eight" firms. We are concerned that these are merely a palliative for governmental assertions of domination. 
6 See Report of the Structure Committee of the Financial Accounting Foundation on The  Structure  of  Establishing 
Financial  Accounting  Standards,  April, 1977. 
10-4 
We recognize that these proposals will require sacrifices of the profession. We believe, 
however, that a new auditing standards board wil l improve the process of establishing auditing 
standards and consequently the services which the profession can provide its clients and the 
public. We are ready to participate with the profession to implement a new auditing standards 
board. 
"Form  of  guidance"  — As we have already suggested, there should be a statement of the 
"conceptual framework"  of auditing, incorporating the independent auditor's role. Though 
much has been written on this subject (notably including the Commission's Report  of  Tentative 
Conclusions)  the auditing standards board should develop its own version as a background 
against which to prepare future individual standards. 
Needless to say, the Commission's recommendations on extensions of the auditor's role in 
Section 6 and his form of reporting in Section 7 would occasion considerable revisions in 
present standards on evidentiary matter and on reporting. We see no reason standards can not 
be made to adapt if agreement is reached on the many fundamental changes envisioned by the 
Commission. 
"Participation  in the process  of  setting  standards"  — As much openness as is possible should 
be provided for,  but there can not be unlimited access if the board is to promulgate standards 
efficiently.  Exploratory and developmental board sessions should probably be private, but all 
deliberative sessions should be " in the sunshine," open to the public. Of course, exposure 
drafts (even "discussion memoranda" where appropriate) should continue to be issued for 
public comment, and public hearings held on all proposed standards if there appears to be a 
sufficient  public interest. 
We have no suggestions on how to enkindle a desire on the part of the vast majority of 
practicing professionals to take the time necessary to comment on board proposals. We 
recognize the necessarily greater resources of the larger firms and their needs for homogeneity 
in their respective firms' practices wil l keep them involved. 
Identifying  researchers  competent  in auditing  — In recommending the establishment of a 
small full-time board to set auditing standards, particular emphasis is given to the lack of 
specific guidance in existing pronouncements and to the frequent problem of failure to 
pronounce on a timely basis. In Section 4 it was noted that auditors are not sufficiently  aware of 
possible deficiencies in individual audit techniques and steps. Thus the Commission believes 
that more efficient  and effective  auditing research would assist the new auditing standards 
board in performing  its tasks and avoiding the weaknesses of the present structure. 
Touche Ross agrees with the Commission's position in general, but believes it does not go far 
enough. Our experience has been that significant improvements have been obtained in 
auditing through academic-type research. We see a cohesive effort  as being potentially very 
beneficial to the profession, and believe that simply encouraging (or sponsoring) fragmented 
project effort  tends to be counterproductive. 
We believe that formation of the auditing standards board provides an opportunity to 
formalize auditing research on a profession-wide basis. The board, as the focal point for 
auditing research, could provide: 
1. A taxonomy for auditing and auditing research. 
2. A cataloguing of completed research — e.g., through NAARS. 
3. A data base facility for experimentation and teaching. 
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4. A vehicle for prioritizing research needs and communicating these as well as their 
results. 
At the present time the large CPA firms support the idea of substantial audit research through 
the AICPA, joint ventures among themselves, internal projects, hiring of consultants and by 
academic grants. Many other groups are doing auditing research — various universities, the 
Institute of Internal Auditors and other countries' accounting organizations. If all of these could 
be brought together in a coordinated manner, the benefits in terms of efficiency  and effective-
ness could be tremendous. We believe the Commission should consider this potential and 
strengthen its recommendation accordingly. 
Periodic  reassessment  and operating  procedure  — We have already suggested establishment 
of a body to charter the auditing standards board. This body could be perpetuated much like 
the FAF Structure Committee to periodically reassess the board's effectiveness. 
We would agree that dissents should not be published as part of the standards pronounce-
ment, but they should be available for the public record so that those desiring more insight into 
interpretation of the standards may obtain it. 
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SECTION 11 
REGULATING THE PROFESSION TO 
MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF AUDIT PRACTICE 
The Commission's Tentative Conclusions 
— Public  accounting  firms  should  voluntarily  expand  public  disclosures  of  their  finan-
cial  and other  internal  data  if  they  foresee  a sufficiently  beneficial  result. 
— Once a duly  constituted  disciplinary  body  begins  its  work,  those who initiate  the 
ethics  complaint  should  be informed  of  the status.  After  resolution,  penalties  should 
be well  publicized.  Excessive  secrecy  is wrong. 
— Appeals in litigation  should  not delay  disciplinary  proceedings  unless it  can be 
demonstrated  that  the outcome would  be prejudiced. 
— The  AICPA,  with  the cooperation  of  accounting  firms...,  should  analyze  cases as they 
move through  the judicial  or  regulatory  system. 
— Legislation  should  be enacted  empowering  courts  to assess costs  against  unsuccessful 
plaintiffs. 
— Statutory  limitation  of  monetary  damages is essential  to the continuation  of  the public 
accounting  profession  in the private  sector. 
— Increased  use of  masters  is endorsed  to make impartial  expertise  available  to the 
courts. 
— Safe  harbors  should  be made available  only  when auditors  are  asked  to assume new 
responsibilities  or  significantly  extend  old  ones. 
Protecting Users from Substandard Performance 
The Commission makes a very important observation — that substandard audits of entities 
not having financial difficulties  are likely to go undetected. It is true that only a relatively small 
number of audits are alleged to be substandard; the allegation usually comes when financial or 
operating reverses occur and the financial statements, not having contained a clear prediction, 
are then said to have been improperly audited. And only in rare instances, does the auditor 
simply admit that he did not follow professional standards (or more likely "consent" without 
admission). 
As indicated throughout the Commission's Report,  the many judgmental areas as well as 
pressures involved in auditing would make it appear that, in most instances of management, 
their representations were false; and that in many fraud by situations of financial failure, the 
auditor may not have expressed a going concern qualification — which the Commission 
proposes, and we agree, should be eliminated. 
The fact that a few adjudicated cases have held the auditor to have not performed in 
conformity with generally accepted auditing standards (as those standards were precisely 
configured for purposes of that particular trial) should not be taken to suggest that there is a 
great deal of substandard auditing occurring which is not detected because the companies do 
not have financial difficulties.  Even the results of the Commission's survey (Section 9), in which 
professional auditors have admitted to signing off  for performance  on audit steps not per-
formed, showed down in its details that only 3% felt their omission occurred in such a way as to 
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affect  their audit quality in the particular area. Therefore,  simply signing off  on an unperformed 
procedure, while unprofessional in terms of documentation, does not cause a substandard 
audit. Even in some of the adjudicated cases of which we are aware, we think the auditing may 
have been better than was provable under challenge, simply because of poor documentation, 
and not because of unacceptable or subprofessional performance  of the audit. While Touche 
Ross emphasizes the need for appropriate documentation, we must make the distinction here 
that the difference  between a "standard" and "substandard" audit should be a conceptual one, 
based on procedures performed,  rather than documentation amassed. 
We concur in the Commission's view that the total system for protecting users from substan-
dard performance,  as it now exists, including litigation and actions by regulatory bodies, 
provides a reasonable level of protection to the public. If anything, we believe that the threat of 
litigation to the major firms provides an extremely strong impetus to following the highest 
professional standards out of an abundance of concern for later challenge. We comment on this 
later. 
We realize, however, that the public, regulators and government may believe that the 
disciplinary and other forces are not sufficient,  and that, therefore,  improvements in the system 
should be implemented, as discussed below. 
Influences on the Regulatory Mechanism 
Under "Nature of Professional Practice," the Commission refers  to "changes in standards 
and changes in performance."  We think a distinction also needs to be made between "stan-
dards" and "procedures." The ten generally accepted auditing standards adopted by Council 
of the AICPA have been in existence for some 30 years. Although they are presently under 
scrutiny for change, they seem to be fundamentally acceptable, and need not be tampered 
with. 
However, the procedures emanating from newly issued statements on auditing standards, as 
well as from other sources such as SEC sanctions and court decisions, take time to implement. 
That should not suggest, however, that auditors do not strive to perform according to standards 
at all times. 
We wonder about the accuracy of the Commission's statement, in discussing "The Signifi-
cance of Large Firms," that smaller practice units may not require the controls needed in large 
practice units to assure consistency of performance. 1 If all independent auditors are to operate 
according to the same professional standards, then all must control their performance  in the 
same way. What the Commission may be referring  to is administrative control, rather than 
technical quality control. Nonetheless, we agree that the larger firm, because of its dispersion, 
must have an extended span of control that small units need not have, such as professional 
development programs, in-house quality reviews, and other matters delineated in SAS No. 4, 
"Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of CPAs." 
1 The Commission states that it has been unable to determine the effectiveness  of large firm quality control systems, 
although they appear impressive. We trust this is not intended to create doubts. It could as easily be said that smaller 
practice units could be hampered because of the absence of these controls. 
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Practice Controls to Improve Performance and Assure Compliance With Standards 
Voluntary  public  disclosure  by  CPA firms  - This section mentions, as a recent activity by 
public accounting firms, Arthur Andersen's publication of its annual report. Touche Ross & Co. 
has also published its "Report on Progress and Prospectives" over the last three years.2 We 
believe we are appropriately limiting our remarks to essential  information required by the 
public to understand the quality of our firm. Our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study elaborates 
on this subject, and is included in Appendix A, pages 9 - 11. A summary of the public 
disclosures we think are appropriate is as follows: 
• Size data — revenues, personnel counts 
• Data concerning general scope of service 
• Services to government agencies, and fees therefrom 
• Financial strength data 
• Data on quality assurance, research, training, staff  development and public interest 
programs 
We are opposed to the issuance of full financial statements and publishing earnings of 
individual partners. Privacy principles should govern here, as no compelling reasons for 
disclosure can be shown. Client listings are also unnecessary, as these are available, as to 
public companies, from other sources. 
Touche Ross will continue to make those disclosures believed to be useful to the public, as 
recommended by the Commission. We think, however, that this disclosure should presently 
continue on a voluntary basis. 
In its comments on "The Effectiveness  of Practice Controls," the Commission is correct in 
suggesting that individual firms have intensified their activity in the area of quality control3 in 
response to highly publicized so-called audit failures. While the Commission admits this is only 
a partial cause, we submit that auditing quality control procedures have been rapidly evolving, 
not because of failures, but because of the litigation aspect — the prospect of being unable to 
categorically demonstrate to a lay jury that an audit was properly conducted in conformity with 
generally accepted auditing standards. 
We do agree, however, that additional attention, as required in Section 9, should be given to 
CPA firms' practice controls, primarily from the standpoint of improving efficiency  and quality, 
rather than to assess whether their present status may have had a negative effect  on the quality 
of work performed. 4 
2 The Commission's Report footnotes the existence of the Touche Ross report without financial statements; this should 
not be taken to imply that financial data are required. 
3 Quality control procedures are also disciplinary, a fact not directly acknowledged by the Commission. ASR 153 
required our firm, in connection with a disciplinary action, to install certain control procedures three years ahead of 
substantive adoption within the profession. In our case, the SEC used disciplinary action as a means of encouraging 
the creation of later SASs. In the case of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (ASR 173), a somewhat controversial 
document concerning accounting for long-term contracts resulted. There could be further  "quality control" influ-
ences from disciplinary actions in the future. 
4 Our comments on "Inspection of the Work of Auditors" in our response to the Metcalf Staff  Study are contained in 
Appendix A, pp. 1 5 - 1 6 . 
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Penalizing  substandard  performance  and misconduct  — As the Commission is well aware, 
the Metcalf Staff  Study5 made numerous allegations about the discipline of the profession, to 
which we have responded at length.Because there is a substantial congruity between the issues 
raised by the Commission and the Staff  Study, we have included in Appendix A hereof,  pages 
11-14 , applicable excerpts of our response to the Staff  Study. Our views on the Commission's 
issues are summarized below: 
— State Boards of Accountancy — Diffusion  of responsibility into fifty  separate adminis-
trative units produces inconsistent results. More effective  use of these bodies war-
rants further  study. 
— The "secrecy" weakness — The Commission believes that existing secrecy has 
prevented their meaningful evaluation of the AlCPA's disciplinary procedures. 
Initiators of ethics complaints are not informed of status, and resolutions are often 
described in the most general terms. We suggest that consideration be given to lifting 
this "veil of secrecy" by: 
a. The Joint Trial Board Division adopting a policy that upon a finding of guilty, a 
description of the violation of the Ethics Code, the name of the member and the 
punishment imposed normally be publicized. 
b. Trial Board hearings be open to the public. 
c. Those portions of the Ethics Division subcommittees and Executive Committee 
meetings that deal with non-disciplinary matters be open to the public. 
d. Quarterly or semiannual consolidated statistics of ethics enforcement activity by 
the AICPA and State Societies participating in the Joint Ethics Enforcement Plan be 
publicized. 
We do not believe that the complaining party should be informed of the status or 
disposition of ethics investigations for the following reasons: 
a. To be equitable to all concerned, if the complaining party was informed of the 
status of the investigation then the respondent should also be informed as to who 
made the complaint against him. We believe this would reduce the number of 
complaints filed and thus be counterproductive. 
b. Trial Boards are and should be the only body authorized to give publicity about a 
finding of guilty. Punishment such as administrative censures issed by the State 
Societies or the AICPA Ethics Division are private censures. Informing the com-
plaining parties who in turn might inform others would turn these into public 
censures. If State Societies and the AICPA Ethics Division do not use administrative 
censures because they believe the violation warrants public censure, then the 
State Society or AICPA Ethics Division should recommend a Trial Board proceed-
ing. 
In an effort  to coordinate enforcement and rule making, especially in the indepen-
dence area, meetings with appropriate SEC and Ethics Division personnel should be 
held on a regularly scheduled basis. 
— Appeals in litigation  — Historically, action on alleged violations of professional 
ethics has been deferred  if the member so requested it pending the outcome of 
litigation. The Commission's Report  calls for the member to submit detailed informa-
tion that the purported ethical violations are directly related to the litigation before 
action on the investigation is deferred. 
5 Op. cit., pp. 20 - 24 (Summary Recommendations). 
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We believe that the relationship between the purported ethics violation and litigation, and 
the possibility of influencing the litigation by disciplinary proceedings has normally been 
self-evident. However, we have no objection to requiring the respondent to so demonstrate. 
The same procedures would apply to matters on appeal — that the respondent would have to 
demonstrate that the appeal proceeding could result in the introduction of new evidence and 
that the appeal process could be affected  by disciplinary proceedings. 
The Penalties of Litigation and Regulatory Enforcement 
The largest single threat to the health and vitality of the accounting profession is the spectre 
of civil litigation. This subject is discussed in Appendix A, pages 1 4 - 1 5 , and our summary 
(from pp. 6 - 7 of our Response to the Metcalf Staff  Study) is cited here: 
"The (Staff)  Study, having assumed that audit failures are endemic to the profession, 
concludes that this results in major part from...  deficiencies in regulatory and disci-
plinary procedures both within and without the profession. The Study suggests that 
such a problem could be alleviated by the SEC taking a stronger stand in disciplinary 
proceedings which involve the large firms and by enacting federal  legislation which 
would increase the exposure of accountants to claims of private litigants. 
"...the record does not support the conclusion that the number of audit failures 
which have occurred in recent years is indicative of pervasive professional failing. 
Nor is there evidence that the public would be well served by imposing on the 
profession a greater exposure to regulatory penalties and claims of litigants. The 
liability risks faced by the profession already constitute an awesome burden, and to 
suggest that those risks be extended would be counterproductive to attempts now 
being made (by the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities) to encourage inde-
pendent accountants to assume expanded duties to the public.... 
"The Staff  Study concludes that the public sector can do a better, quicker, and more 
open job of...reviewing the quality aspects of auditing firms. It also states that such 
efforts  would be carried on with less influence from self-interested parties than exists 
under present circumstances. Touche Ross agrees (as it always has) that the search for 
improvement of existing processes should be constant, but cannot accept the conclu-
sion...that the public sector should assume the responsibility." 
As a consequence of all this, and as the Commission suggests (p. 144), there is definitely an 
element of "wasteful, defensive auditing" which has built up in the last half dozen years in the 
auditing profession. We think this is mostly directed toward precision in documentation to 
assure that, if challenged, reliance will not have to be substantially on oral remarks of the 
persons who performed the work or made the judgment. In our own firm, we believe we may 
be excessive in comparison with other firms in terms of memo writing; although this practice 
has its origins in the distant past, our firm's proclivity toward putting memos on the file has 
accelerated in recent years, because of all the various and vague responsibilities being ascribed 
to the profession. 
"Analyzing  and reporting  audit  failures"  — The Commission recommends (p. 145) that 
"...the AICPA, with the cooperation of accounting firms and through the use of court and SEC 
documents, should establish a mechanism for timely and continuing analyses of individual 
cases as they move through the judicial or regulatory system." Apart from the possibility that 
the Commission may be over-dignifying SEC proceedings as a source of changes in auditing 
standards (we believe the best way for standards and procedures changes to be mandated is 
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directly, rather than indirectly such as through SEC homilies), this is an appropriate idea but 
considerable specification and safeguards wil l be required to make it work. The problems 
which will be encountered are similar to those involved in disciplinary proceedings (above) at 
the time litigation is in process.6 
"Assessment  of  costs  against  unsuccessful  plaintiffs"  — We believe that appropriate legisla-
tion along the lines now being pursued by the American Law Institute should be enacted 
empowering, but not requiring, the court to assess costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs.  This 
would tend to limit or discourage nuisance or strike suits against auditors. 
"Statutory  limitation  of  damages"  — We are in favor of some form of statutory limitation of 
monetary damages which may be awarded in judgments against public accountants. Since the 
time devoted by a firm's senior personnel to defense is necessarily immense under current 
conditions, consideration should be given to appropriate recompense. Touche Ross is pleased 
to see the Commission in favor of limitations and is in general amenable to the American Law 
Institute's proposals incident to the restatement of the Federal Securities Code now in process. 
"Safe  harbors"  — With respect to the Commission's recommendation that "safe harbors 
should be made available only when auditors are asked to assume new responsibilities or 
significantly extend old ones," we agree that this is one way to get auditors to step into 
experimental positions. However, it does not present a long-term solution, and may have the 
disadvantage of taking a considerable time to formulate parameters before the auditors offi-
cially begin whatever it is. We suggest that, in addition, considerable recognition should be 
required to be given to statements by the auditor describing the limitations on the assurance he 
is giving in new areas. Presently there seems to be a reluctance to tread into new areas on the 
theory that all auditor's "caveats" will be dismissed as communication only for the initiated. 
We are also concerned that the Commission may not have considered the use of "safe 
harbors" with respect to the many extensions of the auditor's role expressed throughout the 
Report.  Although the specifying of forecasting and current values is made in the context of 
examples, there are many more "new, untried, high risk areas." 
In a sense, all auditor assurances on soft or unaudited data would be in a "safe harbor" if 
sufficiently  specific standards and objectives for the auditor's activity were to be created. 
6 Refer to our comments on p. 4-7 regarding dissemination of information on frauds. This situation is much the same. 
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APPENDIX A 
Applicable Excerpts from 
STATEMENT 
of 
TOUCHE ROSS & CO. 
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Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting 
and Management 
of the 
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
on 
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 
May 23, 1977 
EXCERPTS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 4. CLARIFYING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF FRAUD 
Auditors Responsibility to Detect Fraud 
The issue of auditors responsibility for protecting against such fraud arises only after the 
management and board of directors of a corporation have both failed in their primary responsi-
bility for dealing fairly with shareholders and the public. Auditing failures have then later 
occurred, but only in the wake of a complete breakdown of corporate responsibility, which is a 
subject having vastly more direct impact on the public than does the role of the accounting 
profession alone. 
An auditor's failure or inability to detect serious management fraud, at the outset, can 
result from a number of factors that need to be separately identified and treated: 
• First, it can be the result of inherent limitations in audit procedures, which rely 
upon sampling techniques that, by definition, are vulnerable to undetected 
abuses. The assumption in the Study that an auditor could provide broad and 
unmitigated assurance of honest stewardship by corporate management is simply 
not valid within the constraints of economically feasible auditing procedures. 
• Second, fraud which escapes audit detection by collusive deception on the part 
of management is necessarily coupled with deliberate misrepresentations and 
concealment. An audit is not the equivalent of an investigation designed to 
winnow truth from potential falsehoods, is not accomplished by subpoena 
power, and cannot be economically designed to presume that responses from 
management or confirmations from third parties are likely to be untrue. 
• Third, undetected management fraud can be the result of an auditor's human 
failure. Although this can take the form of complicity, it is a matter of pride that of 
the thousands of persons active in the profession, only six have been convicted of 
criminal violations for auditing malfeasance in the past decade. If human failing 
is a significant and relevant problem, it is more likely a problem of deficiencies in 
such areas as qualifications, training, supervision, and diligence of performance. 
In our view, the adequacy or failure of professional self-discipline and outside 
regulation must be measured by determining the extent to which such deficien-
cies have contributed to instances where management fraud was not detected. 
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EXCERPTS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 9. 
MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR 
Performance of Non-Accounting 
Management Advisory Services 
The Study states that the performance  of "non-accounting" management advisory services for 
audit clients is incompatible with the necessity of an auditor to be independent in appearance 
and in fact. Such non-accounting services are defined to include executive recruitment, 
marketing analysis, plant layout studies, product analysis, actuarial services, and financial 
management services. 
As the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities indicates in its Report of Tentative 
Conclusions,7 surveys of financial statement users generally show that a significant minority of 
users are initially concerned about the potential conflict between management advisory 
services and the audit function. However, their concern decreases as their familiarity with the 
nature of services offered  by public accounting firms increases, and their concern diminishes 
further  when the services are provided by different  functional divisions of the staff,  such as a 
separate management advisory services function. 
As a general matter, substantial safeguards assure us that we do not lose our objectivity and 
effectiveness  either as an independent auditor or as an independent management consultant. In 
the first  place, our management advisory services activity is a separate function within the firm. 
Secondly, in our consulting work with clients we make a clear distinction between advising  a 
client, which requires independence, and making  management decisions  for a client, a role 
which is inconsistent with independence. We are careful  to act only in the capacity of 
independent advisors. 
It has been our experience that the additional knowledge of a client gained in the course of 
management advisory service engagements facilitates our rendering an opinion as to the 
client's financial statements. Increased knowledge of an audit client has, in fact, been the 
objective of all good auditors going back to the time of the early Scottish accountants, who 
themselves also engaged in management advisory service work; to preclude auditing firms 
from consulting activities would accomplish little but to hamper an additional source of 
information. In addition, if the role of the auditor is to be expanded, as some suggest, to cover 
such things as forecasts, the necessity for even greater knowledge of the client is vital, and this 
could be supplied through the management consulting activity. 
In any event, it appears that in spite of the merit of the above discussion, the Staff  perceives 
that a potential problem of a lack of independence in appearance exists in the six areas of 
management advisory services work noted above, which we believe requires specific response. 
• Marketing Analysis, Plant Layout Studies, 
and Product Analysis 
As a first  point, Touche Ross does not perform marketing analysis, plant layout 
studies or product analysis as those terms are defined in the Staff  Study. This may 
appear inconsistent with our response to the letter from Senator Metcalf dated 
December 19, 1975, but only because we responded affirmatively  to those particular 
questions out of an abundance of caution in dealing with undefined terms. Turning 
specifically to each of those issues: 
1. Marketing analysis - The Study describes this term as "performing  studies to 
determine the feasibility of selling a client's products or services to a particular 
market...and may include identifying likely customers, surveying the attitudes of 
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consumers, or finding areas of excess disposable income." The scope of our 
services in this area excludes any consumer research, and we do not perform 
engagements designed to discover areas of excess disposable income. However, 
we do assist our clients in determining whether contemplated major users of new 
products and services would view the new product or services as viable. In 
addition, we assist our clients in determining what channels of distribution are 
most appropriate and economic. Our services are limited to presenting our 
research to the client who, in turn, makes the ultimate management decision of 
whether to proceed with the marketing of the new goods or services. 
2. Plant layout studies - The work contemplated by the Study requires broad 
engineering capabilities, which we do not possess and consider beyond our 
scope. In our prior affirmative  response, we considered that the terms might 
include our inventory control work, which consists of assisting clients in achiev-
ing proper inventory levels and turnover. 
3. Product analysis - We do not "analyze a client's product to determine its value to 
customers," as described in the Study. On the other hand, we do engage in 
product line analyses which employ well-established economic and managerial 
accounting techniques in order to assist clients in determining the relative 
profitability of existing product lines. 
We do not consider the work which we do as described in items 2 and 3 to be in 
conflict with our audit function. Indeed, they consist merely of well-accepted 
accounting tools being made available for management's use in its own day-to-
day operations. 
• Actuarial Services 
Touche Ross is indirectly engaged in performing  actuarial services through a joint 
venture arrangement with a firm of actuaries; such joint venture is not under Touche 
Ross management but is supervised by its own separate board of directors. We 
consider such work a necessity as part of our auditing services since generally 
accepted auditing standards as promulgated by the AICPA and SEC require that the 
auditor either be satisfied with the actuarial assumptions reflected in financial state-
ments or modify his opinion appropriately. For example, in the case of an audit of a 
life insurance company (where actuarial assumptions as to required reserves would 
be a very material consideration), inability to be so satisfied would require the 
auditor to disclaim an opinion. 
Because of this substantial responsibility in our auditing role, we have chosen to 
associate with a highly respected actuarial firm for expert assistance. We believe 
such a relationship is essential. We also make available to our clients the services of 
that separately managed joint venture for other specific needs of the client as, for 
example, the development of employee benefit plans. 
• Financial Management Services 
We perform work described in the Study as "financial management services," 
specifically including such indicated services as "designing and implementing elec-
tronic data processing and other services which help management of client com-
panies make financial decisions...., computer forecasting models and inventory 
control systems ...." These services relate to advising clients in developing proper 
financial records, accounting controls, and forecasting procedures, all of which are 
fundamental to reliable corporate accounting systems. The highest degree of exper-
tise on this subject must by definition be available within independent accounting 
and auditing firms, and the assistance provided serves to improve the client's systems 
and procedures for developing proper records, controls, and abilities to make ac-
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counting and financial decisions. This activity is not in conflict with the firm's 
function of auditing financial results, but is clearly supportive of the audit function 
because of the heightened reliability of underlying systems which is produced. It 
seems clear that to prohibit accounting firms from providing such expert service 
would be directly contrary to the public interest. 
• Executive Recruitment 
The Staff  appears to believe that to help a client fill a position is so conducive to a 
relationship which is other than arms length that independence would be com-
promised. Although we do not believe that such activities impair a firm's indepen-
dence, we agree that auditing firms should not be in the business of executive 
recruiting, or purport to be. On the other hand, we believe that it is proper for a firm 
to accommodate the occasional requests of clients to assist in filling vacancies in 
positions where we have professional expertise. Clients naturally expect us to be able 
to help in filling their technical accounting and financial personnel needs, and we 
comply with such requests when we can. 
On the other hand, we would be will ing to accede to a rule, if universally 
applicable, which would preclude firms from engaging in any executive recruiting 
activity, including mere client accommodation efforts. 
We believe that the concerns of the staff  about non-accounting management advisory 
services can be met by corporate audit committees. As discussed earlier, such committees 
should be responsible for oversight of auditor independence, and thus should be alert to any 
possible problems arising from consulting work provided by the auditing firm. 
Direct or Indirect Representation of Clients' Interests 
Before Governmental Agencies 
The Study asserts broadly that Big 8 accounting firms actively represent clients before federal, 
state and local governments and that they advocate the interests of clients on substantive issues 
regarding corporate taxation, pricing, government contract costing rules, federal  regulations on 
corporate reporting, and uniformity of accounting for federal  purposes. 
Touche Ross does, of course, represent identified clients before such governmental agen-
cies as the SEC, IRS, state tax agencies, and utility regulatory commissions, but only if the 
position taken is consistent with a totally objective viewpoint of the issues involved. We 
consider this activity a necessary part of our professional engagements and believe that we 
could not fulfill  our professional duties to our clients in any other way. Touche Ross also 
occasionally makes its position known to legislative and regulatory agencies on technical 
issues or matters of principle, which the firm as a group of informed individuals believes is its 
right and duty as a citizen body. On the other hand, the firm considers it inappropriate to 
attempt to influence legislative or regulatory bodies simply to satisfy specific interests of 
particular clients. Such an activity would not be practical in any event, since the interest of one 
client is often diametrically opposed to that of another. 
The Study states that Touche Ross "is very active in testifying before state regulatory 
commissions in utility rate cases," and we concur in that statement. However, the Study then 
asserts: "As such, it has supported controversial rate-making procedures which benefit utilities 
at the expense of consumers." That statement is incorrect. In our submission of April 30, 1976 
to the Subcommittee we listed 71 instances in which we appeared before a governmental unit 
in order to offer  testimony. In all  but  six  of  the engagements  we were  hired  by  a regulatory 
commission  and in no instance  did  we testify  on behalf  of  a public  utility.  As that suggests, the 
vast majority of our work in regulated industries is performed for regulatory bodies, public 
advocates, and municipalities which intervene in rate cases on their own behalf. 
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Our public utility services clearly meet the test of serving the public interest. Our work has 
faced unique challenges, as it is often contested by the public utility involved and judged by a 
state regulatory commission. In addition, we have been engaged by several federal  regulatory 
bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. As an example we are presently engaged by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a 
project to review the costs of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline system for purposes of setting rates. 
In short, for the Staff  to imply that our work involving rate-making procedures primarily 
benefits utilities at the expense of consumers is wrong. A host of state and federal  regulatory 
bodies will verify this position. 
* * 
CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION 
The Staff  has made the following recommendations concerning competitive aspects of the 
profession: 
Federal action is needed to relieve excessive concentration in the supply of 
auditing and accounting services. (Recommendation 12) 
Competition among accounting firms should be increased as to the auditor 
selection process, e.g., there should be (1) mandatory rotation of auditors 
after a certain number of years or upon a finding of non-independent action; 
or (2) placement of more than one firm on the ballot at annual meetings of 
stockholders. (Recommendation 4) 
It is our view that both of these recommendations are based upon invalid premises and 
accordingly are inappropriate. Specifically, we perceive that (1) present concentration in the 
large firms is not excessive but rather is essential to the proper rendition of accounting and 
auditing services in the public interest, and (2) open competition among the accounting firms 
not only exists but has indeed become very intense. 
Development of Existing Concentration 
The configuration of firms and individual practitioners comprising the public accounting 
profession today is radically changed from that which existed at the end of World War II. 
Although most of the major firms existed then, their geographic coverage, both internationally 
and domestically, and their divergence in relative size were substantially less than at the 
present time. The profession consisted of more equally-sized firms that often operated out of a 
single location or on a regional basis, since the major U.S. corporations of that era typically 
were involved in a single industry at a limited number of domestic locations. Since commercial 
air travel was in its infancy, wbrk away from office  locations was often handled by correspon-
dent firms. Regulatory requirements were much less complex at that time, as well. 
During the fifties  and sixties business became increasingly complex as the drive for 
corporate growth gave rise to mergers that took major companies into multiple industries and 
multiple operating locations. These new locations were frequently in foreign countries, each 
with its own set of regulatory requirements and tax laws. 
Accounting problems became correspondingly complicated, as did state, federal  and 
international laws respecting such matters as income taxes and securities transactions. As these 
developments occurred, auditing firms were required either to expand their operating locations 
and professional capabilities both nationally and internationally or face the prospect of losing 
their clients to firms better postured to provide the necessary services. Accordingly, firms 
responded by forming offices  in more and more cities, often accomplishing this through 
mergers with local and regional accounting firms. In addition, they began to invest substantially 
in recruiting, training, technical resources, and quality control procedures. The process of 
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responding to needs imposed by corporate growth and increased technical complexity has 
continued throughout this entire era, resulting in a number of firms of international dimension, 
with large staffs  providing expertise in a great variety of specialized fields. 
Existing Concentration in the Public Interest 
Only a major multinational accounting firm can maintain the number of world-wide locations 
required to audit large complex businesses effectively  and on a timely basis, and avoid the 
problems of control and the waste of duplicatory effort  which would inevitably be involved if 
several small firms attempted to service an engagement jointly. Only the combined talents 
found in a large firm can supply the varied expertise which would simultaneously be needed on 
a very large audit to cover such matters as special industry accounting, tax and regulatory 
matters, pension and profit  sharing plans, state, local and international tax rules, safety and 
health regulations, and currency exchange rules. Only such a firm can stay abreast of the 
totalIity of an increasingly complicated set of generally accepted accounting principles, since 
many are applicable only to major corporate entities. 
Specialists in the large firms are often the same professionals who also do much of the 
research on present and prospective accounting or auditing issues necessary to move the 
profession forward  into the future. Normally this same research is shared with smaller prac-
titioners through the larger firms'  participation in AICPA activities in the form of the develop-
ment and distribution of technical materials, teaching in training programs, and service on 
AICPA committees. Such individuals in large firms also share their expertise with the profession 
at large through the publication of books and articles, as well as by giving speeches and 
participating in seminars on industry and professional matters. The same large firms are also 
better able to provide the financial resources which must constantly be reinvested in programs 
necessary to assure that their professionals are properly trained and that quality work is 
performed. 
In addition, size is important for independence reasons. It is clear that where one or two 
major clients represent a significant portion of a firm's fees, the firm will have greater difficulty 
maintaining its independence, given technical disagreements. That problem can only be cured 
through the existence of firms of sufficient  size to serve a number of large corporations 
simultaneously. As a matter of fact, effective  independent audits of sizeable companies are still 
available to its public shareholders only in those countries where large public accounting firms 
practice. Recognizing this, governments of several major countries where firms of substantial 
size have not historically operated have recently openly encouraged their formation. In other 
words, those countries have recognized that the lack of availability of adequate and indepen-
dent auditing capability is clearly not in the public interest. 
Development of Competition Among Accounting Firms 
The need to maintain multiple office  locations, a variety of specialists, extensive training 
programs, quality control systems, and other forms of fixed costs necessary to properly audit the 
major corporations in turn began to create pressures for added fee volume to cover those 
overhead costs. During the late fifties  and sixties most of the firms were able to obtain this 
added volume in a variety of ways, since that was an era of unparalleled economic growth. The 
stock market was in its "high flying, go-go" years. New companies and conglomerates were 
forming at unprecedented rates, resulting in the need for a record number of SEC registrations. 
Much of this work went to the Big 8 firms because underwriters demanded that audit opinions 
come from firms with requisite experience. 
It was also a period of substantially increased needs from several industries because of new 
regulatory requirements and demands of improved financial disclosure. These changes were 
particularly noticeable in the commercial banking, life insurance, and savings and loan 
industries, as well as in the health care industry where, with the advent of Medicaid and 
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Medicare, hospitals started requiring a totally new level of services from the accounting 
profession. 
In government, other new programs such as the war on organized crime, welfare aid to 
mothers with dependent children, and low-income housing were created; old programs grew 
larger as the federal  government became more involved in trying to solve the nation's social 
problems. Each of these efforts  also created new requirements for accounting and auditing 
services. 
During the late sixties and the early seventies, however, circumstances changed. The 
economy began to experience difficulties  in sustaining its growth pattern as inflation and 
recession simultaneously developed. The stock market began to reflect extreme investor 
uncertainty, with the result that requirements for assistance in filing SEC registration statements 
fell to levels considerably below earlier periods. In addition, only a few new government 
programs such as Economic Stabilization and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
have created new service opportunities for the profession. In general, the period has been one 
in which the market for new services has become relatively inelastic. At the same time the 
requirements necessary to perform proper audits of companies have continued to escalate, 
increasing the overhead costs of the firms and requiring continued growth to support those 
costs. 
This phenomenon has resulted in greater competition among the Big 8 firms for added 
volume. Since new areas for expansion are now relatively limited, it has meant that heavier 
competitive pressures have been placed on existing auditor relationships. We believe this 
competitive pressure is in the public interest. Others are concerned that perhaps it has gone too 
far.  Tentative conclusions of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities state: "It is not lack 
of competition, however, but possible excessive competition that appears to present a problem 
to the accounting profession today."8 
This competition has given rise to business development and client service programs 
within most of the major firms, designed both to obtain new clients and better serve existing 
clients. Today it is common for companies that are seeking to change auditors to discuss this 
matter with more than one firm and ask for competitive proposals before making a decision. 
Except in those states where precluded by statute, the proposal is normally required to include 
a fee estimate, which encourages competitive pricing. Although the potential client normally 
considers price important, we find that other factors such as the general reputation of the firm, 
qualifications of the professionals to be assigned to the account, understanding of the industry 
in which the company operates, and unique approaches to performing  a quality examination 
on a timely basis are usually the more important factors upon which the selection is made. 
Contrary to stated claims, such competition has not had a uniformly negative effect  on the 
non-Big 8 firms. It is true that over the years the smaller firms have tended to be replaced on 
their larger multinational accounts by the Big 8 firms but only because those firms have 
generally been unable to provide a world-wide service capability economically. A continua-
tion of such firms' attempts to audit a company which they are not postured to serve would not 
be in the public interest. 
A close scrutiny of changes in auditors for SEC-registered companies during the past few 
years indicates that, except for the larger, more complex multinational companies, non-Big 8 
firms have realized net increases in clients. For example, during the period from 1973 to 1976, 
there were 1,379 completed changes in audit relationships for SEC-registered companies with 
sales volumes of $25 million or less. The net effect  of these changes was that the Big 8 firms as a 
group lost 132 clients to non-Big 8 firms — hardly a situation that would occur if the smaller 
firms were not able to compete effectively  in an overall sense. 
Another concern sometimes raised is that Big 8 concentration has in fact limited new 
competition. The successful rise of Touche Ross to a position within the Big 8, following its 
formation since World War II, is the best proof we can offer  to dispel this concern. We believe 
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that firms are not limited by their ability to expand geographically or to enter new technical 
fields except to the extent they are unwilling to invest in additional personnel who possess the 
requisite personal characteristics and technical expertise to provide high quality professional 
services. Such investments are relatively small compared to industries, such as petrochemicals 
or steel, where significant outlays for plant and equipment would be required. The building of 
many new important segments of our practice, including agribusiness, construction, and health 
care, were started through making these long-range investments. Such expertise and part of our 
client base were often initially acquired through merger, as well as by bringing other individu-
als with specialized knowledge directly into the firm. 
In our opinion, concentration has not lessened competition but, in fact, the need for 
individual firms to grow has been the very thing that has fostered competition. Although 
competition is intense today, we believe it to be healthy and reflective of the free marketplace 
which has been the foundation of this country's economic growth. Contrary to often-stated 
claims, we do not believe it has caused the demise of the non-Big 8 firms, as they compete very 
creditably in the segment of the market they are best equipped to serve. And, finally, concentra-
tion has not limited new competition, to which the vigorous growth of our own firm will clearly 
testify. 
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EXCERPTS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 11. REGULATING 
THE PROFESSION TO MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF AUDIT PRACTICE 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY THE 15 LARGEST FIRMS 
The Study recommends that the 1 5 largest accounting firms be required to report annually on 
basic operational and financial data and on various internal programs and activities, on the 
grounds that the public needs such information to evaluate the performance  of important 
responsibilities under the federal  securities laws. (Recommendation 9) 
Touche Ross Annual Report 
Through the publication over the last three years of our annual Report  on Progress  and 
Perspectives,  Touche Ross has met many of the concerns raised by the Staff.  We have provided 
a significant amount of operating data in these reports, including revenues, partners' contri-
buted capital and retained earnings, mix of services, and number of partners and staff.  In 
addition, descriptions of our program designed to assure the quality of our sevices, programs for 
the development of our professionals,  and our research and public service activities have been 
included. In this way, we believe we have been responsive to the Staff's  concerns about the 
public's right to know how Touche Ross is reacting to its responsibilities in the performance  of 
services and in our relationships to clients and the investing community. 
Generally stated, our position is that we should be completely responsive to real and 
appropriate public concerns about our firm. Where we believe there is not a demonstrated 
problem or sufficient  concern to justify the disclosure of specific data, we consider the possible 
harmful effects  to the partnership and its partners which could arise from public reporting. In 
other words, we believe we should publish financial and operating data and descriptions of 
various activities when we believe there is a demonstrated public purpose served by disclosure; 
when it cannot be clearly shown that disclosure of other data is in the public interest, we 
believe fundamental privacy principles should prevail.24 
Appropriate Public Requirements 
The Staff  identifies a number of specific categories of data which it perceives the public 
requires. Touche Ross believes that most of these are appropriate requests, and responds as 
follows to the individual items: 
• Size data (revenues, number of partners and staff),  to meet a concern for a potential 
concentration problem. 
Although we disagree with the premise that a concentration problem exists, 
we do publish (as previously stated) such data in our annual report. 
• Listing of clients, necessary to reveal unreasonable industry representation or exces-
sive dependence on a few clients or on an industry. 
This information is already available as to public companies through various 
sources,25 and we believe need not also be reported by individual firms. 
• Data concerning general scope of service, to reveal unwarranted scope or too much 
concentration (similar to product line reporting requirements). 
We do not object to making this information available and in fact publish 
data about our functional mix of services in our annual report. 
• Types of service provided to, and fees received from, government agencies, to 
provide data on involvement in governmental activities. 
This information can be furnished; we do not object to providing such 
information, within the limits of professional confidentiality restraints. 
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• Financial strength data (with particular reference  to a balance sheet), to provide a 
basis for assessing stability and to answer to legal judgments. 
Our firm has disclosed various facts about our financial stability in our 
annual report. In addition we annually provide balance sheets to banks from 
which we have lines of credit. 
• Information concerning certain other activities, including quality assurance pro-
grams, research activities, training and staff  development programs, and public 
interest activities. 
Descriptions and relevant quantifiable data can provide meaningful infor-
mation to the public and we have accordingly described many of our 
programs in our annual report. Also, the AICPA peer review program, to 
which we are a party, is structured to review and evaluate many of these 
activities on behalf of the public. 
Full Financial Statements & Earnings of Individual Partners 
On the other hand, we do not support the Staffs  recommendation that the large firms be 
required to issue to the public full financial statements and earnings of individual partners. The 
large accounting firms are all partnerships, are not publicly-owned, and are not open to public 
ownership. Accordingly, financial disclosure need be made only to partners and not to 
unknown potential public investors. 
In addition, the staff  has not demonstrated relevance to the public need of full financial 
statement disclosures by the major firms or the beneficial purposes for which such information 
would be used. Until a significant need to know can be demonstrated, privacy principles 
should govern, since Congressional and regulatory traditions and precedents would ordinarily 
not require public disclosure of full financial statements of non-publicly-owned organizations. 
Many, if not all, of the reasons for disclosure of information set forth by the Staff  can be readily 
met through alternative limited means of disclosure specifically responsive to the need-to-know 
reason, as discussed previously. 
Not only has the public need for general financial disclosure not been established, we 
believe that the publication of financial information relating to size, profits,  rate of growth, rate 
of profitability,  and rate of growth of profitability would result in performance  pressures which 
would work to the public detriment. Such pressures could lead to: 
• Short-cutting the scope of audits, resulting in performance  deficiencies; 
• Undesirable broadening of range of services; 
• Less time and money spent on quality control programs, research, and training; and 
• Increased concentration in the largest, most profitable firms as prospective clients use 
such financial information in selecting auditors (the ability of small firms to compete 
might be significantly impacted). 
As to individual partner earnings, the Staff  has not shown why disclosure of such data is 
relevant to the issues raised in the Study. It is difficult  to understand the Staff's  described need 
for partner compensation data in assessing a firm's performance,  independence or influence on 
the establishment of accounting principles. Particularly, when dealing with individual partner 
earnings, public disclosure is a very serious invasion of privacy and, absent compelling reasons 
for disclosure, privacy principles should govern. 
Experimentation with Voluntary Disclosure 
In considering the issue of financial disclosure by accounting firms, the preliminary report of 
the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities encourages experimentation with reporting on a 
voluntary  basis, but without suggesting the precise nature of the data to be disclosed or the 
format of presentation. The report states: 
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"Our encouragement of experimentation with public disclosure is not  a 
call for  required  reporting. Accounting firms are privately owned organiza-
tions. While there is interest in and possible benefit from information 
published by public accounting firms, there appears to be no overriding 
public need for it. Only when the public interest clearly mandates disclo-
sure of information by privately owned businesses should public disclo-
sure of their internal affairs  be required. If public accounting firms foresee 
sufficient  benefits to themselves, to the profession, and to the public, they 
should voluntarily expand their disclosures."26 
We support the Commission's position and believe that disclosures made in our firm's 
annual report comply with its recommendations. 
* * * 
DISCIPLINE OF THE PROFESSION 
Following are specific recommendations contained in the Staff  Study: 
The SEC should treat all independent auditors equally in disciplinary enforcement 
proceedings under the Federal Securities Acts. (Recommendation 14) 
Congress should amend the Federal Securities Acts to enable damaged individuals to 
sue independent auditors for mere negligence. (Recommendation 3) 
The federal  government should not establish any "accountant-client privilege " or 
provisions which would limit the liability of independent auditors. (Recommenda-
tion 3) 
The basic question raised by these recommendations is whether or not significant auditing 
failures have resulted from any deficiencies in the existing regulatory and self-disciplining 
procedures affecting  the accounting profession. We believe it is necessary to examine this 
question in a broad context in order to reach meaningful conclusions. 
Background of Procedures 
The regulatory and self-disciplining procedures which concern the accounting profession are a 
complex pattern of interrelated factors, as the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities has 
described: 
"The system of regulation of the public accounting profession includes four elements: 
• Establishing high standards of skill and competence for both entering the profes-
sion and continuing the right to. practice. 
• Developing and promulgating technical and ethical standards that serve both as 
performance  goals and as a means of measuring departures. 
• Designing and implementing quality control policies and procedures to monitor 
and encourage compliance with technical and ethical standards. 
• An effective  disciplinary system to impose penalties for performance  or conduct 
that departs from standards established by law, SEC regulation, or the profession. 
The overall effectiveness  of regulation depends on the satisfactory performance  of all 
four elements operating and interacting as a system."9 
The described interrelationship of these elements is a clear indication of the elaborate 
framework  by which the profession attempts to assure high standards of performance. 
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Our present interest is with the fourth factor,  namely, professional discipline. This, in turn, 
involves numerous components for the accountant: 
• Disciplinary activities of the SEC; 
• Disciplinary powers of state boards of accountancy; 
• Ethics enforcement activities of the AICPA; and 
• The threat and incidence of civil and criminal litigation. 
Each one of these components has a substantial impact upon the current accounting scene, and 
has a substantial effect  on each of the other three components. 
Having identified the procedures covered by the general topic of discipline in the account-
ing profession, it is also necessary to give preliminary attention to the concept of "auditing 
failures" on which the Staff  relies in its proposals for change. We have already noted in this 
document that the list of such "failures" is very meager in length and substance, in contrast 
with the thousands of audits performed each year with respect to public companies alone, and 
is related primarily to instances involving management fraud successfully perpetrated for some 
period of time before discovery. 
*  * * 
Specific Disciplinary Systems 
We turn now to an evaluation of the four previously discussed primary sources of disciplinary 
authority within the profession. 
• SEC Enforcement Program 
The SEC has exercised disciplinary authority over the accounting profession under its 
Rule 2(e), which purports to empower the Commission to disqualify, temporarily or 
permanently, an accountant from practicing before it. Related rules define "practice" 
to include the rendering of opinions on financial statements of public companies, 
which is by far the most important phase of most large accounting firms' operations. 
Thus, the authority claimed by the SEC under Rule 2(e) provides, in effect,  ultimate 
control over the right of a large firm and its individual members to engage in their 
professional pursuit. Statistics recently released for the first  time by the SEC indicate 
that since it adopted this rule in the late thirties, approximately 115 professionals (75 
attorneys and 40 accountants) have been the subject of disciplinary proceedings, 
either by negotiated sanctions or adverse determinations by the Commission follow-
ing its investigation. This indicates the Commission has certainly been will ing to 
exercise its Rule 2(e) authority. 
We also note that while the Staff  assumes that the SEC is lax in its discipline of 
the accounting profession, responsible commentators have begun to suggest that the 
SEC is over-zealous in its disciplinary attitudes toward the professionals who practice 
before it. 
In its recommendations, the Study limits its criticism of the SEC's enforcement 
program to the assertion that the SEC deals more harshly with smaller practice units 
than with the large national firms. Since Rule 2(e) proceedings have generally not 
been public (except as to announced results when adverse to the professional),  it is 
difficult  for an outsider to evaluate that statement. 
It is significant, however, that the SEC has consistently declared that its enforce-
ment philosophy is designed to stimulate training standards and quality control 
procedures that will effectively  protect the public. The SEC has also stated that, 
generally speaking, the large practice units have highly developed training and 
quality control procedures which obviate the need for SEC intervention, while the 
smaller units are sometimes found lacking in ways that require mandatory improve-
ments following disciplinary proceedings. As a result, it seems appropriate to find 
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that the sanctions imposed by the SEC often apply firm-wide to smaller units to 
stimulate necessary improvements, while adverse findings against the large firms 
follow from individual or isolated departures from existing firm standards which 
warrant less generalized sanctions. The SEC has also indicated that in problems 
involving smaller units, all partners may be found to have shared responsibility with 
respect to a single audit engagement, thus requiring a sweeping disciplinary action. 
However, in the case of larger firms, the mass of partners who would be innocent of 
any wrong-doing or even involvement in a challenged audit could not fairly be 
curtailed of their professional rights to practice. 
• AICPA Ethics Enforcement Procedures 
The Study effectively  summarized the ethics enforcement activities of the AICPA, as 
coordinated with the 39 state CPA societies which participate in the Joint Enforce-
ment Plan previously described.* The Study also correctly notes that AICPA or state 
society authority is limited to determination of membership in the relevant organiza-
tion. While this sanction would not preclude an individual from practicing public 
accountancy, the public notice of a membership termination is rightly feared as a 
major impediment in a professional career. 
Although statistics regarding the overall disciplinary activity of the AICPA and 
the state societies have not been available prior to 1970, it is clear that numerous 
CPAs are under investigation at any given time. While many proceedings are con-
cluded with formal reprimands and censures rather than terminations of member-
ship, those findings are of substantial concern to the individuals involved and 
constitute part of their permanent professional records. The profession clearly re-
spects the career damage that can result from these adverse findings and considers 
the AICPA and state society programs to be a significant disciplinary threat. 
It is equally important to note the interrelationship between these disciplinary 
proceedings and related undertakings by the SEC, by state boards, and civil litigants. 
The AICPA program is the only one of these four disciplinary activities that has 
recognized pendancy of other proceedings as a proper basis for deferring  immediate 
activity of its own. The AICPA has concluded, and we strongly concur, that multiple 
attacks upon the same professional engagement can distort, rather than produce, 
meaningful results. The possibility that an accountant's response in one forum of 
investigation could cause unpredictable consequence in the proceedings affecting 
* That  description  is as follows: 
Since August 1, 1975, a Joint Enforcement Plan between the AICPA and state 
CPA societies has been in effect  for enforcing the Professional Code of Ethics, 
including the rule on independence. To date, 39 states have joined the plan, and five 
are in the process of doing so. Enforcement actions under the Joint Plan are taken in 
both the AICPA and state society's names, and the results can affect  an accountant's 
membership in both organizations. Punishment can range from a private letter of 
criticism to public censure and expulsion from membership in both organizations, 
with publication of the matter being made to the 130,000 members of the AICPA and 
the membership of the applicable state society. Letters of criticism and certain other 
forms of censure may be issued by the AICPA or state society ethics committees, but 
suspension or expulsion requires a formal Trial Board hearing similar in many ways 
to a court proceeding. In any event, any of these steps taken publicly can be very 
damaging to the reputation of the offending  CPA. 
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the same auditing services naturally tends to hinder our ability to deal candidly and 
effectively  with legitimate authority. Accordingly, we are reluctant to participate in 
investigations by the AICPA which would have the effect  of making experts of other 
professionals who might then be subpoenaed by plaintiffs  in civil cases or by the SEC 
in related proceedings. 
• State Boards of Accountancy 
The traditional source of ultimate disciplinary responsibility for the accounting 
profession has been the various state boards of accountancy. Each of the fifty  states 
has such a board which is charged with the responsibility for licensing and disciplin-
ing accountants practicing in that jurisdiction. This authority historically preceded all 
of the other systems discussed in this section and has the clearest constitutional and 
statutory legitimacy. 
It is also clear that state boards of accountancy have not been highly active in 
applying those powers, although a growing level of activity is visible in recent years, 
including in a number of states the development of specialized staffs  charged with 
such disciplinary responsibility. It is also recognized that diffusion  of responsibility 
into fifty  separate administrative units operating under slightly varying statutory 
mandates inevitably produces inconsistent results. However, these observations do 
not necessarily mean that these bodies are an anachronism or incapable of filling a 
valuable role in giving public assurance of quality services by the accounting 
profession. The potential for the more effective  use of these bodies warrants further 
study and consideration. 
• Civil Litigation 
The largest single threat to the health and vitality of accountants and accounting firms 
in today's environment is the spectre of civil litigation. Reasonable estimates suggest 
that many hundreds of such cases are currently pending, some seeking astronomical 
recoveries. It should be no surprise that these cases cover a breadth of criticism 
ranging from sheer opportunism by plaintiffs  and their counsel to legitimate attacks 
upon the quality of professional performance.  Case results cover a similar spectrum 
— from totally successful defenses by accountants, to occasional adverse judgments. 
But as with all kinds of litigation, settlements are the most prevalent form of resolu-
tion. 
No meaningful bona fide data are available with respect to the profession's 
collective experience in the civil court. We can, however, impart some flavor by 
discussing the experiences of Touche Ross in this context. We have been the target of 
dozens of lawsuits in recent years, a level which we deem typical of national 
accounting firms. None of those cases involves any charges of criminal violations. 
Two civil suits have been tried to conclusion before a jury, both resulting in 
judgments wholly exonerating Touche Ross. One case is presently in trial, and others 
are expected to follow in the coming months. We have settled a number of lawsuits 
during the past several years, but our combined contributions to those settlements 
represent less than 1 % of the amounts claimed by the parties who filed suit against 
us. In reviewing this experience to date, we are proud of the firm's ability to justify its 
professional services in the testing ground of civil litigation. 
The litigation horizon is not, however, free from trauma. The possibility of 
massive damage awards by juries composed of lay people who are not fully able to 
comprehend the complex commercial and professional issues involved is a fear that 
will remain with us for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the demands of time and 
expense upon a national firm in dealing with its litigation portfolio are immense, 
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representing a percentage of our annual budget that would prove beyond the means 
of most commercial firms. The ability of the accounting profession to absorb this 
burden is based, in part, upon the availability of insurance protection which in itself 
is merely a financing device to spread costs over a period of time. Unfortunately,  that 
protection is rapidly eroding. 
Commentators have suggested that the volume of litigation is indicative of 
performance  failures by the profession. We disagree. More than anything else, the 
volume of litigation indicates the recognition that accounting firms can represent a 
deep pocket when the principal corporate wrongdoers are insolvent or missing. 
There is also a serious question in a broad social sense whether the measure of 
ultimate recovery to injured plaintiffs  justifies the expenditure of time and effort 
involved in the total litigation effort.  For example, the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities estimates that 75% of the money that changes hands in these civil 
lawsuits is absorbed in litigation costs and attorneys' fees.10 
Some persons have stated that the threat of serious civil litigation serves a useful 
purpose by spurring the accounting profession to accelerate its attention to quality 
control and professional responsibility. However, whatever value these threats may 
have had has passed its optimum point and is now inevitably producing the 
counter-productive effect  of impeding the profession from taking on new and crea-
tive responsibilities in serving the public interests. For this reason we must disagree 
with the Staff  recommendations that the federal  securities laws be amended to 
provide that auditors may be sued for mere negligence and that there should be no 
federally-established accountant-client privilege or limitation on auditor liability. 
These recommendations are based on the premise that exposure of auditors to legal 
liability should be increased. However, the potential for damage claims by public 
investors against auditors is already staggering, and any further  burdens on the 
profession by way of opening additional areas of exposure would be counter-
productive to the pursuit of professional performance,  and would not be in the public 
interest. 
* * * * 
Inspection of the Work of Auditors 
We believe that the Study is correct in perceiving the need for an external inspection program 
of firms engaged in auditing publicly-owned corporations. Such firms constitute a substantial 
factor in the capital market and the public has a right to expect that the quality of their practice 
is subjected to the scrutiny of objective reviewers. 
On the other hand, the profession has already taken steps to develop an effective  inspec-
tion program. The AICPA has established several committees to develop the concept of peer 
review and has expended substantial money and talent in this quest. Two of these committees 
— the Quality Control Review Committee and the Special Committee on Proposed Standards 
for Quality Control Policies and Procedures — are currently active in developing the adminis-
trative structure, the conceptual framework  and specific procedural guidelines for peer review. 
Many task forces have been established to assist the work of the committees in various detailed 
aspects of their work. The AICPA has published a "Voluntary Quality Control Review Program 
for CPA firms," and a guide to implementation of peer review is currently in the final approval 
stages. 
The entire peer review program is scheduled to be operative at an early date, possibly in 
1978. As presently envisioned by the AICPA the program would contemplate that all firms, 
regardless of size, may volunteer for a review by another firm or by a team established either by 
the Quality Control Committee or by a state society. The Quality Review Control Committee 
would supervise the activities of the teams and review the reports on individual inspections. 
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We believe that the ultimate development and implementation of such a program will 
effectively  satisfy the public need, as opposed to the Staffs  recommendation that such a 
function be fulfilled  by the federal  government. Professional auditors can be effectively  re-
viewed only by others currently engaged in public practice, since only they would have 
sufficient  breadth and depth of commercial, economic, and business experience, and the 
exposure to the multifaceted aspects of an accounting firm, to formulate an opinion as to its 
adherence to the standards of the profession. Furthermore, our opinion would not change if a 
review were not in the ordinary course but was ordered as a result of a disciplinary or 
enforcement proceeding required by the SEC, since the necessary expertise would be lacking in 
persons outside the profession, whether they be in government, industry or education. In 
addition, the AICPA has the professional credentials to manage the inspection program and to 
insure that professionals of high calibre and experience would participate. 
Touche Ross has had an internal quality assurance program for many years. This includes a 
"professional standards review" function in each office,  which entails a pre-issuance examina-
tion by a person independent of the engagement as to each audit report to be issued. In 
addition, a "second partner" is assigned to provide a further  review of all major engagements. 
Each office  is examined every year by seasoned partners and managers from other locations, 
with particular reference  to internal quality control procedures and technical performance. 
Such deficiencies as might be noted in these reviews require specific corrective action by the 
office,  and common deficiencies are reported to the firm through our communication system 
and stressed in educational programs. 
In acknowledging the need for an external inspection program, the firm has committed a 
significant amount of time and talent to the AICPA in its current development of the peer review 
program. The firm has also arranged for a peer review of its own U.S. practice, which is being 
performed this spring and summer by another major firm. 
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FOOTNOTES 
7 The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions  (New York, 
1977), pp 45 et seq. 
a Ibid., p. 106. 
24 Privacy Act of 1974 (Title 5, United States Code, Sec. 552a). In the introduction to Sec. 2(a), 
the Congress specifically determined that:.... 
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution of the United States; and 
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems 
maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to 
regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by 
such agencies. 
25 Such as Spencer Phelps Harris, Who  Audits  America;  A Directory  - 8000 Companies  & 800 
Accounting  Firms  (Menlo Park, California, 1976), and Auditor  Extract  Tape,  (Bethesda, 
Maryland: Disclosure, Incorporated, 1976). 
26 Report  of  Tentative  Conclusions,  op. cit., p. 138. 
9 Ibid., p. 135. 
io Ibid., p. 144. 
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